US embassy cable - 05MADRID1324

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SP, Other 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 
MORATINOS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
1. (U) April 2, 2005. 
 
2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S.: 
 
The Deputy Secretary 
Charge Bob Manzanares 
EUR Acting A/S Robert Bradtke 
D Executive Assistant Ross Wilson 
Political Officer Ricardo Zuniga, note taker 
 
Spain: 
 
Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos 
Deputy Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon 
Foreign Minister's Chief of Staff Javier Sancho 
Director General for North America and Europe Josep Pons 
 
3. (C) Summary.  The Deputy Secretary met with Foreign 
Minister Moratinos on April 2 to discuss bilateral relations, 
Middle East issues, President Zapatero's recent visit to 
Venezuela and Colombia, and other issues.  Moratinos 
acknowledged the difficulties in U.S.-Spain relations, but 
said the Zapatero government was committed to building 
stronger ties to the USG and that he looked forward to his 
visit to Washington to meet with the Secretary.  Moratinos 
discussed Spain's contributions in Iraq, but asked for USG 
understanding on the issue of Spanish caveats barring the 
participation of Spanish personnel in NATO operations in 
Iraq.  Moratinos said North Africa was even more important to 
Spain and the EU than the Middle East, pointed to the Western 
Sahara dispute as the key point of conflict in the region, 
and called for the appointment of a high level U.S. figure as 
the UNSYG's personal representative on Western Sahara. 
Moratinos said he was aware of U.S. concerns regarding 
Spain's sale of weapons to Venezuela, but assured the Deputy 
Secretary that Spain would keep pressing Chavez towards 
 
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moderation.  He also defended Spain's Cuba policy and pointed 
to Cuba's release of political prisoner Raul Rivero as a sign 
that Spanish policy was working to create political space for 
the opposition. 
 
4. (C) The Deputy Secretary said the GOS was dealing with 
challenging issues and thanked Moratinos for Spain's 
leadership of a PRT in western Afghanistan and welcomed the 
upcoming visits of the Spanish Interior and Justice ministers 
to strengthen bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. 
Moratinos welcomed the USG's leadership on the Middle East 
Peace Process and offered his knowledge of the region and the 
key players should the USG find it useful.  The Deputy 
Secretary urged the GOS to assist both Israel and the 
 
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Palestinian Authority, since both parties had taken great 
risks to move the discussions forward.  He said the arms 
sales to Venezuela were a setback, urged Spain to use 
whatever influence it had with Chavez to encourage good 
behavior, and questioned whether Spain's policy on Cuba was 
actually creating political space or simply strengthening 
Castro.  End Summary. 
 
5. (C) Moratinos declared the Zapatero government's 
commitment to building a good bilateral relationship.  He 
cited President Bush's February visit to Europe and his 
speech in Brussels as reconfirming the key role of the U.S. 
in the international community and clear signals that the 
U.S. wanted to work closely with Europe.  Moratinos said 
Spain played an important role in the EU and hoped to use the 
commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the New 
Transatlantic Agenda to highlight strong U.S.-EU ties. 
 
======================== 
U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS 
======================== 
 
6. (C) Moratinos said he looked forward to his mid-April 
visit to Washington, the first of several Spanish ministerial 
visits intended to help reinvigorate the bilateral 
relationship, including the visits of the Interior and 
Justice ministers to discuss counterterrorism cooperation. 
Moratinos said it was important, especially for Spain, that 
his visit to Washington convey the sense that U.S.-Spanish 
relations are moving in the right direction.  "We can't 
fabricate a honeymoon, but we must show that there are areas 
where we can work together."  He said Minister of Defense 
Jose Bono had enjoyed a productive meeting with Secretary 
Rumsfeld on the margins of the Nice ministerial and 
anticipated a useful exchange during his early May visit to 
Washington.  Moratinos observed that several military 
contracts involving U.S. companies were in play. 
 
7. (C) Moratinos recognized the difficulties in bilateral 
relations over the last year, but asserted that Zapatero's 
Socialist government was in a better position to argue for 
strong relations with the USG because the Socialists enjoyed 
greater credibility with traditionally anti-American elements 
in Spanish society and could bring them along.  He suggested 
that the absence of close cultural ties between Spain and the 
U.S. was a factor in the Spanish public's skepticism towards 
the U.S. and urged increased attention by both countries to 
cultural exchanges.  On economic issues, Moratinos said U.S. 
and Spanish officials had recently worked together to resolve 
a trade dispute involving rice and an illegal sale to Iran by 
a Spanish company.  He said Spain was worried about declining 
U.S. investment in Spain and hoped to be able to reverse this 
trend. 
 
