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| Identifier: | 05BANGKOK2318 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BANGKOK2318 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bangkok |
| Created: | 2005-04-01 06:19:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM PGOV TH BM ASEAN BURMA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002318 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, TH, BM, ASEAN, BURMA SUBJECT: THAILAND'S POSITION ON BURMA AND ASEAN: NEW FACE, SAME POLICY REF: STATE 50205 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke, Reason: 1.4 (b) and ( d) 1. (C) Summary: The appointment of a new foreign minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, will not substantially change Thailand's "constructive engagement" policy towards Burma, according to a key Foreign Ministry (MFA) official responsible for Burma. Kantathi has already publicly (and privately) made clear that Thailand will not join a movement to thwart Burma from assuming the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006 if it has not implemented democratic reforms before then. The MFA official said the Burma chairmanship issue will be discussed informally in Cebu, but he doubted that other ASEAN governments -- despite some recent statements -- were serious about pressuring Burma on that issue. On related matters, the "Bangkok Process" appears dead because the SPDC does not want to engage potential critics while it still has not achieved any reform progress with which to respond. The Thai believe that the European Union (EU) is on the verge of softening its policy towards Burma. End Summary. 2. (C) On March 22, Post conveyed reftel para 5 talking points in a non-paper to MFA and, on March 31, PolCouns followed up with Director Damrong Kriakruan, the senior working level official handling Burma. Many of reftel's points were also raised with new Foreign Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon on March 30 by visiting Ambassador to Korea and A/S Designate for EAP Christopher Hill (septel), by visiting Congressman Adam Smith (D, WA) in a separate meeting, by Ambassador Boyce in both meetings, and underscored in a paper the Ambassador left with the FM. 3. (C) On March 31, Polcouns and Poloff Sweeney reiterated the reftel points, elaborating on the negative U.S. view of recent developments in Burma and asking for the RTG's latest thinking on its own Burma policy and the Burma ASEAN chairmanship issue. Damrong responded that he expected to brief FM Kanthathi in the near future on the details of Thailand's "Myanmar" policy, but it already seemed clear that no change in the "constructive engagement" approach is in the offing. He said that Kanthati has already publicly stated his disagreement with the idea put forward by some other ASEANs to put pressure on Burma to implement democratic reforms or forgo assuming the ASEAN chairmanship for 2006-7. He said he expected that the RTG will continue to dialogue with the SPDC and, while there are no specific plans yet for Kantathi to travel to Burma, the FM will take time to approach the SPDC as he has had no personal contact with the Burmese generals. Damrong noted that the plan from former FM Surakiart's tenure for an informal "high level meeting" with Burmese General Thura Shwe Mann in late May is still on the calendar. He said that MFA has also been approached by both SPDC FM Nyan Win and PM Soe Win about visiting Thailand, but the RTG has not responded. 4. (C) Carefully emphasizing that it was only his personal view, Damrong said there might be some room for "fine tuning" in Burma relations as Kantathi had also recently been quoted as saying that the RTG "won't let the Burma issue compromise Thailand's regional standing." This, he said, could mean there is a limit to how much the Thais could really engage the Rangoon regime, and might possibly result in "a slight step back" from pursuing the bilateral ties. 5. (C) Damrong also opined, however, that recent calls by Malaysian and Singapore MPs and officials to bring up the Burma chairmanship issue in Cebu later this month are mainly "a show," allowed by many ASEAN governments, including the RTG, to highlight concerns to Burma while keeping the ASEAN mechanism and policy of non-interference essentially unchanged. The Thai view, he commented wryly, is "Let Kraisak make the noise," a reference to Senator Kraisak Choonhavan, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who is a vocal critic of the Burmese regime. And Damrong said that he did not expect that, in the end, other ASEAN governments would join a serious consensus to pressure the Burmese, not even the Malaysians. (Note: On March 29, it was reported locally that Prime Minister Thaksin -- supposedly commenting on a statement made by Malaysian FM Syed Hamid Albar to the effect that the Burma chairmanship issue could only be decided by a full ASEAN consensus -- agreed that "all ASEAN members together will have to find a solution and decide how to show collective concern to Myanmar for its adjustment." End Note.) 6. (C) Damrong said he nevertheless did expect the Burma chairmanship issue to be discussed extensively at the ASEAN ministerial "retreat" in Cebu although, in line with ASEAN traditions, the issue does not even appear on the "indicative list" (informal agenda) for that meeting. However, he also noted that Burma is aware that it has about 15 months left until the ASEAN ministerial in November 2006, enough time to run through its National Convention constitution-drafting exercise and a possible referendum, which will probably be "good enough for ASEAN." 7. (C) Damrong commented that the "Bangkok Process" is definitely dead as the SPCD does not want to participate in meetings with Europeans and others where they (the Burmese) have nothing to talk about in terms of democratic openings and only open themselves up to criticism. Damrong also mentioned that he had a follow-on meeting that morning with a local representative of the European Commission (EC) who apparently wanted to discuss contemplated changes in European Union policy towards Burma in the direction of resuming high-level visits, restoring some European aid programs, and easing up on European use of sanctions. After that meeting, Damrong told PolCouns that the EU seems to moving to these revised positions. ARVIZU
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