US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN583

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HEARINGS ON N-K OPEN NEW SPACE FOR PUBLIC DEBATE

Identifier: 05YEREVAN583
Wikileaks: View 05YEREVAN583 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Yerevan
Created: 2005-04-04 10:59:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PBTS AJ TU AM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 000583 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/SNEC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, AJ, TU, AM 
SUBJECT: HEARINGS ON N-K OPEN NEW SPACE FOR PUBLIC DEBATE 
 
REF: YEREVAN 553 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Public hearings on Nagorno-Karabakh hosted by 
Armenia's National Assembly March 29-30 continue to dominate 
local political discussions and appear to have opened a new 
space for public debate on the issue.  Reports by Foreign 
Minister Vartan Oskanian, Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian and 
pro-government and opposition MPs revealed common themes:  1) 
Armenian policymakers are worried by a perceived increase in 
"bellicose" rhetoric coming out of Baku; 2) legislators and 
NGOs want more access to discussions and documents related to 
resolution of the conflict; and 3) none of the "acceptable" 
scenarios presented by the speakers include an N-K that is 
subject in any way to Azerbaijan.  The idea that resolution 
of the conflict will involve concessions was floated by 
various speakers during the meetings, most notably by the 
traditional hard-liner Sargsian.  The inevitable public 
posturing wove its way in and out of the sessions, but the 
fact that Sargsian and others are now openly talking about 
concessions suggest the GOAM could be ready to engage the 
public on more realistic approaches to resolution of the 
conflict.  While we should not join the GOAM as it 
congratulates itself for hosting a "mature" public discussion 
of the issue, we can acknowledge the role that such 
productive discussions will play in forming public opinion 
that will help foster a resolution.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
STANDING-ROOM-ONLY HEARINGS A FIRST 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The National Assembly's Standing Committee on Foreign 
Relations hosted public hearings on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict March 29-30.  The full range of civil society, press 
and diplomatic corps representatives attended the meeting. 
These hearings represent the most extensive widely publicized 
official forum that the GOAM has hosted to date on the issue. 
 The meetings offer a clearer picture of where public 
officials and private officials stand on the N-K issue.  Post 
will forward a full set of meeting notes to EUR/SNEC and 
EUR/CACEN via classified e-mail.  On April 1, local 
newspapers began printing sections of their notes from select 
speeches, but National Assembly representatives told us not 
to expect the release of the official meeting transcript 
until "July or August at the earliest." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
"BELLICOSE RHETORIC FROM BAKU" TOPS LIST OF THEMES 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (C) Three themes were present in almost all of the 
presentations.  The Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and 
party politicians cited concerns about a perceived increase 
in "bellicose" rhetoric coming out of Baku.  Legislators and 
NGOs called for more access to discussions and documents 
related to resolution of the conflict (with a particular 
emphasis on details surrounding the Key West talks).  None of 
the "acceptable" scenarios presented by the speakers included 
an N-K that is subject in any way to Azerbaijan.  This view, 
while not unexpected, is widely-held, with opposition figures 
commenting, "Even we can agree with the government on this." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
OSKANIAN:  EVERYTHING BUT THE WORD "REFERENDUM" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (C) Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian's comments drew 
heavily from earlier speeches but included a long 
justification of why conflict should not be discussed in 
other international fora (such as the United Nations) or 
"handed over" to groups like the Council of Europe.  He said 
that Azerbaijan's attempt to take discussion of N-K beyond 
the Minsk Group was a move to highlight the issue over 
territorial integrity while muting other issues that "should 
be part of the dialogue."  His speech did not fully follow 
the text that the MFA posted on the web while he was talking, 
putting even greater emphasis on his opinion that the issue 
of self-determination was key to finding a mutually 
acceptable compromise.  Oskanian, in an unprecedented move, 
remained in the National Assembly chamber for the duration of 
the discussions (to the surprise of the organizers as well as 
his personal staff).  During the Q and A session Oskanian 
commented, "If you ask me, Vartan Oskanian, private Armenian 
citizen...of course I would vote for an N-K that is part of 
the Armenian state...but that is just my personal opinion and 
in no way affects my treatment of the subject as FM."  (The 
irony of this remark elicited laughter from the audience.) 
