US embassy cable - 05CARACAS943

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQ USSOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
SAN JOSE FOR USAID/OFDA TCALLAGHAN AND SVELADO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PGOV, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: SIX WEEKS AFTER THE FLOODS 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 255 
     B. CARACAS 470 
 
Classified By: ECONOMIC COUNSELOR RICHARD M. SANDERS FOR REASON 1.4 D 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Venezuelan Red Cross officials remain highly critical 
of the GOV's handling of the major floods which hit the 
central coast (especially Vargas state) and western Venezuela 
in February, telling econoff that the NGO continues to get a 
cold shoulder at the national level and inadequate 
information from Caracas officials regarding the needs of 
displaced persons.  A visit to Vargas revealed that 
reconstruction efforts continue to use the same techniques 
which failed in the last flood, as well as the far greater 
1999 flood.  Agricultural experts suggest that there will be 
a significant long term impact from the flooding on food 
production.  U.S. assistance has been largely distributed, 
through the Red Cross.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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GOV ROLE - STILL GOING IT ALONE 
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2. (C) As was the case in the immediate aftermath of the 
February Carnival floods, the GOV has continued with a policy 
of not coordinating with the Venezuelan Red Cross (VRC), or 
apparently other relief agencies.  Dr. Hernan Bongioanni, 
Secretary General of the VRC, told econoff March 8 that the 
 
SIPDIS 
VRC had asked if they could transport relief supplies and 
volunteers to Merida on a Venezuelan Air Force plane.  The 
GOV responded that they could ship supplies, but not 
volunteers.  As the VRC wants to remain independent from the 
GOV, it refused the partial offer.  Bongioanni noted that, 
even going by land, the VRC reached many of their 
destinations before the military.  He added that, while the 
VRC has received many requests from Venezuelan officials, it 
has yet to receive any money, or even information, to help 
its own parallel efforts. 
 
3. (C) VRC officers also expressed concern that flood relief 
is being used as a political weapon.  VRC Vice President 
Mario Gomez told econoff March 16 that numerous people had 
been escorted out of a GOV shelter after it was discovered 
they had signed the petition to convoke the referendum to 
recall President Chavez.  There are also reports that housing 
being provided to now homeless families is being given based 
on the same criterion.  The housing is low-quality as well - 
one of the buildings designated by Caracas mayor Juan Barreto 
had already been condemned.  Bongioanni also observed that 
the GOV is inflating statistics of those helped by adding 
people whose homes were barely damaged by rising water and 
received as little as a meal from the GOV. 
 
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A VISIT TO VARGAS 
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4. (C) Econoff visited Vargas on March 17, seeing the areas 
that were hit hardest both in 1999 and 2005.  Lack of running 
water was still a major concern, as one large town near the 
edge of the affected area had it only two consecutive days 
per week, while other, less accessible areas still had none 
at all.  (As of March 30, the GOV was still delivering water 
by truck to affected areas.)  The VRC food distribution had 
gone quite well, with few reported problems, mostly from 
families who felt they should have been included but were 
not.  However, most of those complaints were in Camuri 
Grande, an area where state oil company PDVSA reportedly had 
delivered food to every family.  In towns farther to the east 
- smaller, as well as less accessible - residents reported 
that no GOV representatives had been there, only the VRC. 
Julio Rodriguez, a leader of the Red Cross relief unit, said 
the GOV had only gone as far as journalists might go, to 
provide relief only where positive press coverage - 
especially photo-ops - could be gained. 
 
5. (C) Many of the homeless had been temporarily sheltered in 
local schools.  By March 30, some of them had begun a hunger 
strike to protest that they still had no housing.  Some 
 
reconstruction had begun on the water channels, but the 
biggest ones were being lined with walls of relatively small 
rocks held in place by chicken wire.  Rodriguez observed that 
those were potentially worse than nothing, as a strong flow 
of water would turn the rocks into "projectiles."  There were 
also two areas where large mudslides had covered the highway, 
making the areas beyond inaccessible by road in the immediate 
aftermath of the flood.  These areas were passable on March 
17, with work underway to clear them back to normal. 
 
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FOOD PRODUCTION AFFECTED 
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6. (C) Agriculture and cattle farming were adversely affected 
by the flooding, especially in the region of Zulia south of 
Lake Maracaibo.  Jose Luis Betancourt, President of the 
National Cattlemen's Federation (FEDENAGA), told press March 
1 that 7-8% of national cattle production was affected.  This 
estimate may be low, as other reports had 35% of production 
affected in that area, which is responsible for 60% of 
Venezuelan meat and milk production.  There were also up to 
150,000 hectares (371,000 acres) of cropland underwater, 
including up to 50,000 hectares (124,000 acres) of banana 
fields alone.  Hiram Gaviria, former Minister of Agriculture, 
told polcouns in mid-March that cows were already being 
killed too young to cover the shortages, and that there would 
be shortages of both beef and milk in the near future. 
 
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USG GIFT SPURS OTHERS 
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7. (SBU) On February 11, the Ambassador exercised his 
authority to offer assistance after a disaster, arranging for 
a donation of $50,000 cash to the VRC (ref B).  USAID and 
MilGroup contributed radios and used trucks.  The Red Cross 
agreed to use the donation primarily for emergency food 
assistance in Vargas, where the Ambassador had visited just a 
month before (ref A).  The first tranche of food kits, along 
with hygiene kits, was delivered to approximately 400 
families in the Vargas area on March 12, with a second to 
follow.  Temporary food assistance, paid for with private 
donations, was previously provided to the region.  Rodriguez 
told econoff March 17 that the US donation had spurred 
others, such as the German Red Cross, to also provide 
significant donations, without which the VRC would not have 
been able assist as many families as it had, over 1200 
nation-wide.  Carlos Sanchez, head of the VRC relief team, 
told econoff on March 31 that they planned to distribute the 
last goods bought with USG funds on or about April 13. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8. (C) The flood and its aftermath have largely fallen off 
the media screen right now.  The GOV's initial response was 
quick enough (aided by the fact that the first flooding took 
place during the Carnival holidays when police and military 
are heavily deployed to deal with travelers).  It was also 
heavily publicized.  But with the medium term recovery effort 
seemingly decaying into the usual administrative 
disorganization that characterizes much of the GOV's actions, 
it has ratcheted down the publicity machine to near zero. 
McFarland