US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK2431

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA. DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM. 
SEOUL FOR AMBASSADOR HILL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PREF, PHUM, TH, CH, China, Asylum, Refugee 
SUBJECT: THAI POLICY ON CHINESE REFUGEES 
 
REF: A. 12/17/04 BCLTV/ANDREW SHAW EMAIL 
 
     B. 12/17/04 PRM/NADEAU EMAIL 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU.  REASON 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary.  The Thai government continues to refuse 
UNHCR access to Chinese dissident Lu Decheng for a refugee 
status determination interview.  In their handling of Lu, the 
Thai are balancing human rights concerns and U.S. and UNHCR 
pressure against their relations with China and a belief that 
Chinese dissident groups are taking advantage of Thailand,s 
humanitarianism.  Lu,s case arose shortly after two other 
high-profile Chinese refugees cases in which the Thai 
struggled to find ways to allow the concerned persons to 
depart Thailand for third country resettlement.  This likely 
led the Thai to think that they needed to stop a developing 
trend.  Their approach on Lu is probably intended to head off 
serious complications in their China policy by deterring 
other prominent Chinese cases from thinking that Thailand is 
an easy transit route out of China to resettlement countries. 
 At the same time, the Embassy knows of no cases where the 
Thai have deported Chinese asylum seekers to China, though 
the location of asylum seeker Zhao Wendong, who was picked up 
by Thai authorities at the same time as Lu, is currently 
uncertain.  The UNHCR pipeline that quietly moves other, 
non-prominent Chinese refugees, as well as hundreds of 
refugees of other nationalities, out of Thailand to third 
countries remains open at the same time that it appears the 
pipeline out of Thailand for high-profile Chinese cases, such 
as that of Lu Decheng, is at least temporarily closed.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) As background to the Lu Decheng case, it is important 
to remember that Thailand is a key asylum and transit point 
for thousands of refugees from numerous countries.  Refugees 
from neighboring countries predominate -- the USG is in the 
process of resettling 15,500 Laotian Hmong and 2,900 urban 
Burmese out of Thailand.  At the same time, UNHCR/Bangkok has 
also given refugee status, or is processing refugee status 
applications, for about 1,300 persons from over 40 different 
nationalities.  Refugees from these other nationalities came 
to Thailand because of good transportation links, the UNHCR 
presence, and the laxness of Thai immigration laws and 
enforcement.  While the Thai have stiffened visa issuance and 
enforcement since the end of 2003, it is still possible for 
refugees generally to survive in Thailand while awaiting 
resettlement, although their lives are difficult and they are 
subject at any time to arrest, detention, and possible 
deportation. 
 
3. (C) Well-known dissident Lu Decheng is currently the most 
prominent Chinese refugee status seeker in Thailand.  The 
Thai government continues to deny UNHCR access to him for a 
refugee status determination interview that would likely be 
the precursor to his resettlement in a third country.  At the 
same time, however, UNHCR has access to and has granted or is 
considering refugee status for 101 other Chinese.  Similar to 
its posture towards refugees from other non-Burmese and 
non-Lao nationalities, the Thai government has shown no 
particular interest or opposition to UNHCR,s processing of 
these other Chinese cases for resettlement. 
 
4. (C) For example, UNHCR last week referred to the Embassy 
an urgent case for U.S. resettlement involving a Falun Gong 
practitioner who had been subjected to severe torture and 
violence in China.  The three relatives of Zhang Rongliang, 
referred by UNHCR late last year and processed expeditiously 
by the Embassy for U.S. resettlement because of high-level 
USG interest, never came to the attention of Thai 
policymakers.  There is no reason at this point to think the 
Thai will object to U.S. resettlement of the Falun Gong case 
if it is approved by DHS or that the general Thai approach to 
Chinese refugee cases will change. 
 
5. (C) Over the past year, the Thai have demonstrated a 
willingness to permit third-country resettlement in two 
prominent Chinese dissident cases, and at least in one of the 
cases, to resist high-level Chinese government pressure for 
deportation of the concerned persons to China.  In doing so, 
however, and apparently sensitive to China relations, they 
have struggled to find ways to move the persons out of 
Thailand quickly.  The Thai allowed well-known dissident Yuan 
Bin to be interviewed by UNHCR and resettled in the United 
States late last year.  However, this occurred only after the 
Embassy strongly weighed in on Yuan,s behalf.  The Thai 
required, apparently at the personal direction of then 
Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, that UNHCR and the 
Embassy process Yuan,s case and move him out of the country 
in seven days. 
 
