US embassy cable - 05NDJAMENA543

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, INR/GGI, PRM, 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS, GENEVA FOR RMA, 
ADDIS/KAMPALA/NAIROBI FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PREF, PHUM, KAWC, CD, SU, Darfur Policy and Rebels 
SUBJECT: RIFTS IN REBEL RANKS PLAY OUT IN CHAD 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 405 
 
     B. NDJAMENA 441 
     C. KHARTOUM 297 
     D. ASMARA 228 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C) Summary.  Over the past month, several important 
developments that could affect cohesion and direction of the 
Darfur rebel movements have played out in Chad.  As 
previously reported, Chadian officials invited members of the 
Sudan Liberation Movement SLM  to N'Djamena to hold 
organizational meetings.  The Chadians provided guesthouses 
and President Deby's half-brother Daoussa managed the 
consultations among various SLM factions and with the Chadian 
Government.  SLM is still planning a leadership meeting in 
Darfur in May to settle its structural problems, and if 
Chadian meddling succeeded, Abdelwahid Nour would be ousted 
as SLM's Chairman.  The Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) 
expulsion of field commander Mohammed Saleh has galvanized 
his determination to remove Dr. Khalil Ibrahim or to split 
off secular commanders disgruntled with the movement's ties 
to former Sudanese Minister Turabi from the group.  Finally, 
rifts within the NMRD over GOC and GOS control and payments 
to its leadership and a GOS attack on the group have split 
the group wide open.  Some of these developments could have a 
positive impact on the movements' ability to negotiate, if a 
consolidated leadership structures can emerge and the process 
is properly managed.  In the short term, however, the GOS is 
gaining valuable ground while the movements' internal wars 
rage.  End Summary. 
 
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SLM: MINI VERSUS ABDELWAHID 
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2.  (C)  The SLM consultations in N'Djamena wrapped up on 
March 25 and appear to have achieved a consensus that Dr. 
Sharif Harir and Bahar Arabi would join Mini Minawi in the 
leadership of SLM.  (Refs A and B discuss Chadian 
motivations.) Abeldwahid will likely be "voted" out in the 
SLM's meeting in Darfur in May.  The Chadians, according to 
some SLM members, would also prefer Mini to be removed, but 
in the end may have reached a deal that consolidates Zaghawa 
control over the movement.  Daoussa Deby, the President's 
half-brother, coordinated the consultations.  Chad allegedly 
is interested in bolstering the SLM organizationally as a 
counterweight to the GOS's support for Chadian rebels based 
in Sudan.  Prior to his departure for France for medical care 
on March 22, President Idriss Deby held several meetings with 
various SLM military and political groups, including at least 
one meeting with field commanders and others with Adam 
Shogar, Sharif Harir, and Bahar Arabi.  According to Adam 
Shogar, Deby told SLM that the Chadian Government shares many 
of SLM's interests, particularly bringing the crisis to an 
end.  Shogar also said the President also told SLM that the 
GOS is manipulating negotiations to buy itself time and that 
it does not intend to respect the ceasefire.  P/E officer was 
taken to greet SLM commanders Juma Haggar, Djidu, and 
long-time contact Ramadan as well as several other field 
commanders in Sharif's room on March 21.  P/E officer later 
learned that they were allegedly there to receive money in 
exchange for supporting Sharif. 
 
3.  (C)  The fate of several SLM members in Chad is 
indicative of the internal haggling going on within the 
movement and Chadian complicity in the attempt to oust 
Abdelwahid.  Reftels A and B report post's attempts to locate 
members of the SLM who were allegedly beaten and detained by 
their own members.  On March 23 after two weeks of changed 
meetings, P/E officer was taken to see them.  Sulieman 
Marajan, Dr. Saleh, and Mohammed Harin had finally been 
allowed to visit their colleagues at one rebel safehouse, but 
hinted they were about to be moved back to Sudan and killed. 
P/E officer used one minute alone with Marajan and Saleh to 
hear that they were being mistreated and feared for their 
lives.  At a second, heavily guarded safehouse, P/E officer 
met Ahmed Kubur.  He did not say anything but looked 
exhausted.  P/E officer requested a meeting with Bahar Arabi, 
who was in N'Djamena to represent SLM's General Secretary 
Mini Minawi, for later that night to get assurances for their 
safety.  Bahar said that Abdelwahid's removal from the head 
of SLM is imminent and there is no need to coerce anyone to 
do it.  Bahar said that the meeting in Darfur is still being 
planned for May, but that he and Mini would like to travel to 
the United States before then.  He requested assistance with 
 
a U.S. visa to travel with Mini Minawi in the near future. 
(Note: Bahar is a Chadian passport holder. End Note.) 
 
