US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1952

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: OVIP, MARR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF GENERAL JOHN HANDY, 
COMMANDER, USTRANSCOM 
 
REF: ANKARA 1906 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC S. EDELMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Your visit comes on the heels of a series of 
US visits since the first of the year (Deputy Secretary of 
State Armitage, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Jones, 
Commander US Central Command General Abizaid, Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy Feith, Secretary of State Rice, US Army 
Europe and 7th Army Commander General Bell, and most recently 
Commander Naval Forces Europe, Admiral Mullen).  You arrive 
in Turkey as we are emphasizing renewed dialogue on areas of 
mutual concern to maximize achievable cooperation.  Our task 
is complicated by a government still questioning the value of 
the U.S.-Turkish relationship.  Recently the Turkish General 
Staff (TGS) has been steadily, rationally, and publicly 
signaling a desire to make the relationship work, although 
there seems to be an overall resistance to the movement 
towards change coming from the EU and IMF. The reinvigoration 
of mil-to-mil engagement is therefore, a welcome and timely 
building block to this effort.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Context of Your Visit 
--------------------- 
 
2. (S) While it is difficult to accurately gauge the depth of 
Turkey's feelings towards restoring the U.S.-Turkey 
mil-to-mil relationship to its pre-March 2003 levels, their 
eagerness to host General Bell's recent visit may serve as a 
reasonable barometer on this matter. Land Forces Commander 
General Buyukanit (likely to become CHOD in 2006), while 
charismatic, popular within the Army and adept at working the 
press, is also successful at playing his political cards 
close to his vest, and consequently has avoided becoming 
fixed to politically controversial positions (his nickname 
among many officers is "weathervane").   Members of his staff 
assert to us that he strongly favors returning to a robust 
military relationship with the U.S. and he used the visit to 
publicly demonstrate that relations with the US military are 
improving. 
 
3. (C) Admiral Mullen provided the CHOD and DCHOD with an 
upbeat assessment of his recent visit to Iraq and highlighted 
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces accomplishments since the 
Jan 30 elections.  The CHOD and DCHOD expressed cautiously 
optimistic views of the situation in Iraq.  Admiral Mullen 
also gained a better understanding of Turkish concerns about 
US and NATO desires to conduct operations in the Black Sea. 
General Ozkok stated he was not opposed to NATO's expansion, 
but he feared such a move could damage NATO's relations with 
Russia and possibly Ukraine.  TGS officials congratulated 
Admiral Mullen on his nomination as Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) and reminded him that it had been 16 years since the 
last CNO visit to Turkey.  Overall, visits by senior military 
officials and mil-to-mil engagements have been positive and 
are aiding in improving the bilateral relationship. 
 
4. (C) That said, there have been several issues, which 
underscore the fragility of our relationship.  An informal 
U.S. request in June 2004 to permanently base F-16 aircraft 
at Incirlik went unanswered and was withdrawn in January 
2005.  Despite the informal nature of the request and lack of 
written information, it still managed to surface in the 
Turkish press, where speculation over U.S. military 
intentions went wild.  Also in June 2004, the U.S. formally 
requested the use of Incirlik AB as a Multi-Directional Cargo 
Hub, serving as an air bridge between Afghanistan and Iraq 
theaters.  To date, the U.S. has not received an official 
response from Turkey.  TGS leadership claimed in Sept. 2004 
to have passed its endorsement to the government.  Since 
then, MFA and Prime Ministry officials have repeatedly told 
us that the decision is at the inter-ministerial level and an 
answer will be forthcoming "soon".  Given the consistent lack 
of responsiveness to mission inquiries, HQ EUCOM, in 
coordination with the Mission, decided to stop making further 
inquiries.  After nine months we would normally assume that 
the lack of a response translates to "no".  However, a recent 
flurry of press reports suggests the Turkish government may 
be close to a response.  The media speculates that this 
decision may be an attempt by the Turkish government to mend 
the US/TU relationship or to gain US support to defeat 
Armenian lobbyist efforts for passage of a Congressional 
resolution on alleged genocide.  For more detail on this 
subject, please see Ankara 1906. 
 
