US embassy cable - 05SANAA860

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CORE EAC MEETING SANAA-02 APRIL 2005

Identifier: 05SANAA860
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA860 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-04-04 05:40:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

040540Z Apr 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000860 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OPO/FPD, CENTCOM FOR 
POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC 
SUBJECT: CORE EAC MEETING SANAA-02 APRIL 2005 
 
REF: 8386-05 (TEARLINE) 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary:  Ambassador convened a core EAC 
meeting on April 02, 2005, to review updates on recent 
incidents and threat reporting. EAC members were 
asked to make recommendations concerning the need 
to reduce the number of temporary personnel and other 
measures to reduce Embassy personnel's' security risks. 
Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting 
included: AMB, DCM, RSO, RMAS, POLE, DAO, FBI, OMC, 
FPD. 
 
2. (S/NF) DCM discussed recent information with the EAC 
concerning the attack on a Ministry of Defense vehicle 
on 3/29. The attack, in which a grenade was used against 
a police car in the Bab-al-Yemen shopping district 
appears to be the result of an internal conflict among 
Ministry of Defense personnel and not related to 
tensions and resumed fighting in the Saada region.  The 
motive for the attack is still unclear. 
 
3. (S/NF) OMC Chief relayed information to the EAC about 
an unconfirmed incident on Wednesday, March 30th in Aden 
in which two individuals stole a police car which lead 
to a running gun battle between the perpetrators and the 
police.  The criminals allegedly attempted to throw a 
hand grenade out of the vehicle at the police but the 
device exploded inside the vehicle before it could be 
thrown.  The grenade might have possibly caused death or 
injury to one or both of the individuals.  There is no 
official confirmation concerning this incident.  OMC also 
told EAC members that according to MOI officials, the 
Yemeni Coast Guard member (Major Abu Abd Rabu) who 
claimed to be seeking revenge against Americans for the 
death of his son in Iraq is being closely monitored. The 
MOI is attempting to confirm the story concerning his 
son's death and does not believe this individual is a 
threat at this time.  RSO will attempt to confirm the 
information concerning the incident with the stolen 
police vehicle as well as another unconfirmed event 
involving a student placing an explosive device near a 
hospital. 
 
4. (S/NF) LEGATT updated EAC members concerning the 
attempted attack on AMCITS on 12/24/2004.  LEGATT was 
granted several hours of access to the perpetrator Hazim 
Ali Hassan AL-MAAS. Al-Mass is now claiming he had no 
intentions to cause harm before he fled and was captured. 
Both the FBI and the Ministry of the Interior now believe 
that Al-Mass may not have been working alone as he now 
claims. The LEGATT is attempting to gain access to other 
suspects connected with this case and will make this 
request when the Interior Minister returns from abroad 
this week. 
 
5. (S/NF) EAC members discussed the kidnapping of two 
Yemeni contractors working for USAID in Marib.  Driver 
Saleh Al Jidri and engineer Amin Ismael Naji were 
abducted on the morning of 02 April 2005 at approximately 
0930 on their way to Shawba to visit several health 
facilities.  Senior Health advisor Ahmed Attieg was able 
to reach Jedri and Naji telephonically and both men claimed 
to be unharmed. Attieg also spoke with one of the 
kidnappers who did not reveal his identity but claimed to 
be a member of the Murad tribe whose leader is Sheikh 
Mohammed Kasim al-Bahaibah.  The kidnapper stated that they 
were holding Jidri and Naji to secure the release of a 
kinsmen by the name of  Mr. Nawaf, who is allegedly being 
held by the PSO in a prison in Sanaa. Officials from the 
Marib Governorate and prominent Sheikhs from the southern 
part of Marib are getting involved to secure the release of 
the two men. RSO is in touch with the MOI which is claiming 
this is not a terrorist related incident. 
 
6.  (S/NF) Ambassador moved the discussion to recent threat 
reporting claiming that "planning for attacks against 
U.S. interests was underway."  Ansar Al-Sunna affiliated 
extremist "ABBAS" and Yemeni extremist "Kan'an" are 
allegedly coordinating attacks against unidentified 
American and Jewish targets in Yemen and are waiting for 
funding and approval before proceeding (REF TEARLINE). 
RMAS stated they believe the information to be credible and 
the threat serious. Due to a measurable increase of TDYers, 
EAC members discussed the merits of reducing the number of 
TDY personnel and/or limiting the numbers of TDYers 
scheduled to arrive in the near future.  DAO and OMC agreed 
they could reduce the number of temporary personnel. DCM 
stated that Post should look at not only this threat but 
all recent threat reporting to aid Post in its decision to 
scale back on personnel.  Ambassador stated that no agency 
will arbitrarily reduce current staff levels without 
a collective decision being made by the EAC. 
 
 
------------------ 
POST ACTIONS 
------------------ 
 
 
7.  (S/NF)  Ambassador called for a general EAC meeting 
on Sunday, 03 April and asked each section head to review 
their staffing requirements and to determine critical 
personnel.  Ambassador asked EAC members to be prepared on 
Sunday to discuss draw-down scenarios of non-essential 
personnel and how the Embassy might best engage the 
community at large concerning recent threat reporting. 
Ambassador strongly urged EAC members to remind Embassy 
personnel of the need to be vigilant and to heighten their 
security awareness.  RSO will be in contact with security 
officials from the MOI to request additional assistance to 
mitigate Post's vulnerabilities and to improve our overall 
security posture. 
Krajeski 

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