US embassy cable - 02HARARE1237

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AS KANSTEINER AND PDAS BELLAMY; ALSO FOR AF/S 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2007 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAGR, ECON, PHUM, ZI 
SUBJECT: MAY 22 DISCUSSIONS WITH MDC MP DAVID COLTART 
 
 
Classified By: DCM REWhitehead due to 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (c)  Summary:  Ambassador and DCM met with MDC MP and 
shadow justice minister David Coltart over breakfast on May 
22.  Coltart addressed his personal security and his upcoming 
trip abroad, then described developments in the MDC's legal 
challenge of the results of the March 2002 presidential 
election.  Coltart also described his recent meetings with 
commercial farmers and a dawning GOZ awareness of the 
ramifications of its wayward agricultural policies.  He noted 
that certain, more radical elements of the MDC favor mass 
action, but he expressed his belief that this would not 
succeed and that attempts to impose quick fixes are 
unrealistic.  Coltart concluded with comments on outstanding 
legal cases that pit the MDC against ZANU-PF.  End Summary. 
 
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Security Concerns 
----------------- 
 
2.  (c) The Ambassador recounted to Coltart his recent 
conversation with Congressman Royce in which the latter had 
described credible death threats against Coltart relayed to 
Royce by Orange County constituents of Zimbabwean origin. 
The Ambassador observed that Royce felt that Coltart's best 
option was to leave Zimbabwe.  Coltart replied that he did 
not think that he was in any clear danger; instead, he viewed 
the ZANU-PF threats as mind games.  The Ambassador asked 
Coltart about the whereabouts of his family and whether 
threats had been directed toward them.  Coltart responded 
that they were at home in Bulawayo, and that there had been 
only "indirect" threats. 
 
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Plans to Travel Abroad 
---------------------- 
 
3.  (c) Coltart continued that while he had no intention to 
"go hide overseas," he did intend to leave on May 26 for a 
month-long trip to the UK, USA, and Canada.  He planned to be 
in Washington between June 10 and 14 and hoped to meet with 
Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, PDAS Bellamy, various human 
rights groups, the American Bar Association, and the 
International Bar Association.  His goal was to recruit 
outside observers to attend the upcoming MDC challenge before 
the High Court of ZANU-PF's victory in the March 2002 
Presidential Election. 
 
4.  (c) He readily admitted that the MDC expected the GOZ to 
steer the case to a High Court judge sympathetic to ZANU-PF 
in order to shield the Supreme Court and Mugabe-appointed 
Chief Justice Chidyausiku from dealing with the case.  What 
MDC sought was high-level international attention to the case 
that would bring pressure to bear on the Zimbabwean 
judiciary.  To this end, the MDC was in contact with an 
eminent South African lawyer named Gauntlet who had been 
recommended to Coltart by the ANC.  Coltart said that the 
Rhodesian born Gauntlet had left Rhodesia as a young man 
because of his father's rejection of Ian Smith's UDI regime. 
A Rhodes scholar with offices in both Johannesburg and 
London, Gauntlet was widely viewed in Southern Africa as one 
of the finest trial lawyers on the scene.  Coltart said that 
he would meet with Gauntlet later in the day to discuss the 
possibility of "Operation Gauntlet," an MDC initiative to 
turn the legal challenge into a media event that would 
embarrass ZANU-PF and maintain an international focus on 
Zimbabwe.  He cautioned that scant MDC resources could be the 
limiting factor in what looked to be an eight-week long trial, 
 
5.  (c) Coltart said that abundant evidence was pouring in, 
so much that it would be necessary to do a legal triage to 
avoid the abundance of facts from obscuring the central 
themes.  The MDC planned to forward constitutional arguments, 
especially on Mugabe's unconstitutional use of statutory 
instruments.  They would supplement this with irrefutable 
technical arguments, such as the Registrar General's failure 
to produce the voters' rolls.  The MDC legal team would steer 
clear of basing their case on pre-electoral violence, since 
this could only produce a series of witnesses pitting one's 
word against the other's. 
 
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The Food Crisis 
--------------- 
 
6.  (c) The Ambassador noted that Zimbabwe's looming food 
crisis would once again focus international attention on 
Zimbabwe; should Coltart engage the press while abroad, he 
should stress the rich contribution of errant GOZ 
agricultural policies to the crisis, both in Zimbabwe and 
regionally.  Coltart said that it appeared that the enormity 
of the crisis had finally begun to dawn on GOZ leadership. 
In Chinhoyi, Mashonaland West Governor Chinetsa recently met 
with war vets and police and instructed them to let 
commercial farmers return to farming.  Last weekend, Mugabe 
and several of his ministers had toured farming areas and met 
with several commercial farmers.  Mugabe had urged them to 
put in the winter wheat crop and -- according to another 
source -- expressed surprise and then chastised his entourage 
when a farmer informed him that he could not undertake 
farming activities because he had received a Section Eight 
acquisition notice and because all of his irrigation pipes 
had been stolen. 
 
