US embassy cable - 02ABUJA1597

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 001597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
KAMPALA FOR AID - DAWN LIBERI; RIYADH FOR POL - R. HANKS 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 5/23/12 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, EAID, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A SLIDE IN THE BILATERAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: The return of democratic government in 
Nigeria brought relief and great expectations in both 
Abuja and Washington. Visions of a strategic 
partnership between the world's preeminent republic 
and Africa's largest democracy tantalized policymakers 
in both capitals. Committing to significant diplomatic 
support, two successive Administrations in Washington 
labeled Nigeria one of the continent's two most 
important countries. In addition to rebuffing military 
rule, Abuja pledged allegiance to economic reform, 
promised to create conditions to attract American 
investment and committed itself to vigorous 
cooperation on transnational issues such as drug- 
trafficking and financial crime. Both nations agreed 
to collaborate in promoting regional stability and 
helping to resolve Africa's conflicts. However, after 
three years, the euphoria of 1999 has worn off, with 
an unvarnished realism taking its place. While the 
overall relationship is still very good, differences 
in perception, substance and developments extraneous 
to the bilateral relationship have created frictions 
not there before. 
 
 
2. (C) Summary Continued: Dissatisfied with the pace 
and scope of reform here, Washington seems to see 
Nigeria as a strong regional actor but a weak domestic 
player with a government reticent or unable to face 
responsibility for problems such as communal violence 
that are not easily resolved yet cannot be ignored. 
Nigeria believes the USG expects too much, too fast 
and does not provide the types of assistance that 
would accelerate reform and help rescue Nigeria from 
its current morass. As Nigeria moves into electoral 
gear, bilateral strains will increase. To quiet 
criticism that he has reaped little from courting the 
US, Obasanjo pines for high visibility USG assistance, 
e.g. debt relief. Conversely, Washington has little, 
if any, appetite for special debt treatment for 
Nigeria. Yet, Nigeria is too important to let the 
relationship slide. We need to engage the Nigerians 
even more actively on key bilateral issues to develop 
more realistic expectations on both sides and improve 
mutual understanding by broadening the channels of 
communication. While the relationship probably could 
not and should not return to what it was in 1999, 
active policy dialogue can place the relationship on a 
sustainable, pragmatic keel that recognizes common 
interests as well as manages the differences that may 
divide us. We should engage the British in this 
effort. End summary. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US 
-------------------------- 
 
 
3. (C) Well-wishers on both sides of the Atlantic 
hoped the inauguration of the Obasanjo Government also 
ushered in an era of good feeling in the bilateral 
relationship. Neither government was immune to this 
optimistic view. Up from the nadir of the Abacha days, 
Nigeria was a country of great potential, promise, 
resources and a highly energetic and gifted 
population. No longer bridled by military rule, 
Nigeria could now gallop toward political and, more 
importantly, economic reform, Washington hoped. 
Through the provision of technical assistance we would 
help them see the "way" and thus effectuate reforms we 
wanted them to make.  The subtext of this assumption 
was that the advent of democracy would quickly make 
the Nigerians begin to think and behave like us. 
 
 
4. (C) Nigerians had a different view. They saw the 
return of democracy as the political equivalent of 
sprinkling holy water on the Government of Nigeria. 
Because of their size and rich and expanding resource 
base (oil and gas), they felt that diplomatically 
Nigeria should be among the upper echelon of nations, 
a nation that deserved a "special relationship" with 
the United States. Yet, because of their developmental 
challenges, Nigeria wanted to be the recipient of 
massive doses of tangible assistance. Partly due to a 
prickly national pride, Nigerians believed this 
assistance should be given with few conditions and 
minimal oversight. Psychologically, they were self- 
important to the extent of believing that we needed to 
give them assistance more than they needed to receive 
it. 
 
 
5. (C) We believed the relationship might become 
special if Nigeria achieved significant reforms. 
Nigeria, on the other hand, believed the relationship 
should be inherently special because of its own of 
Nigeria's place in the world and the region, reform or 
lack thereof notwithstanding. These different outlooks 
and mutual misperceptions initially were concealed by 
the celebration that accompanied the return of 
democracy. Over time, however, these differences have 
become more visible as celebration yielded to the 
limitations, constraints and frictions of the daily 
workings of the bilateral relationship. 
 
 
6. (C) We discovered that reform would be slow 
everywhere, and glacial in some areas. This languor 
confirmed that many high-level GON officials were not 
truly committed to reform nor were they governing 
according to our democratic precepts. But how could 
they? Many senior GON officials have spent nearly 30 
years in government service but only seven of those 
years under civilian rule; meaning, they have spent 
nearly a quarter century working and, indeed, 
prospering under different military governments. 
Almost half of all Nigerians never experienced 
democracy before 1999. All Nigerians are more familiar 
with the obtuse workings of military rule than the 
openness of democratic governance. Some key political 
operatives in the Obasanjo Government were one-time 
apologists for military rule. A single round of 
elections was insufficient to change deeply ingrained 
behavior that had been positively reinforced by 
acquisition of wealth and power on the part of these 
officials over the years. 
 