8. (C) Moratinos praised the visit of President Bush to 
Europe in February, which he said clearly demonstrated the 
USG's willingness to work with the EU as a whole. 
 
9. (C) The Deputy Secretary said he understood that the GOS 
was dealing with challenging issues.  He expressed the USG's 
satisfaction with the good level of counterterrorism 
cooperation between Spain and the USG and said he hoped the 
upcoming visits of the Interior and Justice ministers would 
further strengthen our security relationship.  He thanked 
Spain for its leadership of a PRT in western Afghanistan and 
participation in FSB Herat.  The Deputy Secretary noted that 
Afghanistan would require further assistance as the September 
parliamentary elections approached. 
 
============================= 
BROADER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES 
============================= 
 
10. (C) Moratinos said Spain understands that the Broader 
Middle East is a top U.S. priority, driven in part by the 
terrible losses suffered on September 11.  He said that at 
the "macro level," Spain shared the USG's concern with the 
lack of modernity in the region and wanted to promote 
positive patterns of behavior.  Moratinos noted Spain's close 
historical bonds with the Arab world and said Spain was 
willing to use its good offices and play a helpful role.  He 
saluted the success of the Forum for the Future, which he 
compared to the EU's Barcelona Process, and pointed to the 
June 8-9 Cordoba Conference on Anti-Semitism as a 
demonstration of Spain's activism on key regional issues. 
(NOTE: Later in the conversation, Moratinos indicated Spain 
planned to invite the Secretary to attend.  END NOTE.) 
 
11. (C) Moratinos emphasized that Spain and the EU also want 
to promote our shared interests on reform and security 
issues.  He said Spain had "tried to help on reform, but was 
not invited to do so" (evidently referring to the Forum for 
the Future).  Moratinos said Spain remained willing to engage 
on promoting reforms and discussed the possibility of 
inviting the Secretary to the November 29 commemoration of 
the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, a suggestion 
Spain has not yet floated with other EU organizers of the 
event. 
 
12. (C) On Iraq, Moratinos said Spain was at a new stage. 
Spain contributed USDOLS 20 million to the UNDP election fund 
and would provide training in Spain for Iraqi security 
forces.  He requested that the USG understand Spain's 
political context with respect to the NATO caveats and 
insisted that Spain could contribute significantly on Iraq 
without having troops on the ground.  He asked that the USG 
not place Spain in the position of having to invoke caveats 
to keep its forces out of Iraq.  Moratinos noted the lengthy 
post-election organization of the Iraqi government and said 
Spain is just awaiting the formation of that government 
before naming an ambassador to Baghdad. 
13. (C) Moratinos expressed his conviction that there exists 
a great opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute.  He said the USG could count on 
Spain's support within the EU on this issue, on which the 
U.S. should play the leading role.  He noted his long 
personal involvement in the region and offered his services 
as an interlocutor should the USG ever feel it might be 
useful. 
 
14. (C) Moratinos said the Maghreb was far more important for 
the EU and for Spain than the Middle East.  He pointed out 
that most of the suspects in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train 
bombings were North Africans, just one indicator of the many 
problems North Africa posed for the EU.  Moratinos said the 
Western Sahara issue remained at the core of the 
Moroccan-Algerian dispute.  He discussed the Zapatero 
government's efforts to reduce tensions between Algiers and 
Rabat.  Moratinos said that for the first time there was a 
confluence of USG, French, and Spanish views on Western 
Sahara and that the moment was right for UNSYG to name an 
important U.S. figure to press the parties towards a 
comprehensive solution. 
 
15. (C) Deputy FM Leon highlighted Spain's "Alliance of 
Civilizations" proposal, on which Spain and UNSYG Annan were 
collaborating.  Moratinos and Leon asked whether it would be 
possible to get a high-level U.S. person to participate in 
the high-level dialogue.  The Deputy Secretary responded that 
the USG had some concerns regarding the language of the 
Alliance of Civilizations plan, which seemed to overlap with 
other ongoing efforts to foster understanding and deepen ties 
between the Islamic world and the West and cornered Israel. 
 
16. (C) On Iraq, the Deputy Secretary expressed the USG's 
disappointment on Spain's continued placement of caveats on 
Spanish NATO forces and said he hoped that might change once 
the new Iraqi government was in place.  He described the 
dynamics at work now in its formation.  The Deputy Secretary 
said the international community would have to provide strong 
support for the new Iraqi government once it is formed, 
including on economic/social issues that will be important to 
defeat the insurgency there.  He noted that the USG had 
floated the possibility of a U.S.-EU conference to bolster 
support for the Iraqi government. 
 
17. (C) The Deputy Secretary said the USG wanted to use 
Moratinos' experience to move forward on the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  He said Abas had won 
legitimacy through his election as leader of the 
Palestinians, but did not yet wield full authority.  The 
Deputy Secretary emphasized that PM Sharon had taken on 
tremendous political risks in order to keep the talks moving 
ahead and urged Spain to show as much sensitivity as possible 
to the Israeli side so that it would not feel cornered.  He 
said both leaders needed the international community's 
support during this critical period.  The Deputy Secretary 
noted Spain's support for the full withdrawal of Syrian 
forces from Lebanon.  He said he shared FM Moratinos' views 
on North Africa and on the prospects for gaining some 
positive momentum on Moroccan-Algerian relations. 
 
====================== 
LATIN AMERICA 
====================== 
 
18. (C) Moratinos assured the Deputy Secretary that Spain 
wanted to work closely and transparently with the USG on 
Latin America.  He said Spain has an important role to play 
in the region, but understands it can't do it alone. 
Moratinos described Cuba and Venezuela as the region's "black 
holes" and said that discussions would reveal that USG and 
Spanish views were not far apart on either country. 
 
19. (C) Moratinos said he understood that Spain's weapons 
sale to Venezuela had produced a disturbance in the U.S., but 
said Spain was satisfied with the outcome of President 
Zapatero's visit to Caracas and Bogota.  He said the GOS 
believed it would lead to positive outcomes for President 
Uribe and for U.S.-Venezuelan relations.  Moratinos ventured 
that closer Spanish ties with Venezuela would act as a brake 
on Chavez' behavior and meddling in the affairs of others. 
He said Presidents Zapatero, Lula, and Uribe had concluded 
that there was a chance for responsible countries to exercise 
influence over Chavez. 
 
20. (C) On Cuba, Moratinos said the Zapatero government 
understood that it could not change Castro's behavior and 
merely wanted to create more political space for the 
opposition.  He said the USG and Spain would have to agree to 
disagree on each others tactics.  Whereas the USG sticks to 
hard-line measures such as the embargo, Spain prefers 
dialogue.  It prefers to have the opposition on the street 
and in a position to organize itself rather than in jail. 
Moratinos noted that Spain had not worked to soften the EU's 
Common Position on Cuba, just to stop inviting dissidents to 
national day celebrations in favor of a "structured EU 
dialogue with the opposition."  He insisted that if Spain 
grew to believe that its approach was not succeeding, it 
could adopt tougher positions.  Moratinos underlined Spain's 
decision to co-sponsor the Cuba CHR resolution as evidence of 
its commitment to human rights and asserted that the Cuban 
government's release of political prisoner Raul Rivero was a 
clear sign that Spain's approach was working. 
 
21. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that actions were important 
and in this context the arms sale to Venezuela was a setback. 
 If Spain could change Chavez' behavior through engagement, 
that would be good, but the problem in our view was that 
engagement also gave the appearance of legitimizing Chavez. 
On Cuba, the question was whether Spain's tactics were 
creating new political space or simply strengthening Castro's 
hold on power. 
 
============== 
KOSOVO 
============== 
 
22. (C) Moratinos touched briefly on the issue of Kosovo 
independence, which he said carried special significance for 
Spain because of Spain's internal regional autonomy concerns. 
 He said the issue would require further discussion between 
Spain and the USG and within the EU.  The Deputy Secretary 
appreciated the insight. 
 
=========================== 
OSLO CONFERENCE ON SUDAN 
=========================== 
 
23. (C) The Deputy Secretary discussed his plans to attend 
the Oslo Conference on Sudan and encouraged Spain, as a NATO 
partner, to engage on this issue.  Moratinos responded that 
he had visited Sudan himself and that Spain would remain 
engaged on Sudan. 
 
 
MANZANARES