US embassy cable - 05PORTAUPRINCE871

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 000871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, HA 
SUBJECT: HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE POISED TO TACKLE REBEL 
VIOLENCE 
 
REF: A. PAP 689 
 
     B. PAP 688 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Following another attack against his officers 
on March 27, Haitian National Police (HNP) Director General 
(DG) Leon Charles told Ambassador on March 29 that the HNP 
was preparing to undertake three significant operations in 
the coming days to root out violent gang leaders and their 
ex-FADH counterparts. Charles underscored, however, that the 
HNP was still outgunned by the heavily armed gangs, and 
requested urgent attention to the weapons license request 
still under review by the USG. The DG also confirmed plans 
for integrating 200 ex-FADH into the upcoming 17th training 
class for the HNP and repeated his assurance that these 
recruits would be treated the same as all the other trainees. 
The meeting finished at the same time a planned pro-Lavalas 
protest got underway downtown under the watchful eye of both 
the UN and the HNP. End summary. 
 
2. (C) Charles explained that on the night of March 27, 
several heavily armed men associated with Gren Sonnen's gang 
attacked the house of the Director of Police for the West 
Department (DDO) near Delmas 33. The HNP sent officers to the 
scene to respond at which point a firefight between the HNP 
and gang members ensued. At that moment, another vehicle 
carrying 3 police officers, a private security guard and a 
civilian driver entered the crossfire near the gang members. 
One of the police officers and the two civilians were killed. 
Later that night, criminal gangs reportedly killed two 
individuals at the port area as well. 
 
3. (C) The Delmas 33 attack is the latest in a string of 
violent incidents against the police and other official 
outposts of the IGOH allegedly perpetrated by heavily armed 
outlaws associated with renegade ex-FADH leader Ravix 
Remissainthe, and gang leaders Sonnen and Dred Wilme. On 
March 25, a grenade was thrown at the Provisional Election 
Council (CEP) headquarters in the same Delmas neighborhood, 
and on March 22 a bodyguard for the Minister of Justice was 
killed. Sonnen announced on the radio March 29 that he was on 
a "man hunt" for official members of the IGOH, while Ravix 
has called his followers in the Central Plateau to wage a 
"guerrilla war" against the HNP and MINUSTAH. Post has noted 
on many occasions the growing alliance between Ravix and 
Port-au-Prince gang leaders. 
 
4. (C) Charles told the Ambassador that the attacks show the 
armed opposition is desperate and has nowhere left to hide. 
He estimated that there is a core group of only 15 bandits 
associated with most of the incidents, but that they were 
much better armed (with M-14s in particular) than the HNP. 
Charles explained that Sonnen used to be an informant at the 
Delmas 33 police station under the Aristide government and 
knows very well how to recognize weakness and the potential 
for an easy attack. He suggested that all three (Wilme, Ravix 
and Sonnen) sustain their ranks with a constant inflow of 
cash from drug trafficking and carjacking. 
 
5. (C) The HNP has planned three strategies for targeting 
these individuals. First, Charles has replaced the command at 
the Delmas 33 with a stronger cadre of officers, though he 
admitted the district still lacked the proper weapons to face 
off against Sonnen's gang. (Note: MINUSTAH has also stepped 
up foot patrols in the Delmas 33 area and is providing round 
the clock security for the CEP. End note). The Ambassador 
assured Charles post would follow up on the IGOH weapons 
order waiver request forwarded to the Department March 16. 
 
6. (C) Second, Charles described a joint MINUSTAH/HNP 
operation in Cite Soleil to control access into and out of 
the area for two weeks beginning March 31. The mission will 
establish checkpoints and provide a base for smaller 
operations inside the dense slum area to try to root out gang 
leaders, particularly Dred Wilme, providing a platform for 
humanitarian projects to begin flowing into the neighborhood 
once again. Third, Charles also confirmed MINUSTAH, CIVPOL 
and the HNP have established a special team to target the 
most wanted individuals. He said Special Intelligence Unit 
(SIU) Director Michael Lucius was assisting along with ten 
HNP officers detailed to the team. 
 
