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| Identifier: | 05SANAA860 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05SANAA860 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2005-04-04 05:40:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 040540Z Apr 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000860 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OPO/FPD, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC SUBJECT: CORE EAC MEETING SANAA-02 APRIL 2005 REF: 8386-05 (TEARLINE) Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d). 1. (S/NF) Summary: Ambassador convened a core EAC meeting on April 02, 2005, to review updates on recent incidents and threat reporting. EAC members were asked to make recommendations concerning the need to reduce the number of temporary personnel and other measures to reduce Embassy personnel's' security risks. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, RSO, RMAS, POLE, DAO, FBI, OMC, FPD. 2. (S/NF) DCM discussed recent information with the EAC concerning the attack on a Ministry of Defense vehicle on 3/29. The attack, in which a grenade was used against a police car in the Bab-al-Yemen shopping district appears to be the result of an internal conflict among Ministry of Defense personnel and not related to tensions and resumed fighting in the Saada region. The motive for the attack is still unclear. 3. (S/NF) OMC Chief relayed information to the EAC about an unconfirmed incident on Wednesday, March 30th in Aden in which two individuals stole a police car which lead to a running gun battle between the perpetrators and the police. The criminals allegedly attempted to throw a hand grenade out of the vehicle at the police but the device exploded inside the vehicle before it could be thrown. The grenade might have possibly caused death or injury to one or both of the individuals. There is no official confirmation concerning this incident. OMC also told EAC members that according to MOI officials, the Yemeni Coast Guard member (Major Abu Abd Rabu) who claimed to be seeking revenge against Americans for the death of his son in Iraq is being closely monitored. The MOI is attempting to confirm the story concerning his son's death and does not believe this individual is a threat at this time. RSO will attempt to confirm the information concerning the incident with the stolen police vehicle as well as another unconfirmed event involving a student placing an explosive device near a hospital. 4. (S/NF) LEGATT updated EAC members concerning the attempted attack on AMCITS on 12/24/2004. LEGATT was granted several hours of access to the perpetrator Hazim Ali Hassan AL-MAAS. Al-Mass is now claiming he had no intentions to cause harm before he fled and was captured. Both the FBI and the Ministry of the Interior now believe that Al-Mass may not have been working alone as he now claims. The LEGATT is attempting to gain access to other suspects connected with this case and will make this request when the Interior Minister returns from abroad this week. 5. (S/NF) EAC members discussed the kidnapping of two Yemeni contractors working for USAID in Marib. Driver Saleh Al Jidri and engineer Amin Ismael Naji were abducted on the morning of 02 April 2005 at approximately 0930 on their way to Shawba to visit several health facilities. Senior Health advisor Ahmed Attieg was able to reach Jedri and Naji telephonically and both men claimed to be unharmed. Attieg also spoke with one of the kidnappers who did not reveal his identity but claimed to be a member of the Murad tribe whose leader is Sheikh Mohammed Kasim al-Bahaibah. The kidnapper stated that they were holding Jidri and Naji to secure the release of a kinsmen by the name of Mr. Nawaf, who is allegedly being held by the PSO in a prison in Sanaa. Officials from the Marib Governorate and prominent Sheikhs from the southern part of Marib are getting involved to secure the release of the two men. RSO is in touch with the MOI which is claiming this is not a terrorist related incident. 6. (S/NF) Ambassador moved the discussion to recent threat reporting claiming that "planning for attacks against U.S. interests was underway." Ansar Al-Sunna affiliated extremist "ABBAS" and Yemeni extremist "Kan'an" are allegedly coordinating attacks against unidentified American and Jewish targets in Yemen and are waiting for funding and approval before proceeding (REF TEARLINE). RMAS stated they believe the information to be credible and the threat serious. Due to a measurable increase of TDYers, EAC members discussed the merits of reducing the number of TDY personnel and/or limiting the numbers of TDYers scheduled to arrive in the near future. DAO and OMC agreed they could reduce the number of temporary personnel. DCM stated that Post should look at not only this threat but all recent threat reporting to aid Post in its decision to scale back on personnel. Ambassador stated that no agency will arbitrarily reduce current staff levels without a collective decision being made by the EAC. ------------------ POST ACTIONS ------------------ 7. (S/NF) Ambassador called for a general EAC meeting on Sunday, 03 April and asked each section head to review their staffing requirements and to determine critical personnel. Ambassador asked EAC members to be prepared on Sunday to discuss draw-down scenarios of non-essential personnel and how the Embassy might best engage the community at large concerning recent threat reporting. Ambassador strongly urged EAC members to remind Embassy personnel of the need to be vigilant and to heighten their security awareness. RSO will be in contact with security officials from the MOI to request additional assistance to mitigate Post's vulnerabilities and to improve our overall security posture. Krajeski
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