US embassy cable - 05SINGAPORE1028

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, SN 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: PERSPECTIVE FROM SINGAPORE 
 
REF: STATE 60794 
 
Classified By: Amb. Franklin L. Lavin, Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
1. (S/NF) Singapore has been a reliable and highly capable 
partner in the global war on terrorism, as it shares our 
concerns about terrorism and possesses the political will and 
capabilities to confront it.  Over the last several years, 
Singapore has publicly supported our CT efforts, even 
providing military support for Coalition activities in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Singapore has signed up for a range of 
CT programs here: the Container Security Initiative (CSI), 
DOE's Megaports and the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) and has actively promoted enhanced maritime security in 
the Malacca Strait. 
 
More Good Work Can Be Done 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (S/NF) Despite Singapore's strong record to date, many 
areas of cooperation remain fertile for further development. 
Some suggestions: 
 
A) Singapore is strengthening its non-proliferation trade 
control regime; it wants to learn from us and work with us 
more operationally.  Intelligence exchanges of very sensitive 
CT information have expanded tremendously in the last few 
years and Singapore has proven judiciously protective of 
those confidences.  We need now to consider how to increase 
sharing of intelligence on counter-proliferation to improve 
Singapore's ability to prevent abuse of this huge entrepot 
for shipments of WMD and related items. 
 
B) Singapore has proven a very useful "test bed" for trying 
out new DoD technology and techniques, on a small, 
controllable scale.  We should consider working with 
Singapore to try out more CT tools, including systems of 
interest to DHS (tracking systems for people, goods and 
money, for instance). 
 
C) As part of our Maritime Security Initiative, Singapore 
could prove a useful partner in developing our UAV 
capabilities in the region, and has expressed an interest in 
providing basing support for our Global Hawk.  We expect this 
will have to wait for Global Hawks to be freed up from 
Iraq/Afghanistan duty and for Australia to come on-line 
first.  But, it's something we should start thinking about 
now. 
 
D) Our current law enforcement cooperation is "good" but not 
"excellent."  A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) would 
improve law enforcement cooperation with Singapore, a key 
node for regional law enforcement work.  We should 
re-invigorate our efforts to negotiate an MLAT and consider 
other methods to improve cooperation at the investigation 
stage of criminal cases. 
 
E) We are doing more with Regional Affairs than ever before, 
but we can still do more. 
 
Leveraging This Relationship 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (S/NF) Singapore is frequently a "first adopter" of our CT 
initiatives in the region, with nearby countries tending to 
follow suit.  For example, Singapore has taken the regional 
lead on maritime security issues and others followed -- after 
Singapore and the United States "re-packaged" the initiative. 
 And, after the GOS started to deploy military assets on 
cargo ships to ward off piracy attacks, Malaysia decided to 
do so as well.  We can leverage Singapore's willingness to 
build regional political will to combat terrorism, especially 
when direct USG involvement carries some political baggage. 
Similarly, in some circumstances regional organizations, such 
as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), can help promote our CT 
objectives in a multilateral setting. 
 
Some Structural Weaknesses Remain 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (S/NF) In ramping up our CT relationship with Singapore, 
we need recognize a few factors that may limit the growth or 
direction of the cooperation.  First, a perception of overly 
close U.S.-Singapore cooperation can engender resistance 
among other regional countries.  Second, Singapore's 
government structure makes it hard for them to understand 
open political systems.  Thus, they often don't understand or 
approve of what's happening in, say, Indonesia or Taiwan. 
Third, as a small country in some ways reliant on our mutual 
friendship, they view influencing perceptions within the U.S. 
government as a key element of their national security. This 
occasionally leads them to "over spinning." 
 
Moving the Talking Point Beyond "Counterterrorism" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (S/NF) Finally, we believe we can sometimes better achieve 
our goals by packaging them as part of a broader problem: 
drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and 
piracy, to name a few.  To the extent we can embed our CT 
initiatives in these other issues, we are likely to meet with 
greater support in the region. 
LAVIN