US embassy cable - 05MANAMA498

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, BA 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: BAHRAIN 
 
REF: STATE 60749 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reasons: 1.4 (b)(c)(d) 
 
1. (S) Summary. Cooperation on counterrorism issues with the 
Government of Bahrain is generally good, as government 
leaders well understand the catastrophic effect that a 
terrorist act would have in a country and an economy that 
does not have the oil wealth of its neighbors.  At the same 
time, the release of six Sunni terror suspects last June two 
days after their arrest brought to the fore concerns we face 
here, including the strength of the GOB commitment to pursue 
Sunni terrorism and inadequacies in anti-terrorism 
legislation.  Recently improved cooperation with the Bahrain 
National Security Agency (BNSA) is helping address the first 
issue, while new anti-terrorism legislation, if passed, will 
help on the second.  Institutionally, the Ministry of 
Interior under new Minister Shaykh Rashid seems poised to 
play a more forceful role in CT enforcement, as evidenced by 
its role in championing a new Joint Counterterrorism Center 
(JCTC).  Bahrain's commitment to cooperate on terrorist 
finance issues is strong, and the country -- with a strong 
financial structure -- is low-risk for significant terrorist 
financing.  In terms of resource requirements, focus should 
be on continued robust ATA training, support for the 
establishment of a JCTC, assistance for Bahrain's Coast Guard 
to address a potential weakness in coastal defense, and 
training in case management, investigation, and terror 
financing for judges and prosecutors.  End summary. 
 
2. (S). The arrest and subsequent release two days later of 
six Bahraini terror suspects last June highlighted two of the 
core issues we face in dealing with counterterrorism issues 
in Bahrain.  In a country where the leadership has 
traditionally focused on threats posed by the Shia majority 
(concerns that have bubbled up again in recent weeks), our 
challenge is to ensure that the government takes threats from 
the country's small number of Sunni extremists seriously. 
And Bahrain's current legislation makes it difficult to 
prosecute terror suspects who have not actually carried out a 
terrorist act. 
 
3. (S) Although the six terror suspects were rearrested and 
served several months in jail, they have been released (under 
surveillance) as their court cases proceed through the 
Bahraini judicial system.  While in the end court cases may 
be dismissed against all of them, the ground has shifted 
considerably since their initial release last June.  Their 
incarceration for several months disrupted any short-term 
terror plans they may have had.  By rearresting them, the 
Government showed more resolve than the terror suspects 
expected.  Since their release, the Government has maintained 
a much more robust surveillance effort on their activities 
than we had seen previously.  And more recently, the 
Government has shown a willingness to enter in joint 
activities to help monitor and track the activities of these 
and other potential suspects in Bahrain. Continued success 
and progress on this latter point, as we pursue potential CT 
targets in general, will be critical in our overall CT 
efforts. 
 
4. (S) Convicting terror suspects who have not actually 
carried out a terrorist act may be more problematic.  It is 
possible that the Constitutional court may rule that the 
article in the penal code under which last summer's terror 
suspects are being charged is unconstitutional.  We are told 
that an Egyptian Court made such a ruling in a parallel case 
in Egypt.  The government has drafted and submitted to 
Parliament new anti-terrorism legislation that would help 
address this problem.  The legislation is under attack, 
however, from some members of parliament who have expressed 
concerns that the legislation will have the effect of 
restricting personal freedoms, including freedom of 
expression (which concerns Sunni and Shia alike). 
 
5. (S) Institutionally, two senior-level appointments appear 
to be having a positive impact on Bahraini CT efforts and CT 
cooperation with the United States.  A year ago, the King 
moved his close confident, Shaykh Rashid al-Khalifa, from 
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to Minister of Interior. 
In his new position, Shaykh Rashid has taken a strong 
interest in CT issues, and has championed the establishment 
of a Joint Counterterrorism Center (JCTC), which received a 
boost from an FBI-led team's March 19-22 visit to Bahrain. 
As envisioned by MOI, the JCTC will be staffed/supported by a 
range of law enforcement agencies, including MOI, BNSA, the 
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), National Guard, Coast Guard, 
Attorney General, Civil Aviation, and Customs.  MOI hopes to 
have the JCTC up and operational within four months, and will 
be looking for equipment and training support (see below). 
MOI envisions the JCTC as a model for the Gulf, and talks of 
establishing a regional JCTC in Manama to enhance regional 
cooperation on CT issues. 
 
6. (S) A second potentially important CT-related appointment 
was the naming of recently-returned former Ambassador to the 
U.S. Shaykh Khalifa Al-Khalifa as Deputy at BNSA.  Having 
served many years at the Bahrain Embassy in Washington, 
Shaykh Khalifa knows well the U.S. perspective on CT issues 
and should be a positive force for CT cooperation.  Although 
it is not yet clear how his role and responsibilities will 
evolve at BNSA, a good sign was his active positive 
participation in the March JCTC discussions.  MOI-BNSA 
relations, BNSA's support for the JCTC, and Shaykh Khalifa's 
evolving role will bear watching in the coming months. 
 
7. (S) Bahrain is a low-risk country for terrorism financiers 
using banking services for significant fund-raising.  The 
well-respected Bahrain Monetary Authority is the sole 
regulator of all financial institutions and requires 
suspicious transaction reporting. While there are about 360 
financial institutions in Bahrain, the banking community is 
close knit and it would be difficult to keep any large money 
laundering or terrorist financing schemes secret. Indicative 
of the country's positive approach on terrorist financing 
issues, Bahrain volunteered to host the new regional Middle 
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA 
FATF).  This organization will review members' compliance 
with anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism regulations.  In terms of future challenges, 
prosecutors and judges need additional training to develop 
the capability to successfully prosecute money laundering and 
terror financing cases. 
 
8. (C) Resource requirements: 
 
-- ATA Training: ATA has a robust training program in 
Bahrain, which is expected to total USD 10 million in the 
2002-2007 period.  It is essential that this program be fully 
funded for the remaining years of this program, including 
approximately USD 2 million for proposed training courses in 
2006 and USD 750 thousand for 2007. 
 
-- Support for JCTC: Bahrain will need help to set up its 
JCTC, including equipment grants (cars, computers, 
surveillance equipment, software, weapons) and training. 
Embassy also recommends a two-year contractor position, to 
work at the JCTC in Manama (reporting to the RSO). 
 
-- Coast Guard: Bahrain is an island country, and the 
Minister of Interior has identified coastal security as a 
vulnerability.  He has requested assistance to upgrade 
Bahrain's radar capability (USD 15 million) and its Tetris 
communication system (USD 15 million), to purchase coastal 
patrol boats for the Coast Guard, and to install upgrades 
(FLIR and NVG) on helicopters. 
 
-- Prosecutors: Training for prosecutors in case management 
and investigation of terrorism cases is needed (perhaps 
through ATA). 
 
-- Terror Financing: Although Bahrain is putting into place 
the legal framework to deal with terror financing cases, its 
judges and prosecutors may not have the legal expertise to 
successfully prosecute these cases. Additional training is 
recommended. 
 
-- MENA-FATF: The USG could offer training and technical 
assistance to MENA-FATF members through the MENA-FATF.  If 
necessary, the USG could consider support to the MENA-FATF 
secretariat in Manama. 
 
SIPDIS 
MONROE