7.  (c) Coltart observed that the apparent ZANU-PF change of 
heart was too late -- the final date for putting in winter 
wheat had already passed.  In addition, necessary inputs are 
not available.  The government had approached the leading 
irrigation equipment dealer from Bulawayo with open 
pocketbook only to learn it would take him a minimum of two 
months to import enough material to put irrigated commercial 
agriculture back on its feet.  Coltart said that his own 
recent tour of the farming heartland around Gweru and Kwekwe 
had revealed the low morale of the commercial farmers, many 
of whom are planning to leave.  He added that it was 
difficult to say exactly how many farmers remained 
countrywide on their farms.  In Matebeleland South, only five 
farmers had been evicted.  In Marondera, 23 or 24 farmers had 
vacated. 
 
8.  (c) Coltart charged that the Commercial Farmers' Union 
had not provided strong leadership.  The MDC has sought to 
champion the farmers' cause by drafting a contract that sets 
three basic pre-conditions:  an all or nothing approach that 
exempts all commercial farmers from harassment; the 
unhindered access of farmers to their fields, and a 
concomitant return to rural rule of law; and the removal of 
Section Eight provisions.  Coltart said that at this juncture 
few farmers are willing to risk a Section Eight provision 
that mandates two-years' imprisonment for any farmer who 
attempts to till his land after a Section Eight has been 
served.  He added that this amendment rammed through by 
Justice Minister Chinamasa in the most recent rump session of 
Parliament was doomed to be stricken down by the courts, 
since once again Chinamasa had suspended procedural rules and 
rammed the amendment through absent the legally constituted 
Legal Committee of three that must review the law. 
 
------------------------- 
Prospects for Mass Action 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (c) The Ambassador cited newspaper reports on calls for 
mass action and asked Coltart if he thought this constituted 
a viable option.  Coltart replied that he did not believe 
that it could work and that, in fact, it would probably play 
to Mugabe's strength.  He mused that perhaps a two-day 
stay-away might prove the point that the population is 
unhappy.  Coltart said that based on their most recent 
conversation, Morgan Tsvangirai shared this view.  However, 
there is a minority of MDC hawks who favor muscular action 
now.  Coltart noted that almost all of these were Shona, 
mostly from Harare.  He felt that it was possible that some 
of these might be agent provocateurs planted by ZANU-PF.  The 
Ambassador said that we are concerned about Tsvangirai's 
ability to control violent outbreaks that the GOZ could use 
as a pretext to move against the MDC.  Coltart responded that 
there is no quick fix solution to Zimbabwe's woes.  However, 
it is essential to hold out some minimal hope.  This was one 
reason why the MDC continued to pursue its legal challenge to 
Mugabe's election "victory." 
 
---------------- 
Legal Skirmishes 
---------------- 
 
10.  (c) Coltart described the ongoing legal tit for tat 
between ZANU-PF and MDC.  He observed that the GOZ has shown 
no enthusiasm for pressing forward on the treason case 
against Tsvangirai.  The GOZ also continues to harass Coltart 
and other Bulawayo based MDC leaders charged with either 
weapons violations or the 2001 murder of ZANU-PF activist 
Cain Nkala, but they have brought none of these cases to 
trial.  Coltart said that this may be partly due to the fact 
that the courts have not yet acted on the disapperance case 
of Coltart's polling agent Patrick Nabanyama, who was 
abducted by three men in front of his family in June 2000 and 
then turned over to other ZANU-PF supporters who allegedly 
murdered him.  The body has never been found, and now the 
prosecution has released the alleged killers and charged the 
four kidnappers with murder, but not kidnapping.  In the 
absence of the body or any corroborating evidence, Coltart 
said, the three men cannot be convicted, and everyone will go 
free.  Once the prosecutors have disposed of this case, 
predicted Coltart, they will set their sights on the MDC 
supporters accused of murdering Nkala. 
 
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Comment 
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11.  (c) Coltart was surprisingly upbeat about the reigning 
situation.  He seems prepared to take a peaceful, tactical 
approach that will prolong ZANU-PF's international isolation 
and wait for the inevitable results of GOZ policy 
mismanagement, including the food crisis, to further weaken 
ZANU-PF's base of support.  Coltart clearly appreciates that 
failed mass action risks undermining the credibility of the 
MDC, and fracturing its disparate base of support.  On his 
own safety, Coltart still believes that intimidation and not 
elimination is the ZANU-PF strategy.  Fellow MDC MP Roy 
Bennett expressed the same views during a separate meeting 
with DCM and Poloff on May 22, although he admitted that 
certain hard-line elements of ZANU-PF can be very 
unpredictable. 
 
SULLIVAN