4.  (C) Mini told P/E officer on March 29 that Abdelwahid is 
a "pathological liar" and had created the entire sequence as 
a hoax to make it look like his supporters were coerced into 
betraying him.  However, Mini ordered Juma Haggar not to kill 
anybody after hearing about our concerns for their safety. 
According to Mini, the members joined SLM of their own free 
will and could leave freely.  (Comment: Mini may or may not 
know what it happening to the commanders.  End Comment.) 
Nonetheless, Marajan and Saleh told intermediaries that they 
"escaped" from the other SLM members before they crossed the 
border into Tine, Sudan and have called from hiding in Tine, 
Chad to find a way back to their colleagues in N'Djamena. 
Two outside sources have indicated to P/E officer that Ahmed 
Kubur is still being detained in N'Djamena by Chadian 
authorities.  General Mahamat Ali told P/E officer on March 
31 that "those SLM being detained committed crimes in Chad", 
an indication that Chadian authorities are likely involved in 
the situation. 
 
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JEM: OUSTED COMMANDER IS ON THE OFFENSIVE 
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5.  (C) The "firing" of field commander Mohammed Saleh could 
prove to be a big mistake for JEM's leadership.  Saleh 
disregarded Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's boycott of the February 
16-17 meeting of the Joint Commission in N'Djamena.  He was 
"ousted" a few days later, but was confident that he has 
enough backing within the rank-and-file of JEM to be 
unconcerned about any of Khalil's pronouncements.  P/E 
officer was surprised to meet up with Saleh in Abeche on 
March 24.  He had left N'Djamena earlier in the month and had 
been in Abeche re-supplying for his return to Darfur to 
mobilize other JEM commanders with secular leanings to remove 
Khalil and the Islamists from JEM's leadership. 
 
6.  (C) Saleh is realistic about the problems with funding 
that would then ensue, but feels very strongly that the 
majority of JEM needs to be liberated from Turabi's agenda. 
According to Saleh, JEM's current agenda remains the 
acquiring seats in the Islamic Government of Khartoum for 
Khalil's people through the Darfur peace process.  Saleh 
claims that he and other commanders are tired of the 
leadership of JEM denying its links with Turabi.  Saleh said 
that many JEM commanders are still upset that Khalil ordered 
them to assist with Turabi's coup attempt and that Turabi and 
those Darfurians who did participate were put in JEM's list 
of persons detained by the GOS for the prisoner exchange. 
This move, according to Saleh, means that it will be more 
difficult to obtain the release of JEM members captured who 
were fighting for Darfur, not Turabi. 
 
7.  (C) Saleh says he is "flexible" on the potential outcomes 
of his actions.  He prefers removing Khalil outright. 
However, if this is not possible, he will look for ways to 
take the remaining JEM forces away from Khalil and join with 
other Darfurian rebels, preferably SLM and the disaffected 
NMRD members, who used to be part of JEM.  Saleh has already 
begun laying the groundwork for his plan.  While he was in 
N'Djamena in February and March, Saleh met with many NMRD 
members who had split from JEM.  They told Saleh that they 
were fooled by promises of money and equipment and quickly 
realized the movement was a creature of the Sudanese 
Government.  Saleh agreed to take back into his fold any of 
the NMRD members that want to leave. 
 
8.  (C) Interestingly, Chadian officials have told us that 
they believe Ahmed Lissan Tugod, JEM's General Coordinator, 
is ready to join Saleh if he is successful.  Talgedin Niam, 
JEM's other Joint Commission representative in N'Djamena, is 
firmly ensconced in the Khalil camp and was put on the JC to 
keep an eye on Lissan.  As previously reported, Lissan has 
tried to temper JEM's position on boycotting the Abuja talks 
until proceedings are underway against war criminals.  (Ref B) 
 
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NMRD: GOS ATTACK, NEW LEADERSHIP 
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9.  (C) The NMRD leadership's ties to the GOS and GOC have 
long undermined its credibility with the international 
community and now are causing severe internal divisions. 
Norain reportedly has been replaced as NMRD's General 
Secretary by Osman Ali Chaibo, brother of Chad's National 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Security Agency Director.  (Note: In ref B, information we 
received that Baradine Chaibo is NMRD's new leader is 
incorrect.  End Note.)  Norain is allegedly considered too 
weak to keep the movement together and to put down internal 
dissent.  P/E officer met with Hasan Khamis, a former JEM 
commander and current member of NMRD, in Abeche on March 25. 
According to Khamis, the rank-and-file NMRD are upset over 
what they perceive to be Norain's and Djibrine's subservience 
to the GOS and GOC.  Khamis claimed that Norain was not only 
in Abeche to visit the injured Djibrine, who was shot in the 
leg during the attack at Jebel Moon.  Khamis explained that 
Norain was there to receive money and instructions from the 
Sudanese consulate in Abeche.  (Comment: Djibrine was moved 
to Abeche for treatment and now is reportedly traveling to a 
third country for additional care.  End Comment.) 
 