 
7. (C) Nigerians did not get the type of assistance 
they desired or expected. While we moved to provide 
technical and advisory assistance aimed at 
institutional and policy reform, the Nigerians wanted 
tangible "stuff" -- money, equipment and goods and 
services -- not advice and feasibility studies. 
Realizing they were not getting what they wanted, 
those Nigerians who hoped for a "special relationship" 
became disillusioned. This sentiment provided 
ammunition to those who sought a correct but not close 
bilateral relationship. For a variety of reasons 
ranging from the enmity generated during the years of 
military rule to different cultural and global 
perspectives, a vocal, at times, very influential 
minority sought to keep us at arm's length. This group 
internalized our disputes with the former military 
regimes, misconstruing them as signs of inherent USG 
antipathy toward their country. These hard-liners 
wrongly sense ulterior motives in whatever we do. They 
were reactionary and distrustful -- some just did not 
like us. With the visible exception of General Victor 
Malu's public opposition to Operation Focus Relief, 
these die-hards basically receded into the background 
after Obasanjo's inauguration. However, the more other 
Nigerians voiced frustration at the perceived lack of 
tangible aid from the USG, the more the USG-bashers 
gloated -- "We told you so." 
 
 
------------------ 
TIME TO TAKE STOCK 
------------------ 
 
 
8. (C) This has fed into a stream of thought that the 
USG is not forthcoming with aid because it sees 
Nigeria as marginal to its interests and therefore is 
indifferent to Nigeria's plight. In public and private 
statements about NEPAD, Zimbabwe and debt relief, 
Obasanjo discharged several anti-Western shots that he 
would not have sounded before. During a May 18 meeting 
with Ambassador Jeter, a plaintive Obasanjo remarked 
the U.S. "would not be my friend for long" unless it 
does something about debt relief.  Recently, the 
British Deputy High Commission recounted a protracted 
anti-American diatribe he had heard from a highly 
placed official in the Presidency. These anti-American 
outbursts are disconcerting; however, we also imagine 
this scenario has probably been mirrored in Washington 
with an USG official excoriating Nigeria to fellow USG 
officials or diplomats of a friendly country. 
Statements like these, even though not introduced into 
the public domain, foul the air in the absence of 
concrete measures and alternatives to tackle the 
issues underlying the criticisms. 
 
 
9. (C) Gleaned from recent conversations with GON 
officials and other reliable contacts, here are some 
observations and thoughts about the bilateral 
relationship from the Nigerian perspective: 
 
 
-- Overall, Nigerians believe the relationship is 
beginning to slide and the USG is increasingly 
indifferent. "The U.S. does not really care what 
happens here," a Presidential insider told a visiting 
American recently. 
 
 
-- Debt Relief: This is the centerpiece of GON foreign 
policy toward the US and other Western donors, so much 
so that Obasanjo put enormous amounts of his time and 
prestige on the line. However, Obasanjo has not been 
able to deliver and is frustrated that Washington does 
not seem to attach political importance to the issue. 
Nigerians think Washington has treated debt relief 
bureaucratically -- a "technical issue" -- not the 
major issue it is for Obasanjo and his Administration. 
If the Paris Club declares Nigeria in default at its 
June meeting, the malaise felt here will only deepen. 
 
 
-- Obasanjo was incensed when the debt/environment 
swap fell through. First, it was a policy setback. 
Second, he trumpeted our proposal when he returned 
home from Washington only to hear subsequently through 
public channels that the deal had fallen through. " 
You did not even have the courtesy to tell me," he 
lamented. For Obasanjo, this was a significant loss of 
face that mocked his reliance on and belief in the 
United States. 
 
 
--Zimbabwe: This has been highly emotional. Most 
Nigerians, in and out of government, see land 
redistribution as the real basis of the UK's 
opposition to Mugabe. Believing the UK was upset 
because most affected farmers were white, the 
Nigerians viewed UK policy as racially motivated and 
biased. They thought the UK raised the red flag on 
elections not so much out of concern for democracy but 
to indirectly thwart GOZ land redistribution to 
previously dispossessed blacks. The GON also felt the 
USG was too closely aligned with the perceived UK 
attempt to scuttle land ownership by blacks in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
-- Obasanjo bristled at our linkage of support for 
NEPAD to Zimbabwe. He felt we condescendingly tried to 
give him instructions about the mandate of an 
organization he helped to create through consensus 
with other African leaders. 
 
 
-- The GON sees us as a tireless "demandeur"; we are 
constantly presenting demarches and raising issues 
when we want something from them. The UNHRC Cuba 
resolution is a recent case-in-point. After we had 
presented a series of demarches and requests on 
several different topics over the course of a few 
weeks, a senior Presidential Advisor half-jokingly 
began a meeting with the Ambassador stating, "What do 
you want now?" 
 
 
--Military Assistance: Overall, OFR has been 
successful but the failure to carry out OFR-II was a 
disappointment.  While Obasanjo still supports MPRI, 
even he is becoming disillusioned to a degree. Many 
senior military officers resent the program for 
attempting to reshape their military institution and 
its culture without providing concrete assistance in 
the form of equipment or weapons. Some dislike the 
program because contract funds were not being used to 
pay Nigerians but U.S. contractors. Some see the 
program as condescending and a spike at Nigeria's 
national honor. We have even heard complaints about 
Avid Recovery because funding for the RONCO contract 
was not passed through Nigerian hands. 
 
 
-- The GON believes it has made achievements on 
privatization and anti-corruption but feels we have 
underestimated the economic and political constraints 
it faces. 
 
 
10. (C) Some things the GON sees as commendable, we 
see as demerits or flaws. This is particularly true on 
corruption and economic reform, including 
privatization. Despite what the GON professes, there 
have been no major breakthroughs and Nigeria could have 
and should have done more on these and other fronts. 
Additionally, the way business is conducted in Nigeria 
has not changed much with the Obasanjo Administration. 
It still disadvantages U.S. firms trying to enter the 
Nigerian market or obtain government contracts. 
Repeated losses to European, Japanese and Chinese 
concerns on commercial advocacy compound the 
impression that the door is not open to American 
business and that the distance between our two nations 
is growing. Now, elections are imminent and the rigors 
that occasion them promise to place added strain on 
the bilateral relationship. In his quest to show the 
public he can deliver, Obasanjo will more actively 
cadge us for debt relief. Due to his own weaknesses 
with the electorate, Obasanjo may face a formidable 
challenge. The stiffer the competition, the more he 
will be occupied with protecting his political flank. 
He will be less inclined toward reform or responding 
to our requests for GON alignment with us on important 
issues in multilateral fora. Obasanjo knows that many 
positions he has staked out, e.g. supporting USG 
action in Afghanistan, are not popular in the far 
North, the region where opposition to his reelection 
is perhaps the strongest. Consequently, electoral 
considerations also may compel him to distance himself 
from us. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
CONCLUSION, COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
11. (C) Nigeria is too important to let the 
relationship slide. Because it involves so many 
important issues and due to our cultural and historic 
differences, the relationship will not always be 
easily managed. Yet, it can be an effective 
partnership that advances USG interests in Africa and 
beyond. To do this, we need to broaden and formalize 
bilateral dialogue on the most significant issues. 
This will help identify areas of commonality and 
minimize differences. It will foster better 
understanding while diminishing misperceptions. 
Greater senior-level engagement from Washington would 
help. Concrete steps that can be taken are: 
 
 
-- A visit by A/S Kansteiner in September to meet 
President Obasanjo and other key political players. 
 
 
-- After the Kansteiner visit, we should meet 
discreetly in London with the British and perhaps the 
Canadians to discuss Nigeria. We envision two 
meetings: the first a "political meeting" at the A/S 
level to discuss our collective and individual 
interests in Nigeria; the second, a heads of 
assistance agencies (USAID and its equivalents) 
session to discuss and coordinate assistance to 
Nigeria, particularly for elections and poverty 
alleviation. Measures that we are prepared to take in 
the immediate post-elections period to help 
consolidate democracy also should be examined. How 
these meetings might be shaped will be the subject of 
a separate message; at a minimum our participation, in 
addition to State and AID, should include Treasury, 
NSC and representatives from the Embassy.  We 
understand the British would endorse the proposed 
meetings. Still to be decided is whether Canada would 
or should participate. 
 
 
-- The "post-JEPC" mechanism needs to be initiated. 
This has been stalled for months; however, it 
represents a solid opportunity to link discussion on 
economic reform with cooperation on developing 
concrete trade and investment initiatives. Wedding our 
push for reform with the Nigerians' desire for 
concrete results, this mechanism could provide a 
practical demonstration of the benefits of close 
cooperation and reform. The more Nigerians see a 
tangible outcome, the more readily they will listen to 
our mantra of reform. 
 
 
-- High-level discussion on debt relief is needed. 
President Obasanjo plans to visit Washington in mid- 
June for the Sullivan Memorial Dinner and will 
participate at the G-8. We should be prepared to 
respond to his expected entreaties on debt relief 
beyond stating that this is a Paris Club issue. We 
need to provide a blueprint that could lead to an 
eventual package of debt relief. Moreover, we need to 
listen to him and show a willingness to be flexible 
and creative while also linking debt relief to genuine 
reform at home. 
 
 
-- We need to have a formal consultation with the GON 
to broadly discuss foreign policy interests. What are 
the fundamental interests and issues for the United 
States and how do these compare with those of Nigeria? 
Most importantly, how do we reconcile differences 
between the two in order to prevent damage to the 
bilateral relationship?  This should take place after 
the London consultations mentioned above. 
 
 
12.  (C) Post appreciates Washington's quick response 
to the proposals stated in paragraph 11. 
JETER