US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV2098

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002098 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KWBG, OREP, PGOV, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GOI EXTERNAL 
SUBJECT: "REALITY BITES" ABBAS, BRIG. GEN. KUPPERWASSER 
TELLS CODEL SAXTON 
 
Classified By: Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In a meeting on March 31, Brigadier General 
Yossi Kupperwasser described for CODEL Saxton the changing 
mission of Israeli intelligence-gathering and presented his 
analysis of the current developments in the Palestinian 
Authority.  Kupperwasser also discussed the battle for hearts 
and minds in the Middle East; the differing attitudes toward 
democratization in the Middle East; the "unconventional" 
terrorist war; and his predictions for post-disengagement. 
The delegation, consisting of Representatives James Saxton 
and Geoffrey Davis, and staff aide Thomas Hawley were 
accompanied by Army Attache and emboff note taker. End 
Summary. 
 
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A New Mission for Intelligence 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Kupperwasser said that, today, the most important task 
of intelligence gatherers is to "imitate" the reality on the 
ground.  In the past, he said, intelligence consumers saw the 
mission of intelligence as answering questions or thinking 
like the "other side."  While these tasks are still part of 
the intelligence community's role, the wider mission of 
intelligence is now to use its ability to assist consumers in 
conceptualizing the reality they live in.  Once you can 
conceptualize, Kupperwasser said, you can be relevant. 
 
3. (C) Kupperwasser also said that there are no longer simple 
consumers of intelligence.  Intelligence gathering is now 
conducted with the aid of its former consumers, who are now 
working in think tanks and as decision-makers.  These 
disparate entities now cooperate, not in order to think 
alike, but to think together. 
 
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Hearts and Minds in the Middle East 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) According to Kupperwasser, this "revolution" in how 
intelligence is used to conceptualize reality is especially 
visible in current analysis of the Middle East.  Americans 
are only now coming to the same conclusions regarding the 
root of the Middle East conflict that Israel reached long 
ago, i.e., that the real battle in the Middle East is not 
between those who want to co-exist with, and those who want 
to confront, Israel, but it is instead within the Arab world 
itself.  Kupperwasser said one group of Arabs, the "hearts," 
is searching to regain lost pride through sacrifice, to the 
point of suicidal terrorism against those perceived to have 
wounded their pride.  The other group, which Kupperwasser 
termed the "minds," believes that the root of the problems in 
the Arab world lies within the Arab world itself. 
Kupperwasser quoted King Abdullah of Jordan as saying that 
the Arab world must "take a long look in the mirror" to find 
the cause of these problems, and Kupperwasser stated that the 
remedy is to change the political culture in Arab countries. 
 
5. (C) The battle is thus not between the United States and 
radical elements, but among Middle Easterners.  In 
Kupperwasser's view, the U.S. and Israel are not the center 
of this battle, though they are participants.  It is a battle 
not of territory, but of concepts, and the most important 
weapon in this battle is the ability to control the 
conceptualization of the situation.  Kupperwasser claimed 
that regimes such as those of Nasser in Egypt and the Ba'ath 
movements in Syria and Iraq once controlled conceptualization 
in the Arab world, but they have lost their power develop to 
new ideas.  The new ideas now come from radicals through mass 
media outlets such as Al Jazeera that promote the idea that 
the Arab world is under attack and that Arabs must kick out 
the West. 
 
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Democratization in the Middle East 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Despite messages against the West, Kupperwasser 
conceded, the world, including the Arab world, still views 
the United States as a symbol of democracy and freedom and as 
relevant in the battle among Middle Easterners.  Three 
attitudes toward growing democratization exist in the region, 
he said.  The first is from those who support democracy and 
its spread.  The second is the attitude of Iran, Hizballah, 
and Osama bin Laden who, Kupperwasser said, cannot agree with 
the principles of democracy and freedom lest they lose their 
identities.  Accordingly, they have chosen to fight against 
democratization.  The third attitude comes from those who are 
too weak to move forward with democratization, such as Syria 
and Hamas.  In Kupperwasser's view, Syria and Hamas are 
moving in the right direction, though without changing their 
ideologies.  He referred to Syria as "the weakest link," and 
not on the side of real radicals but rather adhering to a 
"radicalism of convenience," not ideology. 
------------------------------ 
Fighting an Unconventional War 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Kupperwasser discussed with the CoDel how Israel has 
been successful in fighting Palestinian terror.  The first 
step in fighting terror, he said, had been the immediate 
understanding that the second Intifada would be both the last 
war and a long war.  He also contended that the endurance of 
society in the face of terror was important in winning this 
war. 
 