6. (C) The second case involved Ao Bo and Duan Xinjun, two 
members of the mainland Chinese rock band, Pungu.  These two 
individuals came to Thailand in March 2004 fearful for their 
safety after performing at a February 2004 &Say Yes to 
Taiwan8 festival in Taipei at which they sang songs 
supportive of Taiwan independence.  UNHCR Bangkok (strictly 
protect) reports that high-level Chinese officials 
subsequently requested Prime Minister Thaksin during a visit 
to Beijing to deport the pair to China.  In early September 
2004, a senior Thai government official informed UNHCR that 
the Thai authorities had agreed to cooperate with the request 
and had issued a directive to border authorities to arrest 
the two.  However, at the same time the same official also 
indicated that the Thai government wanted UNHCR to provide 
protection and was willing to allow the two to leave Thailand 
prior to their arrest and deportation.  The official said he 
would take steps to ensure that Thai border authorities did 
not intervene if the two were moved to Cambodia.  An NGO 
thereupon assisted the pair to Phnom Penh where they were 
quickly and quietly resettled to Sweden. 
 
7. (C) Lu Decheng,s case is special because he is another 
prominent Chinese dissident whose case has come to the 
attention of Thai policy level officials.  It is not clear 
exactly how this happened.  UNHCR has reported that the 
Chinese Embassy tipped the Thai off to Lu,s presence. 
However, there was also local press coverage of Lu,s case 
after news of his arrest by Thai police appeared on NGO 
websites in the United States. 
 
8. (C) In discussions about Lu,s case, senior and working 
level Thai officials have told the Embassy that while they 
are mindful of humanitarian considerations, they are 
concerned that what they see as Thailand,s traditional 
willingness to provide refugee asylum could be abused by NGOs 
and other groups intent on pursuing their own objectives. 
Lu,s case came hard on the heels of the Yuan Bin case late 
last year and the Thai probably saw a trend of high-profile 
cases developing that could complicate relations with 
Beijing.  The concern about the motives of NGOs is not 
unfounded.  Refs noted that America-based activist Xu Wen Li, 
who was closely associated with Yuan Bin,s case, requested 
expedited processing of a U.S. refugee travel document for 
Yuan after his U.S. arrival so Yuan could return to Thailand 
as soon as possible and set up a conduit for persons to get 
out of China. 
 
9. (C) It is not clear how much pressure the Chinese have put 
on the Thai over Lu,s case.  On February 4, a Chinese 
Embassy law enforcement official sent a letter to the Thai 
Immigration Bureau requesting Lu,s repatriation to China. 
But the Thai MFA told the Embassy that this letter was not an 
official extradition request and would be ignored.  The 
Embassy knows that the Thai have permitted access to Lu by 
Chinese Embassy officials and have pressured Lu to accept 
&voluntary8 deportation to a neighboring country.  Lu has 
refused.  NGOs and Lu,s friends continue to have access to 
him. 
 
10. (C) The Embassy,s repeated and senior-level requests to 
the Thai MFA to permit UNHCR access to Lu for a refugee 
status determination interview have so far not worked.  A 
Thai MFA official recently told the Embassy off-the-record 
that the U.S. and Thailand understand each other well in this 
matter, that is, Thailand's "predicament" and the U.S. 
concern that Lu's life could be endangered.  He said that 
Thailand would do its best to make sure it proceeds according 
to its immigration law and takes steps not to put Lu in 
danger. 
 
11. (C) Another Chinese asylum seeker, Zhao Wendong, was 
picked up last year with Lu Decheng.  At the time, Zhao was 
appealing UNHCR,s refusal of his refugee status application. 
 Zhao was kept until March 25 at the Thai Immigration 
Detention Center, the same location where Lu is being held. 
According to UNHCR, Thai immigration officials reported that 
the Chinese had leaned on them to deport Zhao to China. 
Immigration officials thereupon put pressure on Zhao to 
accept &soft8 deportation to the Burma border, warning that 
he might otherwise be turned over to the Chinese.  &Soft8 
deportation means a person is taken to a point on the border 
and released.  No officials from the neighboring country are 
present and in most cases it is assumed that the person 
simply returns to Thailand.  Zhao initially resisted the Thai 
pressure.  But on March 25, Zhao was taken to the Mae Sai 
border area and released.  UNHCR does not know whether the 
Thai moved Zhao forcibly.  The Thai claim he agreed to soft 
deportation.  A Thai immigration official told UNHCR that no 
Burmese authorities were involved and that he expected Zhao 
would receive help from the Chinese community in Chiang Rai 
and find his way back to Bangkok.  However, as of April 5, no 
one has heard from Zhao. 
 
12. (C) Comment.  The Thai may hold Lu Decheng for some time 
to deter other high-profile Chinese dissidents from 
transiting Thailand, and as a practical matter, the pipeline 
out of Thailand for such cases may well be closed at least 
temporarily.  At the same time, it is important to note that 
many other Chinese refugees, whose cases may not be as 
prominent but may be equally deserving, are flowing quietly 
through the Thailand pipeline.  Embassy will continue to 
follow Lu,s case closely and urge UNHCR access. 
ARVIZU