US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA2854

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KJUS, CO, Human Rts 
SUBJECT: DUTCH-FUNDED COLOMBIAN ANTI-IMPUNITY PROJECT 
LOOKING FOR NEW DONORS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reason 1.4(d). 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (U) For the past six years, the Government of the 
Netherlands (GON) has supported GOC efforts to investigate 
and prosecute high-profile human rights cases.  In June 
2003, the GON agreed to donate 340,000 USD to finance a 
two-year Anti-Impunity Project focused on resolving 
prominent cases and developing an official GOC policy to 
combat impunity.  The Project is administered by the local 
office of the UNDP and managed by two special committees: 
the Technical Committee (TC), which selects cases for 
funding, and the high-level Special Impetus Committee 
(CEI), which establishes policy and reviews progress.  The 
TC has designated 170 cases as eligible for Project 
funding, including a majority of the last decade's most 
notorious massacres and political murders.  The cases are 
divided proportionally among alleged abuses by the State, 
paramilitaries, and guerrillas.  The Dutch, who participate 
in the committees as observers, have asked that the Project 
prioritize cases of alleged State misconduct.  In December 
2004, the CEI produced a document outlining the GOC's new 
public policy against impunity.  The GON is hiring outside 
experts to evaluate the Program, and will probably continue 
to fund it -- although perhaps at reduced levels -- if the 
evaluation is positive.  The GON is encouraging other 
governments interested in human rights, including the USG, 
to support the Project.  End Summary. 
 
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Background 
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2. (C) In 1998, the Government of the Netherlands (GON), in 
consultation with relevant Dutch NGOs, decided to dedicate 
a significant percentage of its foreign assistance to 
Colombia to address the issue of impunity.  To accomplish 
this goal, the GON worked with the administration of former 
President Andres Pastrana to subsidize, beginning in 2000, 
the investigation of high-profile human rights cases 
stalled in the Colombian judicial system.  The GON provided 
piecemeal assistance for specific cases, but was generally 
disappointed by GOC officials' seeming lack of enthusiasm 
for the initiative and reluctance to face unpleasant 
realities about corruption and inefficiency in the judicial 
system.  Dutch DCM Arno Ambrosius, who managed the initial 
phases of the GON initiative, said the GON was "unhappy 
with the response [it] received from the Pastrana 
administration and its lack of will to go after important 
cases.  Instead, [the GON was] left seeing results from 
only minor cases."  With the Uribe administration's 
inauguration in August 2002, the GON began to notice a 
gradual improvement in the GOC's motivation to address 
sensitive human rights cases.  As a result, in June 2003 
the GON and GOC designed a new two-year plan to address 
high-profile cases and develop a permanent public policy to 
address impunity. 
 
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Funding 
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3. (SBU) The GON financed its new Anti-Impunity Project 
with approximately 340,000 USD, administered locally by the 
Colombia office of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP).  Local UNDP officials distribute funds for 
investigations to relevant GOC entities such as the 
Prosecutor General's Office ("Fiscalia") and Inspector 
General's Office ("Procuraduria") consistent with the 
project's case priorities.  According to Ambrosius, the 
Anti-Impunity Project's flexibility in funding needs as 
diverse as investigators' per diem, gasoline, and forensic 
tests "eliminates any excuses the GOC might have not to 
pursue these cases." 
 
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Case Selection and Program Coordination 
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4. (C) Two special committees manage the Anti-Impunity 
Project.  The Technical Committee (TC) selects the cases 
the Project will fund.  It meets about four times a year 
and is composed of working level representatives from the 
Presidential Program for Human Rights (PPDH), the Fiscalia, 
the Procuraduria, and the Colombia office of United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR).  The GON 
participates as an observer without voting privileges. 
According to Alberto Lara, the PPDH's director of the 
Anti-Impunity Project, the TC has designated 170 cases as 
eligible for Project funding, including nearly all the 
high-profile massacres and political murders that have 
occurred in Colombia over the past decade.  The 138 cases 
listed in the TC's latest report (December 2004) are 
distributed roughly evenly among abuses blamed on 
Government forces, paramilitaries, and guerrilla 
organizations such as the FARC and ELN.  Ambrosius told 
Embassy officials the Dutch have emphasized the need to 
prioritize investigations of alleged State misconduct, 
arguing that such inquiries are the surest way to 
demonstrate the legitimacy and value of the Project.  He 
added, however, that the GON is disinclined to take overt 
credit for this emphasis or the success of any particular 
investigation, noting that his Embassy's security is not 
what it could be. 
 
5. (U) The Special Impetus Committee ("Comiti Especial de 
Impulso," or CEI) is a high-level group that meets at least 
twice a year to establish Project priorities and policies, 
coordinate inter-agency cooperation, and review progress on 
specific cases.  The members of the CEI are the 
Vice-President, the Inspector General ("Procurador"), the 
Vice-Minister of Justice, the National Director of Public 
Prosecutors (the third-ranking official in the Fiscalia), 
the President of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary 
(CSJ), the National Human Rights Ombudsman ("Defensor del 
Pueblo"), the Director for Justice and Defense Issues at 
the National Planning Department, the Director of the 
Fiscalia's Human Rights Unit, the Director of the 
Procuraduria's Human Rights Office, the Director of the 
PPDH, the PPDH's Anti-impunity Project Director, the PPDH's 
Human Rights Coordinator, the GOC's External Advisor for 
the Anti-Impunity Project, the Director of the Colombia 
office of the UNHCHR, and the Director of European Union's 
Colombia Cooperation Office, with the Dutch DCM and 
Technical Cooperation Officer present as observers.  The 
Vice-President and senior Fiscalia officials must attend 
every CEI meeting.  The CEI met five times in 2004. 
 
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Public Anti-Impunity Policy 
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6. (U) In December 2004, the CEI satisfied a GON priority 
by producing a document outlining the GOC's public policy 
to combat impunity, which will govern the investigation and 
prosecution of prominent human rights crimes.  Some 
noteworthy elements of the new public policy include 
improving training for investigators and prosecutors, 
strengthening coordination between the Fiscalia and 
Procuraduria and other national and local government 
entities, strengthening protection programs for victims, 
witnesses, investigators, and prosecutors, and enhancing 
the financial and organizational resources available for 
special field investigations. 
 
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Future Funding 
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7. (U) Both the GOC and GON told Embassy officials they are 
cautiously optimistic about the Project's potential to help 
improve the human rights environment over the long term. 
Ambrosius said the GON hopes that other governments, 
including the USG, will join it in supporting the 
Anti-Impunity Project.  Current GON funding for the Project 
will expire in June 2005.  The Embassy of the Netherlands 
plans to hire a team of three outside experts beginning in 
May 2005 to evaluate the project.  If the critique is 
positive, the GON will most likely continue some level of 
funding.  However, Ambrosius emphasized that it is in the 
interests of the entire international community, 
particularly those countries focused on human rights, to 
support the Project and build momentum with the GOC to 
overcome the institutional inertia of impunity. 
 
WOOD