7. (C) Charles confirmed once again the same information 
regarding the integration of ex-soldiers into the HNP he gave 
the Charge March 15 (PAP 688). He said a list of 450 ex-FADH 
had been identified by the Bureau de Gestion, from which 
Charles was in the process of selecting 200 candidates to 
join the 17th class of recruits slated to begin training in 
April. Charles said that the recently demobilized ex-soldiers 
from Cap Haitien (ref B) were not part of this group and 
would not integrate into the HNP. It was Charles' 
understanding, he said, that the 200 ex-FADH in the 17th 
class would be the last group of former military integrated 
into the HNP this year. He added that he planned to bring the 
ex-FADH from the 15th class who left early back to the 
Academy to complete their training in April. Charles also 
denied that the ex-FADH in the 15th class had been deployed 
to HNP swat units, and assured that they had instead been 
positioned at several sub-stations throughout the country. 
 
8. (C) Charles said the 450 potential ex-FADH recruits had 
already taken a written test and a physical exam and were 
awaiting the results of their lab tests. He assured the 
Ambassador that the tests given to the ex-FADH recruits in 
March were the "same type" as the exams given last summer to 
civilian recruits. Ambassador Foley explained that it was 
imperative for the USG to be able to verify that the testing 
and training were totally legitimate in every possible way, 
and asked Charles to give the ex-FADH recruits last summer's 
test as well. Charles said he would meet with the Police 
Academy Director Maxime and OAS Vetting Program Director Guy 
Magny to discuss the possibility. Charles also downplayed 
rumors that other countries (France, Mexico, Chile) would 
contribute significantly to HNP training, saying these ideas 
"were a dream." The Ambassador repeated that the U.S. 
welcomed assistance from other countries as long as all the 
HNP recruits received the same training. 
 
9. (C) Charles worried that others in the IGOH had made 
unrealistic promises to the ex-FADH about jobs in the HNP in 
order to convince them to demobilize. He fretted that the Cap 
Haitien group set an example that others may follow, and 
indicated the IGOH could have over 1,000 former soldiers 
looking for jobs soon, including the 235 from Cap Haitien; 
300 from Ouanaminthe; 200 from the Central Plateau; 150 from 
Les Cayes; 100 from Arcahaie, and 80 from St. Marc. 
Ambassador explained that the USG was willing to contribute 
$3 million to the DDR process but could not release the funds 
until the IGOH concluded an agreement with the UN on an 
acceptable DDR strategy and program. 
 
10. (C) The Ambassador finished by reminding Charles to 
remain vigilant on human rights abuses by the HNP. Ambassador 
acknowledged that there were elements, both Lavalas and 
ex-FADH, disguising themselves as police and committing 
abuses. Nonetheless, he said, the HNP must demonstrate that 
it is actively investigating allegations of human rights 
abuse in a very public way, releasing the results quickly and 
transparently and prosecuting officers who are found to be 
guilty of abuse. Charles responded that the best way to guard 
against human rights abuses was to increase joint operations 
with CIVPOL. He said that CIVPOL's co-location program with 
the HNP would provide the oversight and reporting needed to 
properly monitor human rights allegations. Ambassador 
promised to engage CIVPOL Commissioner Dave Beer and others 
in MINUSTAH to accelerate the co-location program. He also 
strongly encouraged Charles to change HNP uniforms and badges 
in an effort to differentiate legitimate HNP from 
impersonators. Charles welcomed proposals to create more 
secure identification and more visible badges but seemed 
reluctant to modify the HNP uniform. We will continue to 
press Charles on the need to clearly distinguish bonafide HNP 
officers from the impostors. 
 
11. (C) Comment: It is encouraging to see the HNP and 
MINUSTAH on the same page regarding joint operations in 
Delmas, Cite Soleil and the special unit designed to track 
down criminal leaders such as Ravix, Sonnen and Wilme. 
MINUSTAH and the HNP are on the spot now that both the 
chimere and ex-FADH camps have declared guerrilla war against 
the HNP, IGOH and even the UN. As the meeting with Charles 
adjourned, Sonnen's gang was ransacking the area around 
Delmas 33 once again. The capture of just a handful of these 
criminal leaders would provide the HNP and MINUSTAH with a 
much-needed victory and open the political space 
significantly for elections. Unfortunately the HNP remains 
outgunned and is still struggling to co-locate with CIVPOL. 
The imminent arrival of USG-provided equipment (vehicles, 
supplies, computers and more) is welcome, but we should aim 
to expedite the weapons waiver and U.S. contribution to the 
joint-station program to get cooperation moving. Charles is 
the latest to confirm the figure of 200 ex-FADH for the 17th 
class, but this promise, along with our reminders to provide 
equal treatment of ex-FADH recruits, will require continued 
vigilance on our part. End comment. 
 
FOLEY