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| Identifier: | 05TAIPEI1626 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TAIPEI1626 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2005-04-05 14:14:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | CH PGOV PREL TW US |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001626 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2030 TAGS: CH, PGOV, PREL, TW, US SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION ISSUES SEVEN POINT STATEMENT ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS Classified By: AIT/T ADIR David J. Keegan. Reasons E.O 12958 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) Taiwan National Security Advisor Chiou I-jen contacted AIT Director by phone on April 5 to inform him that President Chen Shui-bian had just concluded a meeting to discuss how to respond to the recent contacts between the KMT and Beijing, especially the recent trip of KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Ping-kun. Participants in the meeting included the Vice President, Premier Hsieh Chang-ting, Chiou, Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang, DPP Vice Chairman Lee Ying-yuan, and NSC SIPDIS staffers Chen Chung-hsin and Lin Jin-chang. 2. (C) The meeting concluded with the decision to issue a seven-point statement (subsequently faxed to AIT, informal translation below) and a call, contained in point five, for an inter-party meeting to reach a consensus on how to handle cross-Strait issues. 3. (C) Comment. While it has been clear for several days that President Chen and his administration have been searching for an effective and politically viable response to Chiang's trip to the mainland, it is unclear how successful this initiative will prove. It offers no indication of what opposition political parties might stand to gain by participating in and thereby giving legitimacy to this DPP effort to undercut the partisan political gains that they believe they have secured through Chiang's trip. 4. (C) Translation. The Conclusions of a Meeting of the Presidential Office, the Executive Yuan, the DPP and the DPP party Caucus, April 5, 2005, on Responding the New Cross-Strait Political and Economic Situation 1. The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country. Sovereignty belongs to the 23 million people of Taiwan. Only the 23 million people of Taiwan have the authority to decide on any changes to Taiwan's future course. This is the most important consensus of Taiwan society, and the Beijing authorities should respect it. 2. Differing points of view on cross-Strait relations should be resolved peacefully. The right of the Taiwan people to freely choose (their future) should be respected. We resolutely oppose the passage of China's so-called "Anti-Separation Law" and the use of "undemocratic" and "non-peaceful" means to resolve cross-Strait differences. 3. Taiwan is already a country with a democratic constitutional government; it has its own popularly elected government. No political party, organization or individual whatsoever has the authority to represent the people of Taiwan or to infringe on the authority of the government on any cross-Strait issue which touches on national sovereignty or the implementation of governmental powers. Cross-Strait exchanges should be conducted according to current laws. The relevant agencies will deal according to the law with anyone who, without permission or properly delegated authority, privately reaches agreements with foreign governments, the other side of the Strait, or those whom they dispatch. 4. The government will hold fast to the principle of "conciliation without drawing back, holding firm without confrontation." To resolve cross-Strait issues and improve cross-Strait relations. Executive agencies will take a clear and determined stance in response to China's consistent denial of our sovereignty and government, its plotting and manipulation, and its schemes to divide Taiwan as well as the intentional or unintentional cooperation of any domestic political party or individual with these actions. 5. Competition between political parties is a normal part of democracy, but the interests of the entire country and the well-being of the people must always be superior to party interest or personal benefit. This is especially true concerning contacts, dialogue and negotiations over cross-Strait issues. We should first come to a consensus between the ruling and opposition parties and among all the people. Only then can we be united and seek from foreign (forces) the greatest benefit for our nation and our people. The President is prepared to invite both ruling and opposition party leaders to hold a meeting to ensure that this series of mainland excitements does not harm the interest and the dignity of Taiwan. 6. In accordance with the consensus conclusions of the (2001) Economic Development Meeting and the (subsequent) Ta-hsi Conference, the government will implement with all its strength a cross-Strait economic and commercial policy to "Deeply cultivate Taiwan and reach out to the world," and to "Actively open up and effectively manage." We will constructively follow through on "Giving priority to Taiwan, giving priority to the economy, giving priority to investment, and giving priority to investment in Taiwan first" in order to protect the economic life of Taiwan. We cannot open up in an instant and disregard the most basic and essential requirement to "manage effectively." National security and executive agencies should now examine and adjust economic and commercial policies. We should undertake negotiations under the auspices and mechanisms of the WTO to address agricultural, service industry and other issues. 7. The greatest difference between the two sides of the Strait is not our political separation, but the conflict between the democratic and the non-democratic. If the Beijing authorities hope to reduce the differences between people on both sides, they should not try to offer Taiwan small favors under a non-democratic system. Instead, they should seriously consider how to eliminate their authoritarian system and how to truly advance toward down the path of democracy. Even more, the Beijing authorities should seriously consider that, in order to become a rising great power, they should become a protector of international peace, and they should become a power that threatens to destroy the international order through non-peaceful means. End Translation. KEEGAN
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