US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1571

C O N F I D E N T I A L TAIPEI 001571 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS AIT/W AND USTR 
STATE FOR EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/EP, EB/IFD/OIA AND NP/ECC/MCCELLAN 
USTR FOR SCOTT KI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2025 
TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, TW, Counterterrorism/Nonproliferation 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN'S NEW COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE 
 
Classified By: AIT DIRECTOR DOUGLAS PAAL, REASON 1.5 B/D 
 
1.  (C) AIT/T Deputy Director Keegan hosted officials from 
Taiwan's new Counterterrorism Office (CTO) to lunch on March 
29 in order to learn the function of the office and how AIT 
might interface with it.   Taiwan participants included 
National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary General 
(Steve) Wang Hsi-tien, NSC Officer Mao Huei-ming, CTO 
Director Kuo Lin-wu, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFO) 
representative to the CTO (Herman) Chiu Tai-chin.   The 
report below is a readout of the lunch conversation. 
 
2.  (C) Established in November 2004, the CTO operates under 
the Executive Yuan (EY) and reports directly to the EY 
Secretary General Cho Jung-tai.  In addition to the Chief and 
 
SIPDIS 
Deputy Chief, the CTO has six officers representing six 
different agencies -- Taiwan Evironmental Protection Agency, 
Department of Health, Ministry of Justice, Atomic Energy 
Commission, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
and Science and Tech Advisory Group -- and six researchers. 
CTO has a broader mandate than just CT.  Wang Hsi-tien, who 
repeatedly compared the CTO to the U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, described the CTO as a fusion of the 
intelligence and operational facets of CT, as well as being 
responsible for dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist 
attack.  He explained how CTO would coordinate an interagency 
response to a variety of natural disasters and epidemics and 
to terrorist attacks with chemical, biological, radiological 
and other WMD.  After any disaster occurred, the CTO would be 
involved in determining the appropriate response, whether 
police, environmental, health, or military. 
 
3.  (C) Wang stated that Jemaah Islamiya was the most likely 
CT threat to Taiwan, although there were possible threats 
from other terrorist organizations.  The discussions also 
touched on the possibility of a terrorist "decapitation" 
attack by Mainland China. 
 
4.  (C) The Taiwan officials were eager to discuss the CTO 
and its functions.  They suggested both sides might benefit 
from increased cooperation and information sharing.  They 
also sought U.S. support and assistance in developing 
intelligence contacts with third country and regional groups, 
such as national intelligence agencies of ASEAN countries. 
AIT responded with interest to the suggestions on 
cooperation, but suggested that Taiwan might have to first 
prove itself a real player in the CT game before it could 
hope for much cooperation from other countries. 
 
5.  (C) The guests also discussed Taiwan,s newTechnology 
Protection Law and the State Department-sponsored Export 
Control and Border Security (EXBS) Workshop held last week in 
Taipei.  Chiu and Mao, who  attended the workshop on behalf 
of CTO and NSC, both stated that they found the EXBS training 
to be valuable and worthwhile for Taiwan.  They agreed, 
however, that Taiwan's Technology Protection Law needed at 
the very least to include specific reference to the strategic 
high tech commodities already identified in Taiwan,s Export 
Control Law.  This part of the discussion ended with an 
update on the status of the P2S5 seized from North Korea, now 
held in Kaohsiung.  Experts had met and determined the only 
safe way to destroy the material would be by fire, a little 
bit at a time, and a Taiwan company has been identified as 
qualified to do the work.  It would probably take five or so 
months before all the material was destroyed. 
PAAL