Oskanian continued to underline what he termed "the vital 
role of self-determination" during the Q and A.  MFA Senior 
Advisor Salpi Ghazarian (Amcit) told us after the session, 
"He tried to say 'referendum' every way possible today 
without actually using the word -- and it looks like he did 
it."  Oskanian responded to a question regarding the 
effectiveness of the Minsk Group Co-chairs and the 
possibility of adding a British Co-Chair by responding, "It 
would be useless to add more Co-chairs at this point." 
(Note:  On March 28, Oskanian passed us a letter to Secretary 
Rice (reftel) regarding the N-K conflict.  The letter raised 
concerns about the possibility of the issue of settlements in 
the occupied territories being reintroduced at the U.N., the 
recent clashes on the Line of Contact, and the perceived 
danger of a renewed conflict.  While Oskanian did not 
specifically address the letter during his speech, he did 
touch on similar themes.  End Note.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
SARGSIAN TALKS ABOUT "CONCESSIONS" 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian surprised the audience 
by using the word "concessions" and outlining possible areas 
where the Armenians may have to change their expectations. 
Journalists and diplomats in the audience noted that he used 
the word three times.  He said that Armenia was willing to 
make the following concessions:  1) the GOAM is willing to 
withhold de jure recognition of N-K's independence -- even 
though de facto it has already given it; 2) the GOAM would 
agree on a referendum within N-K on its future status; and 3) 
the GOAM would be willing to engage in negotiations regarding 
the "buffer zones" (referring to the occupied territories). 
Sargsian said that these concessions would be contingent upon 
international guarantees for the security of N-K and Armenia 
as part of those negotiations.  Sargsian spoke of Turkey's 
role in the process more than any of the other speakers 
during the hearings.  He said that Turkey's influence on 
Azerbaijan's role in the negotiations was at times overlooked 
and should be carefully considered by the co-chairs and 
international community.  He painted a long picture of the 
history of the conflict, saying that the causes of the 
conflict should be left to the historians, but that they will 
conclude that N-K's actions were legally justified.  Sargsian 
claimed that, even though movements by Azeri troops had taken 
place within the territory already controlled by Azerbaijan, 
these movements did not result in a significant advantage for 
the Azeris.  He warned, however, that the troops were now too 
close to one another (claiming a distance of just 30 meters 
at some spots) and that the situation could de-stabilize 
quickly given this proximity.  He closed his speech saying 
that Armenia wants a "two-state, one people solution" and 
qualified the statement saying, "We want a settlement like 
the one that exists with Azerbaijan and Turkey...two states, 
one people." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
DASHNAKS:  N-K AS AN ACTOR IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6. (C) National Assembly Deputy Speaker Vahan Hovhanissyan 
(an influential Dashnak party leader and traditional 
hard-liner on N-K issues) praised the hearings as "evidence 
to the mediators that we in Armenia are willing to engage on 
the issue with civil society -- unlike Baku."  He agreed with 
elements of Oskanian's speech, claiming the National Assembly 
-- almost without exception -- viewed the attempt by Azeris 
to take the conflict to other international bodies as a 
"dangerous move."  He said the Azeris had correctly 
identified the United Nations as a forum that would be 
sympathetic to their cause because the organization focused 
on "consequences more than causes."  Hovhanissyan said that 
anything beyond "proven methods of negotiation, including the 
Minsk Group" would complicate the dialogue.  Hovhanissyan 
predicted that April 2005 would be the next major turning 
point in the conflict settlement because of the EU's pending 
decision on the Action Plan for Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia as part of the new neighborhood initiative. 
Hovhanissyan claimed that the Azeris are willing to sacrifice 
a closer relationship with Europe over possibly making 
concessions on N-K.  He predicted that, unless the 
international community intervened all three countries would 
miss the chance to move closer to Europe since the Europeans 
want all of them to enter at the same time.  He said that he 
was not as "enamored" of the package concept as were others 
in Armenia.  He said the step-by-step approach, if it first 
addressed the status issue, would bring the greatest amount 
of progress the fastest. 
