US embassy cable - 05PARIS2162

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: (C) GENERAL AOUN ON LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: 3/21/05 EMAIL DIBBLE-WOLFF AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment: At the Department's 
recommendation (reftel), DCM met with former Lebanese Armed 
Forces Commander General Michel Aoun at the latter's request 
March 29.  Throughout the hour-long discussion, Aoun stressed 
his status as the most long-standing opponent of Syria's 
occupation of Lebanon, and made a distinction between himself 
and other opposition figures unwilling to voice public 
support for UNSCR 1559 and willing to work with the Syrians 
prior to Hariri's assassination.  Aoun confirmed his 
intention to return to Lebanon soon without offering a date, 
said he expected that Syria's regime would fall post-Lebanon 
withdrawal, and suggested that political negotiations with 
Hizballah might be the best way to move towards eventual 
disarmament and dismantling of the organization.  On the 
latter point, Aoun suggested that USG indication of 
flexibility on court cases against Hizballah's top leadership 
could help facilitate Hizballah's disarmament and 
dismantling.  DCM responded by reiterating that USG policy on 
Hizballah's status as a terrorist organization remained 
unchanged.  Aoun also suggested that Lebanon's spring 
parliamentary elections might be best delayed until August, 
and asserted that if the elections were held on time, 
Hizballah would win big.  Aoun was relaxed and confident, but 
relatively soft-spoken throughout the discussion; he appeared 
not to be seeking USG support so much as a captive audience. 
End summary and comment. 
 
2. (C) DCM opened the discussion by reiterating the need for 
full implementation of UNSCR 1559, a full Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon before elections, free and fair elections, and a 
credible international investigation into former PM Hariri's 
assassination.  DCM stressed that he was meeting with Aoun 
privately at the latter's request and that he had no message 
to convey from the USG, other than the need for the Lebanese 
opposition to remain united and determined in its pursuit of 
Lebanon's full independence and sovereignty.  Aoun responded 
by highlighting his Congressional testimony prior to adoption 
of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Restoration of 
Sovereignty Act, which he credited with leading to the 
eventual adoption of UNSCR 1559.  Aoun expressed confidence 
that the criminal charges against him launched by the 
Lebanese government after his 2003 Congressional testimony 
would soon be dismissed, along with trumped up court cases 
dating back to the 1990's which he said falsely accused him 
of financial misdeeds and defamation of the State.  Aoun 
commented that the latter investigations had turned up 
nothing, but essentially confiscated his savings, pension and 
other financial holdings.  (Comment: The meeting took place 
in a spacious, but relatively sparsely furnished apartment in 
Paris' 17th arrondisement, which did not appear to be a 
residence.  End comment.)  Aoun opined that the Lebanese 
government, in the face of continued pressure, appeared to be 
ceding in its accusations against him and would likely 
withdraw the court cases soon, which would permit his return 
to Lebanon.  (Comment: Aoun did not offer a specific time 
frame for his return, though in a recent French press 
interview he suggested that he could return to Lebanon by 
late April, provided that the Syrians had fully withdrawn by 
then.  End comment.) 
 
