US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI305

UNCLAS DJIBOUTI 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR DS/OPO/FPD - RIKI TRAVERS AND DS/IP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC, DJ 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: REDUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY GUARD 
COVERAGE 
 
REF: A. STATE 28639 
 
     B. LEWIS/RAMOS TELCON ON 3/28/05 
 
1.  (SBU) Upon receipt of REFTEL (A), RSO discussed, with the 
EAC, potential ramifications of a further reduction of 
residential guard services.  During a heightened time of 
threat, the reduction envisioned will present a negative 
message to many of Embassy Djibouti's American and LES 
employees. 
 
2. (SBU) A reduction of residential guard services at the 
proposed time of June 1, 2005, will not only bring about a 
deterioration in staff morale, but it will likely create an 
atmosphere of LES animosity towards the Embassy.  This could 
pose added security risks for the Mission.  Locally employed 
staff (LES) are still reeling from the 10% budget cut applied 
in the waning months of 2004.  The EAC strongly believes that 
local discontent over a reduction in force (RIF) of this size 
could make Mission residences more vulnerable to acts of a 
criminal nature. 
 
3. (SBU) Embassy Djibouti, is a small SEP post in a 98 
percent Islamic country.  Although the threat of Political 
Violence is Medium, the threat from Trans-National terrorism 
is Critical and the Crime threat is High.  With the arrival 
of the U.S. Military in 2002, the presence of American 
personnel within the Embassy and in country has skyrocketed 
and with it an increase in documented incidents of theft and 
burglary.  In addition, 2005 is a presidential election year 
for Djibouti resulting in numerous demonstrations and heated 
rivalries between the party of the incumbent and those who 
oppose it.  These are clear indicators to the EAC that 
official Americans in Djibouti are in harm's way on several 
levels. 
 
4. (SBU) Embassy Djibouti is already running a bare bones 
security program consisting of only one RSO, one LES 
investigator, a Surveillance Detection Unit, and a PSC guard 
force plagued with personnel issues ranging from 
insubordination and belligerence to violations of 
trustworthiness.  As Post's security resources are stretched 
to the limit, adding a RIF will seriously impede the security 
of this Mission.  Furthermore, Host Nation Police Forces lack 
the physical and financial resources to properly respond or 
provide static cover to official American residences. 
 
5.  (SBU) Per REFTEL (A), neither recommendation for a RIF is 
a viable option for Post at this time.  For this and reasons 
cited here, the EAC respectfully requests that the current 
residential guard services remain in place through September 
30, 2005 while a reassessment of the security environment be 
conducted in the 4th quarter of FY-05.  This will allow 
enough time to brief existing personnel on the implications 
of the potential RIF and hopefully ease tensions.  In 
addition, Post will seek technical expertise for the 
installation and maintenance of a Central Alarm Monitoring 
System (CAMS) and a Guard Electronic Monitoring System 
(GEMS).  If it is determined during the 4th quarter FY-05 
review that reductions should be made, the reductions should 
be carried out in conjunction with the FY-06 budget plan and 
should begin in the new Fiscal Year. 
 
6. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95. 
RAGSDALE