US embassy cable - 05SANAA863

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OPO/FPD, CENTCOM FOR 
POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 03 APRIL 2005 
 
REF: (A) 8386-05 (TEARLINE) 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d). 
 
1.    (S/NF) Summary:  AMB convened an EAC on 03 April, 2005 
to discuss recent security threats.  RMAS briefed EAC on 
threat information of a sensitive nature involving an 
unidentified arab male in Sana,a who is apparently in the 
final stages of attack planning against " American leaders" 
in Yemen.  AMB emphasized the sensitivity of the threat 
information to the EAC.  Security posture of embassy 
employees was discussed and the decision was made to cancel 
visa services at the consular section for a period of 48 
hours, with a core EAC to be held Tuesday, 05 April, 2005 for 
reassessment of the security situation.  AMB directed EAC 
members to have section chiefs immediately evaluate all 
current and future TDY personnel in their respective 
sections, as to the necessity of their presence at the 
embassy.  AMB directed EAC to have all mission employees 
heighten awareness and significantly increase the variance of 
arrival/departure times to the embassy. EAC personnel 
represented at the meeting included:  DCM, LEGATT, RMAS, 
POLE, OMC, FPD, MO, RMO, PD, USAID, DAO, CONS, MSG, IPC and 
RSO. End Summary. 
 
2.    (S/NF)  RMAS briefed EAC on an arab male named Kan'an 
who was reported to be in Sana,a.  He is reported to have 
had contact with various terrorists in Iraq and has a team of 
ten personnel with him in Sana,a.  The team is reported to 
have already finished surveillance and attack planning of " 
American leaders " and is only waiting for funding, 
equipment, and orders to commence operations.  RMAS stressed 
that the ROYG has been working on the issue and that there is 
no information to date that the team has received funding for 
the operations.  DCM stated that this issue, though currently 
the main threat facing the American community in Yemen, had 
to be put in the context of other recent security incidents, 
to include the hijacking of Yemeni USAID contractors outside 
of Sana,a, the Bab-al-Yemen shopping district grenade 
incident, thwarted grenade attack on AMB in DEC 04, general 
threats against the Aden Sheraton, and several angry Yemeni 
fathers whose sons had been allegedly killed or captured 
fighting coalition forces in Iraq.  RSO also noted a FEB RMAS 
report of an unidentified male with a Saudi accent asking 
about future clustering of Americans or westerners at the 
Sheraton Hotel, Aden, and Tourist City.  DCM stated that, 
given all the threat reports, we had to seriously consider 
our profile/footprint in Yemen. 
 
3.    (S/NF)  AMB stated to EAC that the embassy community 
must reduce their presence and profile in Sana,a.  AMB 
directed all section chiefs to analyze their current TDY 
staff and determine how essential each member is to the 
mission.  In addition, section chiefs must make a 
determination on all future TDY personnel as to whether or 
not it is essential to have them come to Yemen.  AMB stated 
the default should be to deny TDY personnel entry unless the 
section chief feels they can convince the chain of command 
that they are absolutely necessary to the mission.  Each 
section chief is responsible for screening their incoming TDY 
personnel and developing a mechanism by which the chain of 
command can screen personnel as well.  AMB directed the EAC 
to look at embassy employees' work habits and develop 
individual plans, allowing for maximum variance of 
arrival/work times and varying vehicular routes. 
 
4.    (S/NF)  MO brought up the issue as to whether or not 
the FSN community should be included in varying arrival times 
and work schedules.  The EAC determined no specific mention 
of threats against the FSN community.  RSO provided copies of 
post tripwires to EAC and noted the situations listed that 
would cover potential for drawdown, authorized departure, and 
ordered departure.  Three situations listed for potential 
drawdown had been met regarding tripwires.  EAC concurred 
with assessment but did not believe post met the criteria for 
"Authorized Departure" given the current environment.  The 
EAC decided that the appropriate response to the current 
threat should include reducing TDY personnel in- country, 
significantly reducing TDY visits to Yemen, issuing warden 
messages and public safety announcements. 
5.    (S/NF)  RSO advised the EAC that he passed a sensitive 
tear line regarding the newest threat to senior MOI officials 
during a 3 April, 2005 meeting.  In that meeting the RSO 
asked ROYG to povide enhanced coverage of frequently used 
routes from the Embassy housing area to the Embassy, focusing 
on choke points, suspicious persons, packages or vehicles 
with an eye for improvised explosive devices similar to those 
used in Iraq against insurgent targets.  Additionally, RSO 
informed the EAC that he requested special coverage by marked 
police cars or gun trucks at the front of Embassy residences 
or coverage by more frequent roving patrols, and added 
perimeter and internal security at the Sheraton Hotel in 
Aden.  Finally, RSO thanked MOI for the ongoing coverage of 
the Sheraton Hotel in Sana'a but asked that MOI review best 
practice at the Sheraton Sana'a as well as at the checkpoint 
on the Embassy perimeter where employees and guests enter the 
Embassy's first security cordon.  MOI did a walk around with 
the RSO on the Embassy perimeter observing where sentries 
fighting positions could be bolstered. 
 
6.    (S/NF)  RSO also briefed EAC members about the current 
condition of the LGF radio network.  RSO informed the EAC 
that the radio network is on a banned VHF frequency that has 
little ability to send and receive messages between key posts 
due to the lack of transmitters and mountainous terrain in 
Sana'a.  Additionally, RSO noted that the LGF radio equipment 
is deteriorating rapidly.  However, RSO advised the EAC that 
117K USD of UHF equipment has been provided through DS 
funding and is in shipment.  Noting the inability of post to 
obtain new frequencies, the EAC discussed the viability of 
placing LGF communications temporarily on the only existing 
frequency that is also the E&E network.  RSO recommended this 
solution due to the fact that the Embassy has tried for years 
to purchase an additional frequency with no success.  On the 
subject of emergency communications, RSO also requested MO 
and the EAC look at new software reported to be available for 
mobile phones in Sana'a, which would allow the Embassy to 
have a more responsive telephone tree programmed with all 
community members mobile phone text messaging addresses that 
will allow one emergency or warden message to be sent via 
text message instantly to all community member/employees 
whose mobile phones are programmed.  EAC members showed 
interest in this enhancement for sending urgent unclassified 
text messages regarding breaking security alerts.  MO noted 
difficulties in dealing with ROYG contacts regarding the 
placement of transmitters and acquiring of new frequencies. 
The Ambassador concurred that improvements in emergency 
communication need ongoing attention from applicable Embassy 
offices to include IPC and RSO. 
 
7.    (S/NF)  EAC concluded with the following decisions 
being made:  Effective immediately, and for the next 48 
hours, the consular section would not be open for visa 
applicants/services, a security advisory would be issued to 
the embassy community regarding best security practices with 
routes, travel, work schedules, and personal habits, and a 
warden message would be issued, advising all Americans in 
Yemen to defer in-country travel pending clarification of the 
security situation.  EAC considered issuing an advisory 
restricting travel to and from home and the embassy but 
decided that was not warranted at this time but would be 
evaluated again at the core EAC meeting in 48 hours.  DCM 
instructed each section head to have their staff read this 
EAC report to ensure clear understanding of the EAC security 
guidance.  AMB reiterated again that section heads must 
commence TDY personnel reduction screening immediately. 
Krajeski