 
DISTINCTIONS WITHIN THE OPPOSITION, I WAS FIRST 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Asked whether he planned to assume a political role in 
the opposition after returning to Lebanon, Aoun responded 
with a confident yes.  He clarified, though, that, in his 
view, there was no "one opposition" but rather two; the first 
group, which he called "my opposition," had taken on a 
resistance role and refused cooperation with the Syrian 
government since 1990.  The second group, which he termed the 
"parliamentary opposition," had accepted working with the 
Syrian government and behaved more like the political 
opposition in ordinary democratic countries, a category in 
which occupied Lebanon was not a member.   The assassination 
of Hariri, in Aoun's view, had caused the second group to 
move over to his camp of resisting Syrian domination.   Aoun 
stressed that for years, he had been alone in his calls for 
Syrian withdrawal and was told by the other opposition 
leaders that he was setting the bar too high in demanding an 
end to the Syrian presence.  He claimed to have faced similar 
reprobation from the "parliamentary opposition" for his 
efforts to seek greater USG involvement and contacts with 
U.S. legislators, including those of Jewish background; he 
asserted that Lebanese politicians, at Syrian instigation, 
parroted anti-Israeli rhetoric more harshly than any other 
Arab governments.  Adding to the list of distinctions between 
him and other opposition figures, Aoun said he was the only 
opposition leader to support UNSCR 1559 openly, while others 
had been afraid to do so.  Despite the opposition's newfound 
confidence, Aoun described it as not fully liberated and 
still hesitant, still exhibiting a hostage mentality after 30 
years of Syrian occupation. 
4. (C) Commenting on specific opposition factions, Aoun 
described the Sunnis as remaining "decapitated" for now, in 
the wake of Hariri's demise.  Aoun cited Mohammed Safadi of 
Tripoli and Fouad Mahkzoumi as potential leaders of the Sunni 
community; he noted that he was in regular contact with 
Mahkzoumi.  Aoun said he was unsure whether Hariri's sister, 
Bahia, had staying power as leader of the Sunnis though she 
had been temporarily propelled into her current high-profile 
role by her brother's demise.  Aoun commented that Druze 
leader Jumblatt remained the symbolic leader of the 
opposition though he represented the Druze only.  Aoun coyly 
declined to offer any comments on the political leadership of 
Lebanon's Christian opposition. 
 
DISARMING HIZBALLAH 
-------------- 
 
5. (C) Though Aoun expressed full support for UNSCR 1559 
implementation, he was cautious on the resolution's call for 
disarmament and dismantling of militias, including Hizballah. 
 He opined that integrating Hizballah into Lebanon's 
political society would be problematic and take time, and 
that Hizballah's senior leadership might need "guarantees" in 
order to lay down its arms.  He added that it would be 
helpful to know "U.S. limits" on the degree to which Aoun 
might be able to engage with Hizballah's top leadership and 
assure them that they were not being sought by U.S. courts. 
Aoun, who claimed to have high-level contacts with Hizballah, 
opined that it might be "comforting" for the organization's 
leadership to know that it was not being sought by U.S. 
courts, which could help negotiations to lead to Hizballah's 
disarmament and integration into the political scene. 
Resolving this concern, according to Aoun, was a key priority 
for Hizballah's top leadership.  DCM reiterated that U.S. 
policy on Hizballah's status as a terrorist organization 
remained unchanged, and that we continued to call for 
unconditional implementation of UNSCR 1559.   Aoun toughened 
his language on Hizballah a bit, remarking that there was no 
justification for Hizballah's remaining armed in the wake of 
the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, since both the 
Israeli threat and Sheb'a farms issue were nothing more than 
pretexts used by Hizballah.  He added that he was seeking to 
gradually deflate Hizballah's "sacred" image among the 
Lebanese and Arab public as the victorious resistance to 
Israel, and show that there was no continued justification 
for militias independent of the central government.  Aoun 
concluded that Hizballah was increasingly isolated, and had 
to lower its maximalist demands in the wake of the March 14 
opposition demonstration, and that Hizballah Chief Nasrallah 
appeared ready to make deals. 
 
6. (C) Aoun added that Syrian and Iranian influence on 
Hizballah remained an important external factor which would 
contribute to a harder Hizballah line, particularly given the 
Syrians' ties to Nasrallah.  He opined, however, that the 
fall of the Asad regime in Syria, with the likely arrival of 
a Sunni government, would change everything, including by 
ceasing Syria's support for Hizballah.  Asked whether he 
thought a fall of the Syrian regime was likely in the wake of 
a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Aoun responded that 
such an outcome was a certainty, not a mere possibility. 
 