8. (C) The United States and Israel cannot fight terror 
simply by killing all the terrorists, Kupperwasser said. 
More relevant is to achieve an understanding of the nature of 
the military struggle.  A terrorist war is an unconventional 
war, Kupperwasser posited, because it is not fought between 
two armies, but rather it is aimed at civilians.  In 
addition, Israel's fight against Palestinian terror is an 
asymmetrical war, not because of Israel's superior military 
capabilities, but because, according to Israeli values, every 
effort must be made to avoid civilian casualties.  According 
to the terrorists' values, however, civilians are the targets 
of choice.  Kupperwasser commented that Israel received 
rebukes from nations and humanitarian organizations regarding 
its treatment of Palestinian civilians, but that the Jewish 
people do not need lectures on what should be the moral 
ground. 
 
9. (C) In the face of this asymmetrical and unconventional 
war, Kupperwasser said, Israel took steps to conventionalize 
the war.  First, it took steps to prevent terrorists from 
reaching civilian centers by building the separation barrier 
between Israel and the West Bank.  Second, Israel 
significantly improved its ability to coordinate real-time 
intelligence and precision guided munitions to create a 
minimum of collateral damage in combating terrorism.  In its 
ability to produce and use intelligence in real time, Israel 
has been able to put terrorists on the run. 
 
10. (C) Kupperwasser emphasized that Palestinian militants 
are not merely keeping quiet.  The attitude of Palestinians 
toward terror has changed.  He contended that 80 percent of 
Palestinians now oppose terror attacks because they realize 
that terror does not promote their interests.  Kupperwasser 
said that he would like to see Palestinians translate this 
new attitude into a new reality, accompanied by deeper 
change, but that it is not happening.  According to 
Kupperwasser, the situation is calming down, but not because 
President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are taking 
steps against terror.  He said that superficial changes such 
as the reduction of incitement and the PA's apparent 
readiness to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks is 
only a "honey trap." 
 
--------------------- 
"Reality Bites" Abbas 
--------------------- 
 
11. (C) This week's incident of Palestinians shooting at 
Abbas's Ramallah headquarters is indicative that Abbas must 
institute real change, Kupperwasser said.  President Abbas 
must take action on the slogans that he has delivered to the 
United States.  According to Kupperwasser, Palestinians see 
Abbas as weak, and Hamas gains from his weakness.  After the 
February bombing of a Tel Aviv night club, for example, Abbas 
not only failed to blame Islamic Jihad for the attack, he 
also tried to place the blame on a third party.  In not 
standing up to terrorist organizations at that time, Abbas 
lost the respect of many more Palestinians.  Kupperwasser 
said that Hamas, still armed, is simply waiting for an 
opportunity to take over politically during the upcoming 
elections.  The next issue Abbas must face is under what 
conditions Hamas will be allowed to participate in these 
elections.  Kupperwasser said he worries that Hamas will gain 
strong victories, and if Abbas does not force them to make 
any compromises, they will maintain the same anti-Israel 
ideology. 
 
12. (C) Abbas continues to make promises to Hamas while, 
along with Islamic Jihad and the radical sector of Fatah, 
Hamas grows stronger militarily and politically.  It is in 
this contradiction between his promises of change and what he 
actually does that "reality bites" Abbas, said Kupperwasser, 
and Abbas will not wake up to this fact until it is too late. 
Kupperwasser predicted that Hamas will act to put conditions 
on Abbas after the conclusion of disengagement. 
 
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Post-Disengagement 
------------------ 
 
13. (C) Kupperwasser remarked that disengagement is a further 
effort to conventionalize the battle, but the question 
remains of what will happen after disengagement.  If a strong 
Hamas emerges from the elections to lead the Palestinians, 
the battle of defining terrorism and deciding whether or not 
terror should be allowed will continue.  Kupperwasser 
described terrorism as the old political culture trying to 
gain power and legitimacy by riding the wave of democracy. 
Abbas knows he must listen to the United States, Kupperwasser 
said, but he must prove himself first.  Abbas, he said, will 
move only under pressure, which the United States must 
provide. 
 
14. (C) CoDel Saxton did not clear this cable. 
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