7. (C) National Assembly Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
Armen Rustamyan (one of the three most prominent Dashnaks in 
parliament) painted a less positive picture of the N-K 
situation but was upbeat about the hearings in general.  The 
official moderator for the meetings, Rustamyan became the 
most fervent cheerleader of the sessions during his speeches 
and during press availability.  He characterized his reaction 
to public dialogue on N-K as "nothing short of delight." 
(Note:  Rustamyan's reactions to the sessions, if sincere, 
indicate a completely new attitude toward public discussion 
of the N-K issue.  End Note.)  Regarding the status of 
negotiations, Rustamyan was adamant about the need for N-K to 
be an actor in the process and said the GOAM should be 
expected to react commensurably to the actions 
("aggressions") of Azerbaijan, both in the press or on the 
lines of conflict.  Rustamyan called for new structures 
within the GOAM that would coordinate the flow of information 
about the N-K negotiation process between the MFA, National 
Assembly and civil society. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
KAZIMIROV'S DICEY CRITICISM STEALS THE SHOW 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Former Russian Minsk Group Co-Chair Vladimir 
Kazimirov's speech contained the most frank discussion of the 
conflict and almost took on the tone of an independent 
consultant's report to a client.  He slammed the Armenians 
for using the "irrelevant" phrase of "liberated territories" 
and pretending to be the only possible guarantor of security 
for N-K.  He counseled the GOAM to dismiss both the package 
and step-by-step approach to settlement of the conflict, 
favoring instead his "alternate back-up plan" for settlement 
consisting of four distinct areas (settlement, status, 
disposition of the occupied territories and human 
rights/civil society concerns) that mediators should address 
at the same time.  He said the Armenians should be concerned 
about the Azeris' "threats to apply force" over the last 18 
months and suggested that the Azeris had been the only party 
to breach the conditions of the cease-fire by their troop 
movements.  (Comment:  Kazimirov's speech was the most talked 
about intervention by a non-GOAM figure.  Some within the 
diplomatic corps and GOAM independently suggested to us 
following the meeting that Kazimirov was, by his colorful 
remarks, angling for a seat at the table.  An MFA advisor 
predicted that he was likely offering similar counsel to the 
Azeri side in hopes of enhancing his profile as an N-K 
expert.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
OPPOSITION LEADERS BREAK THE BOYCOTT TO SPEAK 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Opposition MPs including Albert Bazeyan, Shavarsh 
Kocharyan and Stepan Zakaryan broke their long-standing 
boycott of the National Assembly for the hearings and gave 
impassioned speeches about the need to share information on 
the negotiation process and called on government leaders to 
devise a more "consistent approach" to the N-K issue.  In 
contrast to opposition MP Viktor Dalakian's filibustering 
attempt at the beginning of the sessions, other opposition 
MPs welcomed the event and remained in the chambers for most 
of the proceedings.  A common theme in the opposition's 
presentations was the need to engage N-K as an actor in the 
negotiations and the legality of N-K's secession.  Shavarsh 
Kocharyan spoke at length about how Armenia might gain 
"legitimacy" in the N-K negotiations were it to make a seious 
effort in moving toward Europe (in fora such as the Council 
of Europe).  While predictably the most politically charged 
presentations, the opposition MPs' remarks were not as 
ill-informed or counter-productive as we expected.  The MPs 
displayed an awareness of Armenia's reputation within certain 
circles as the aggressor in the N-K conflict and talked more 
than other speakers about the need to counter this perception. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  OPENING A SPACE FOR DIALOGUE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) While the inevitable public posturing wove its way in 
and out of the sessions, the fact that Sargsian and others 
are now openly talking about concessions suggests the GOAM 
could be ready to engage the public on more realistic 
approaches to resolution of the conflict.  While the GOAM is 
congratulating itself for hosting a "mature" public 
discussion of the issue, we intend to underscore with our 
interlocutors the role that such discussions will play in 
forming public opinion as part of any future resolution. 
EVANS 

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