AOUN'S PLAN 
---------- 
 
7. (C) Outlining his party's priorities for Lebanon, Aoun 
stressed that reasserting Lebanese control over the nation's 
security was imperative, through reorganization of the 
domestic security services, which existed and operated as a 
clone of the Syrian system, operating via terror and threats. 
 Lebanon's political institutions similarly would have to be 
revived and change fundamentally in character to take on 
their intended functions.  He described the current 
parliament as practically Syrian-appointed given the degree 
of SARG domination.  He dismissed the Lebanese judiciary as 
totally corrupt and transformed into the instrument of the 
executive to pressure opposition through "mafia laws" and 
selective justice.  Lebanon's economy also needed major 
restructuring to battle corruption, eliminate the political 
and economic "neo-feudalism" practiced by Lebanon's 
oligarchs, and overcome the nation's overwhelming debt burden. 
 
 
ELECTIONS THIS YEAR AND IN 2009 
------------- 
 
8.  (C) On Lebanon's spring parliamentary elections, Aoun 
said he would be willing to accept a slight delay of a few 
months, to about August, in the wake of continued delays over 
formation of a government.  He opined that if elections were 
held on time, Hizballah would "win all the seats."  He 
speculated that a government composed of "familiar old 
figures" might soon emerge.  Delaying elections by a few 
months, in Aoun's view, would give Lebanon the chance to 
emerge from the current emotionally charged atmosphere, and 
give time to convince the public that Hizballah's continued 
maintenance of a separate militia was unwarranted.  Aoun 
stressed that Lebanon's democratization process would take 
time, and require the development of institutions reduced to 
irrelevancy by Syria.  He opined that the real battle of 
Lebanon's political future would therefore be elections in 
2009.  Aoun added that his party was the only one in Lebanon 
to offer a secular alternative for the Lebanese people, and 
that the rise of secular democracy in Lebanon could be an 
inspiration for the rest of the region. 
 
 
COMMENTS ON U.S., FRANCE AND OTHERS 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Aoun described current U.S. efforts on Lebanon as 
"perfect."  He cautioned, at the same time, that the U.S. 
should be careful to make sure that it was clear in its 
Lebanon policy and not play a double-game.  The U.S., he 
advised, should remain similarly vigilant regarding those in 
Lebanon who say privately that they want to be close to the 
U.S. while participating in anti-U.S. demonstrations.  Aoun 
was less generous in his comments on French President Chirac, 
whom he said had been angered by criticism Aoun made of 
Chirac's 1996 visit to Lebanon, during which the French 
president asserted that implementation of the Ta'if accords 
could not precede a full and comprehensive Middle East peace. 
 Aoun said that after the 1996 flap, over remarks Aoun made 
to the press, French authorities essentially banned him from 
giving interviews and practically put him under a gag order. 
The situation, of course, had evolved considerably by today, 
with Aoun now free to talk to the press, such as a February 
2005 LBC interview, which he claimed had attracted a TV 
audience of two million in Lebanon -- perhaps not all 
supporters.  Aoun added that he had no contact with the 
French government, though he enjoyed support among some 
French parliamentarians, who had shown greater activism in 
supporting his anti-Syrian occupation message since 2000.  On 
other Arab governments, Aoun described Jordan as the most 
forthright in supporting Lebanon's independence, which he 
attributed to ties to Lebanon among former AUB graduates in 
the top levels of Jordan's government.  Aoun added that Egypt 
had helped pressure Syria to withdraw, though he quipped that 
the GOE remained wary that the images of a million Lebanese 
opposition protesters would inspire popular demands for 
political freedom in Cairo. 
 
10. (C) Comment: Aoun was relaxed, confident, and somewhat 
soft-spoken throughout the meeting, which offered few 
surprises.  He appeared gratified that the meeting took 
place, and more eager to pontificate before a captive U.S. 
audience than convey a specific message or request to the 
USG, beyond his probing about the legal status of Hizballah 
leadership figures.  While Aoun was detailed in recounting 
his status as the first to call for Syria's withdrawal from 
Lebanon, he did not offer details on current efforts to 
support Lebanon's opposition or describe the extent of his 
base of support in Lebanon.  Aoun seemed more intent in 
pointing out his credentials as an opposition leader and the 
distinctions between himself and other opposition figures 
rather than focusing on what unites them.   End comment. 
LEACH