US embassy cable - 02HARARE1219

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TSVANGIRAI VOWS MASS ACTION; MUGABE WARNS MDC AGAINST IT

Identifier: 02HARARE1219
Wikileaks: View 02HARARE1219 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2002-05-21 14:09:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV ASEC ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, ZI 
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI VOWS MASS ACTION; MUGABE WARNS MDC 
AGAINST IT 
 
REF: A) HARARE 1151 B) HARARE 1136 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington. 
Reasons: 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  The talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC have collapsed 
for now, as President Mugabe insisted the ruling party would 
not participate until after the courts rule on the 
opposition's legal challenge of the presidential election 
results.  MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai subsequently declared 
that mass action is now unavoidable and inevitable since the 
population is "combative and defiant" and refused to 
recognize Mugabe's legitimacy.  The objective of mass action 
would be to make the country ungovernable and force a new 
election, but an MDC advisor said the party needed at least 
six more months to lay sufficient groundwork for such an 
effort to be successful.  An independent political analyst 
thought that the MDC would not be able to sustain effective 
mass action and should concentrate instead on strengthening 
its own structures, devising appealing policy alternatives, 
and intensifying efforts to build bridges to the continent, 
particulary to South Africa.  Taking these steps, while 
letting food shortages and economic decline take their 
inevitable toll on the current government, might be the best 
of Tsvangirai's narrowing options.  End Summary. 
 
Interparty talks collapse 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  After several days of energetic attempts by the 
South African and Nigerian facilitators to jump start the 
nascent dialogue between ZANU-PF and the MDC, it appears that 
the talks have collapsed before they ever really began.  As 
reported in reftels, the ruling party requested a suspension 
of the dialogue (which had, to date, produced only an 
agreement on agenda items) until the MDC's legal challenge of 
the election results was completed, and President Mugabe 
refused to budge from this position in a subsequent 
discussion with the facilitators.  We understand that MDC 
leader Morgan Tsvangirai plans to phone Nigerian President 
Obasanjo, presumably to follow up on the latter's promise to 
travel to Harare personally to ensure continuation of the 
dialogue. 
 
3.  (C) Prominent political analyst (and occasional advisor 
to the MDC leadership)Brian Raftopoulos told us that the MDC 
needs the talks more than the ruling party.  The dialogue 
gives the MDC visibility, and the longer the opposition party 
is out of the public spotlight, the more they lose 
credibility and relevance. 
 
Mass action "inevitable" 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) In a May 18 interview with an independent weekly 
newspaper, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai said mass action 
now appears to be the only feasible alternative left for the 
opposition party.  "We have come to a stage where non-violent 
action has to be taken.  It is evident that mass action is 
unavoidable.  It is now inevitable."   He reiterated some of 
the points that he made with us on May 14 (reftel), namely 
that the party has engaged in nationwide consultations on the 
way forward, and that the mood around the country is 
"combative and defiant."  He implied that, ultimately, the 
achievement of peaceful change depends upon Zimbabweans 
themselves, not on the international community. Throwing down 
the rhetorical gauntlet, Tsvangirai insisted that "The people 
are refusing to accept Mugabe as their president and as a 
responsible leadership we are going to channel their emotions 
in a positive way that will resolve the crisis this country 
is in." 
 
5.  (C) Gandi Mudzingwa, Tsvangirai's special advisor, told 
us on May 21 that the objective of mass action would be to 
make the country ungovernable, and create an imperative for 
an election rerun by forcing Mugabe from office.  Sufficient 
groundwork, however, has not yet been laid for mass action to 
be successful, according to Mudzingwa.  Although the party 
had completed consultations with its own structures around 
the country, it had only just begun to confer with 
broad-based civic organizations -- such as the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions and the Zimbabwe National Students 
Association -- whose participation would be critical to the 
success of such an endeavor.  In addition, the MDC must also 
concentrate on demoralizing members of the armed forces, 
reducing their inclination to fire on protestors, a factor 
which will depend in large measure on the passage of time, as 
the economy continues to deteriorate and affects soldiers and 
their families.  Mudzingwa estimated that the party would not 
be ready to launch mass action for at least six months. 
Asked whether Tsvangirai agreed with that assessment or was 
inclined to act much sooner, Mudzingwa said it was unclear, 
and that the MDC leader is under tremendous pressure to act. 
In a separate conversation, MDC Member of Parliament David 
Coltart told us some form of limited mass action was 
necessary, as it would send a signal to the region and 
international community of continuing unhappiness with the 
election outcome.  He thought the party could and should shut 
down the country for two days, but that anything longer than 
that would be unsustainable and would simply play into 
Mugabe's hands. 
 
6.  (C) Raftopoulos maintained that the MDC currently does 
not have the muscle to mount effective mass action.  The 
ruling party, he said, has succeeded in neutralizing 
influential civic groups that are key to a successful 
mobilization effort and has the MDC and its leadership very 
much on the ropes.  An attempt to organize a broad-based and 
sustained anti-government campaign would, therefore, almost 
certainly fail, and lead the GOZ to engage in a no-holds 
barred effort to crush the opposition leadership. 
Raftopoulos thought Tsvangirai might go for broke, anyway, 
since he is under enormous pressure to channel the anger of 
his supporters and demonstrate the party's capacity to 
deliver, but the consequences of failure are very high.  In 
order to avoid erosion of its influence and bargaining power, 
Raftopoulos believes the MDC must concentrate on 
strengthening its organizational structures, regularly devise 
dynamic policy positions, particularly on land, maintain its 
international stature as a credible alternative to ZANU-PF, 
and intensify efforts to build political bridges on the 
continent, particulary with South Africa. 
 
Mugabe to "deal with" the MDC 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (U) Meanwhile, President Mugabe's remarks on May 15 to a 
national gathering of ZANU-PF youth made clear that the MDC 
must tread very carefully.  Using the truculent language 
typical of his rantings against his political opposition, 
Mugabe said his government would not tolerate further 
"nonsense and rubbish" from the MDC.  He warned that "if they 
choose violence, then we will deal with them effectively," 
and described the organization of mass action as a "dangerous 
undertaking" that would not be tolerated.   The President 
once again cautioned Zimbabweans against allowing the 
assumption of power by a party he claimed is funded and 
manipulated by the British. 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Morgan Tsvangirai's latitude for maneuver is 
narrowing.  He faces on one side large numbers of disgruntled 
supporters who are fed up with ZANU-PF's economic 
mismanagement and lawlessness and are leaning heavily on the 
MDC to do something to extricate them from increasing misery. 
 Failure in the near term to demonstrate that the party is a 
force to be reckoned with could relegate it to irrelevance. 
At the same time, President Mugabe knows that large-scale 
demonstrations could quickly get out of hand and lead to 
consequences he cannot control.  We have no doubt, therefore, 
that he will use all necessary force to crush demonstrations 
even before they begin.  Under these circumstances, we doubt 
there is a critical mass of people willing to risk their 
necks without some realistic possibility it would lead to 
positive change, an outcome which Tsvangirai cannot 
guarantee. 
 
9.  (C) The MDC leader thus finds himself in a box with few 
good policy options.  His best course of action may be simply 
to bide his time, focusing on strengthening his party 
organizationally and staying in the public spotlight by 
holding regular rallies and proposing appealing, realistic 
policy alternatives to those being pursued by ZANU-PF.  In 
the meantime, worsening food shortages and continued economic 
deterioration will generate their own pressures on the 
current regime, making Mugabe's position domestically and in 
the region increasingly untenable. 
 
 
SULLIVAN 

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