------------------------- 
Iraq Dominates the Agenda 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Turkish Government shares the goal of a unified, 
prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally and with its 
neighbors.  However, our intervention there is unpopular and 
has generated Turkish frustration and anger over a perceived 
lack of U.S. action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish 
separatism and designs on Kirkuk, as well as attacks against 
Turkish truck drivers.  Bilateral relations were poisoned by 
grossly distorted Turkish media coverage of and irresponsible 
statements by senior GOT officials about the Fallujah 
operation late last year and incessant criticism of US 
actions--and inaction (such as against the PKK)--in Iraq. 
The EU decision on December 17 to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005, may have 
provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible 
positive shift in relations.  A series of high-level 
Administration and military visits at the beginning of this 
year pushed some Turks to stand up for the relationship, 
despite policy differences over Iraq. 
 
6. (C) The Turks worry about long-term US staying power in 
Iraq, that events there could spiral out of control, and that 
Ankara could be faced with either a Shia-dominated government 
that they assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an 
intensified movement toward an independent Kurdish state 
emanating from northern Iraq, or both.  Since the success of 
the Jan. 30 elections, however, Turkey appears to be taking a 
more constructive approach toward its policy in Iraq. 
Previous complaints of alleged voting fraud by Iraqi Kurds, 
disenfranchisement of Iraq's Turkmen population, and the 
non-participation of the Sunni Arab community have been 
replaced by a more positive tone. 
 
7. (S) Despite the continued public opposition to our 
operations in Iraq,  Turkey has provided valuable assistance. 
 Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in 
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base tankers 
to refuel aircraft on support missions for both Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on rotation 
out, and permits the transit (via Habur gate) of supplies for 
our forces and humanitarian goods.  Turkey is active in 
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for 
Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni 
political groups and, as its main contribution to the NATO 
training mission, Iraqi security forces. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand 
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's 
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis.  In hosting the 
January 2005 trilateral PKK talks, the Turks signaled their 
willingness to work together with the Iraqis on this shared 
problem.  Still, they, and the public at large, remain bitter 
over their perception that the US has taken no steps in Iraq 
to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge that that 
country will no longer be a base for terrorist operations 
against Turkey and they expect the US to remain engaged in 
the effort.  Some in the Turkish military harbor the belief 
that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's presence in 
Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports of US/PKK 
meetings.  (NOTE:  We also know that the military uses our 
lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the current 
AKP Government.) 
 
9. (S) If confronted with this issue, you should remind the 
Turks about our long-standing efforts that make us Turkey's 
number one ally against the PKK:  our listing of the PKK and 
all successor groups as terrorist organizations; our 
successful campaign to get the EU to do the same; and our 
assistance in rendering PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.  You 
should refer back to the trilateral talks where, with the US 
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks 
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for 
actions against the PKK, including establishing an 
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts 
meeting after the government is in place to discuss issues 
related to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in 
northern Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who 
are arrested.  MNF-I is in the process of posting Tier I list 
of PKK terrorists on CENTRIX. This is a small but an 
important step by MNF-I and, once executed, should be 
appreciated by the Turks. 
----------------------- 
Global War on Terrorism 
----------------------- 
 
10. (C) Turkey took command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan in February 2005, 
and will contribute over 1,600 troops.  Ankara renewed its 
offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Afghanistan, but location was again a problem -- Turkey wants 
to take over a PRT in the north, while the Alliance needs 
PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion requirements. 
 
11. (S) On the other hand, the current government has 
disbanded the anti-terrorism coordination center in the 
National Security Council which used to bring together the 
three main intelligence services (TNIO, Jandarma, and 
National Police), which otherwise have a spotty record of 
coordination.  The absence of a coordination center raises 
severe questions about the direction of the Turkish 
anti-terrorism effort. 
 
12. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey 
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
improving their abilities to protect important energy 
transport routes.  Turkey subscribes to every arms control 
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which they 
offered to host a multi-functional (air-sea-land) exercise in 
2006. We had hoped that the Turks would hold this in the 
Black Sea, especially given their own Operation Active 
Endeavor-like Operation Black Sea Harmony and their 
leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR organization on 
prevention of trafficking.  However, they have been reluctant 
to facilitate non-littoral states' operations in the Black 
Sea (see para 17 below) and the PSI exercise looks likely to 
occur in the Mediterranean.  Turkey has also been mildly 
supportive of international efforts to press Iran to meet its 
commitments to the IAEA, and they publicly back the EU-3 
process.  The GOT has taken seriously information about 
Turks' involvement in the AQ Khan network and is moving 
toward prosecution of these individuals.  Turkey's stance on 
Syria has been disappointing:  The government has 
consistently been behind the curve on pressuring Syria to 
withdraw from Lebanon.   The government and many in the 
military view Bashar Assad as a would-be reformer contending 
with old-line Ba'athists.  Their policy assumption is that 
Assad represents "stability" and the possibility of gradual 
change. 
 
13. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training 
Center in Ankara provides counter-terrorism and other 
training to personnel from PfP partner countries.  The 
military has established a NATO Center of Excellence-Defense 
Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), that will provide more 
specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner 
nations and Allies.  Currently the TRADOC LNO, a U.S. Army 
Major, stationed here in Ankara, is serving part time. The 
U.S. Navy has offered to provide a Navy Captain as the Deputy 
Director/Project Officer, and the Joint Staff recently agreed 
to staff two additional US positions (one 04 and one E6) at 
the center.  The TGS has also offered training at the COE-DAT 
as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training mission. 
 
------------------------------- 
Political and Economic Backdrop 
------------------------------- 
 
14. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) by the military and other 
elements of the secular elite, Prime Minister Erdogan long 
appeared unassailable, with a two-thirds majority in 
parliament and a high personal popularity in the heartland. 
Erdogan's frequent trips abroad and discontent and corruption 
in the party and Cabinet signal that AKP has peaked and is in 
a stall.  Since December, the government has lost energy and 
has begun to drift.  Resurgent nationalism threatens to fill 
the leadership void.  Despite resentment and suspicion of AKP 
by the military and other elements of the secular elite, 
there is currently no alternative to PM Erdogan's AKP 
government.  Resignations are slowing eroding AKP,s 
parliamentary majority, but Erdogan remains popular.  With 
the political opposition virtually non-existent, the only 
opposition is in effect, the military.  However, TGS Chief, 
General Ozkok, while a solidly pro-Atlanticist senior 
commander, is reluctant to take on the government publicly 
for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and thereby 
losing popular support for the military.  Deputy Chief of 
Defense General Basbug's (in line to become CHOD in 2008 
after General Buyukanit) repeated emphasis on the breadth, 
depth, and importance of relations with the U.S. during his 
January 26 televised press conference (the first such 
conference to be televised), might signal a subtle shift in 
TGS reluctance to confront the government publicly.  General 
Ozkok has moved step-by-step to try to bring more modern 
thinkers into senior ranks, but left-nationalist sentiments 
are strong at lower ranks. 
 
15. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and GDP grew 8.9% in 2004. 
However, the recovery remains vulnerable due to a large 
current account deficit (over 5 percent of GDP) and a large 
debt with a short maturity structure.  Unemployment and 
poverty remain high, and ordinary people have not felt much 
benefit yet from the overall macroeconomic improvement. 
Turkey remains too reliant on Russian energy sources (a point 
the Russians are trying to use as leverage for political 
gain). Macroeconomic success has also bred a sense of 
complacency about the need to persist with difficult reforms, 
such as privatization and reform of the banking, social 
security and tax systems.  These reforms are being addressed 
in the new three-year standby program that the IMF and GOT 
are in the process of finalizing. 
 
16. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in 
the wake of the EU's December decision to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey in October.  However, this is 
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of 
structural reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack of 
appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder 
in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession 
will affect nearly every aspect of their lives, and for the 
likelihood that it may in the end be quite costly for Turkey 
to comply with EU directives in environmental protection and 
other areas. 
 
--------------- 
TRANSCOM ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
17. (C) Suggested Talking Points: 
 
-- OEF/OIF Tanker Refueling Operation: USTRANSCOM appreciates 
Turkey's support for allowing the U.S. to utilize Incirlik AB 
as a forward deployment base for air refueling aircraft.  To 
date U.S. tankers have off loaded more than 14 million pounds 
of fuel to awaiting aircraft.  Additionally, appreciate your 
governments support in allowing over 8,500 U.S, troops to 
transit out of Iraq in latter part of 2003 and beginning of 
2004. 
 
-- Transit of Italian equipment: Welcome Turkey's assistance 
for the US movement of Italian equipment through Incirlik to 
Afghanistan.  Appreciate Turkey's support for both Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO ISAF mission. 
 
-- Air Operations for OEF/OIF:  Extremely pleased with 
Turkey's cooperation in regards to granting diplomatic 
clearances for OEF/OIF.  We will continue to educate our 
pilots and planning staffs on abiding by guidelines contained 
in these clearances. 
 
-- Cargo Hub: (IF RAISED ONLY) Understand your need to 
closely consider our request.  We would welcome your positive 
response.  However, our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
ongoing.  If you cannot respond positively, we will find 
other options, as we have done up until now. 
 
18. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN