US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1626

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CHEN ADMINISTRATION ISSUES SEVEN POINT STATEMENT ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

Identifier: 05TAIPEI1626
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI1626 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-04-05 14:14:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: CH PGOV PREL TW US
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2030 
TAGS: CH, PGOV, PREL, TW, US 
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION ISSUES SEVEN POINT STATEMENT 
ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: AIT/T ADIR David J. Keegan. Reasons E.O 12958 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Taiwan National Security Advisor Chiou I-jen contacted 
AIT Director by phone on April 5 to inform him that President 
Chen Shui-bian had just concluded a meeting to discuss how to 
respond to the recent contacts between the KMT and Beijing, 
especially the recent trip of KMT Vice Chairman Chiang 
Ping-kun. Participants in the meeting included the Vice 
President, Premier Hsieh Chang-ting, Chiou, Presidential 
Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun, DPP Chairman Su 
Tseng-chang, DPP Vice Chairman Lee Ying-yuan, and NSC 
 
SIPDIS 
staffers Chen Chung-hsin and Lin Jin-chang. 
 
2. (C) The meeting concluded with the decision to issue a 
seven-point statement (subsequently faxed to AIT, informal 
translation below) and a call, contained in point five, for 
an inter-party meeting to reach a consensus on how to handle 
cross-Strait issues. 
 
3. (C) Comment. While it has been clear for several days that 
President Chen and his administration have been searching for 
an effective and politically viable response to Chiang's trip 
to the mainland, it is unclear how successful this initiative 
will prove. It offers no indication of what opposition 
political parties might stand to gain by participating in and 
thereby giving legitimacy to this DPP effort to undercut the 
partisan political gains that they believe they have secured 
through Chiang's trip. 
 
4. (C) Translation. 
 
The Conclusions of a Meeting of the Presidential Office, the 
Executive Yuan, the DPP and the DPP party Caucus, April 5, 
2005, on Responding the New Cross-Strait Political and 
Economic Situation 
 
1.    The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent 
country. Sovereignty belongs to the 23 million people of 
Taiwan. Only the 23 million people of Taiwan have the 
authority to decide on any changes to Taiwan's future course. 
This is the most important consensus of Taiwan society, and 
the Beijing authorities should respect it. 
 
2.    Differing points of view on cross-Strait relations 
should be resolved peacefully. The right of the Taiwan people 
to freely choose (their future) should be respected. We 
resolutely oppose the passage of China's so-called 
"Anti-Separation Law" and the use of  "undemocratic" and 
"non-peaceful" means to resolve cross-Strait differences. 
 
3.    Taiwan is already a country with a democratic 
constitutional government; it has its own popularly elected 
government. No political party, organization or individual 
whatsoever has the authority to represent the people of 
Taiwan or to infringe on the authority of the government on 
any cross-Strait issue which touches on national sovereignty 
or the implementation of governmental powers. Cross-Strait 
exchanges should be conducted according to current laws. The 
relevant agencies will deal according to the law with anyone 
who, without permission or properly delegated authority, 
privately reaches agreements with foreign governments, the 
other side of the Strait, or those whom they dispatch. 
 
4.    The government will hold fast to the principle of 
"conciliation without drawing back, holding firm without 
confrontation." To resolve cross-Strait issues and improve 
cross-Strait relations. Executive agencies will take a clear 
and determined stance in response to China's consistent 
denial of our sovereignty and government, its plotting and 
manipulation, and its schemes to divide Taiwan as well as the 
intentional or unintentional cooperation of any domestic 
political party or individual with these actions. 
 
5.    Competition between political parties is a normal part 
of democracy, but the interests of the entire country and the 
well-being of the people must always be superior to party 
interest or personal benefit. This is especially true 
concerning contacts, dialogue and negotiations over 
cross-Strait issues. We should first come to a consensus 
between the ruling and opposition parties and among all the 
people. Only then can we be united and seek from foreign 
(forces) the greatest benefit for our nation and our people. 
The President is prepared to invite both ruling and 
opposition party leaders to hold a meeting to ensure that 
this series of mainland excitements does not harm the 
interest and the dignity of Taiwan. 
6.    In accordance with the consensus conclusions of the 
(2001) Economic Development Meeting and the (subsequent) 
Ta-hsi Conference, the government will implement with all its 
strength a cross-Strait economic and commercial policy to 
"Deeply cultivate Taiwan and reach out to the world," and to 
"Actively open up and effectively manage." We will 
constructively follow through on "Giving priority to Taiwan, 
giving priority to the economy, giving priority to 
investment, and giving priority to investment in Taiwan 
first" in order to protect the economic life of Taiwan. We 
cannot open up in an instant and disregard the most basic and 
essential requirement to "manage effectively." National 
security and executive agencies should now examine and adjust 
economic and commercial policies. We should undertake 
negotiations under the auspices and mechanisms of the WTO to 
address agricultural, service industry and other issues. 
7.    The greatest difference between the two sides of the 
Strait is not our political separation, but the conflict 
between the democratic and the non-democratic. If the Beijing 
authorities hope to reduce the differences between people on 
both sides, they should not try to offer Taiwan small favors 
under a non-democratic system. Instead, they should seriously 
consider how to eliminate their authoritarian system and how 
to truly advance toward down the path of democracy. Even 
more, the Beijing authorities should seriously consider that, 
in order to become a rising great power, they should become a 
protector of international peace, and they should become a 
power that threatens to destroy the international order 
through non-peaceful means. 
 
End Translation. 
KEEGAN 

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