10.  (C) Khamis is in hot water with NMRD's leadership (i.e. 
with the Chadian and Sudanese security services) because he 
has vocalized the complaints of other former JEM members of 
NMRD that the movement's leadership does the bidding of the 
GOS.  Khamis told P/E officer that he was placed under the 
watchful eye of another NMRD member and the Chadian and 
Sudanese security services in Abeche.  He is not free to 
leave Abeche but is allowed to move around the town.  He is 
looking for a way out of Abeche to rejoin JEM's Mohammed 
Saleh in the field and believes that other disaffected NMRD 
and JEM can reconstitute another group that may either take 
over JEM or join with SLM. 
 
11.  (C) During a meeting with P/E officer in Abeche on March 
24, Norain described the GOS attack on NMRD's base at Jebel 
Moon.  Approximately 600 GOS soldiers and jandjaweed 
surrounded and attacked the NMRD at Jebel Moon on March 16, 
according to NMRD's Norain Minawi.  The GOS reportedly had 
intelligence that NMRD's chief of staff Djibrine Abdelkerim 
Bary was in Tine with 200 other NMRD followers, leaving Jebel 
Moon virtually undefended.  GOS troops and jandjaweed staged 
for the attack approximately 25 kilometers from Jebel Moon 
and launched the assault at 5:00 a.m.  The NMRD reports that 
the GOS used an Antonov during the attack, although it did 
not bomb the area. 
 
12.  (C) Djibrine was alerted in Tine and rushed back to 
Jebel Moon within a few hours.  According to Norain, Jebel 
Moon's natural defenses helped NMRD repel the attack. 
Djibrine and his troops were able to push the GOS and 
jandjaweed some 50 kilometers out of the area.  NMRD claims 
that 100 jandjaweed were killed and only four NMRD died.  The 
GOS and jandjaweed burned all of the fields and huts in the 
area and destroyed all of NMRD's spare parts for their 
vehicles.  Norain described other movements of men in 
Sudanese government uniforms on horseback and camels near 
Masteri and Kabkabir.  He also reported that 30 villages 
located 60 kilometers south of El Geneina in a 
jandjaweed-controlled area were recently destroyed. 
 
13.  (C) Norain described his meeting with Chadian President 
Idriss Deby on March 22.  According to Norain, Deby told him 
that the GOS is not respecting the ceasefire agreement it 
signed with NMRD in December 2004.  Deby reportedly told 
Norain that as far as Chad is concerned, the NMRD is free 
from any obligation to honor the agreement. Deby told Norain 
that it is clear from Deby's meeting with Vice President Taha 
the previous week, that the GOS wants to control key areas in 
Darfur, such as Jebel Moon and Jebel Marra, prior to the next 
Abuja session. 
 
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COMMENT 
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14.  (C) Leadership changes in the rebel movements could 
result in a clearer focus and development of a cohesive 
political agenda if properly managed.  In the case of JEM, an 
outcome which strengthens the secular elements against the 
pro-Turabi, Islamic elements could help diminish Khalil's 
disruptive influence and make JEM a more effective negotiator 
at the table.  It could also diffuse some of the GOC's 
dislike for JEM should the movement be able to de-link itself 
from the GOS's most powerful rival.  The defection of JEM's 
remaining field commanders would clearly undercut Khalil's 
credibility.  However, a new JEM would lack Khalil's powerful 
financial base.  Settling SLM's leadership issues, however, 
is more difficult and has the potential for a dangerous rift 
within the group with the largest presence on the ground.  If 
Abdelwahid is removed, he still has commanders who could 
cause serious problems on the ground for SLM.   Moreover, a 
 
resolution that overwhelmingly favors the Zaghawa members of 
the movement will inevitably alienate members of Fur, Dadjo, 
Masselit and other ethnic groups.  The emergence of another 
SLM splinter group among the movements would also hamper 
attempts at negotiations.  Finally, the NMRD's demise would 
have little or no impact on the situation unless its members 
join forces with another movement.  We are still pursuing the 
issue of the detained SLM commanders with Chadian authorities 
and SLM officials in N'Djamena. 
 
15.  (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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