US embassy cable - 05HARARE486

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South African Ambassador Acknowledges MDC Momentum

Identifier: 05HARARE486
Wikileaks: View 05HARARE486 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2005-03-30 17:02:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI Zimbabwe South African Relations March 05 Elections
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/F DAS WOODS, AF/S FOR MOZENA/NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS EUMEM EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/12/15 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, Zimbabwe South African Relations, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: South African Ambassador Acknowledges MDC Momentum 
 
Classified by:  Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under 
Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) South African Ambassador Ndou called on Ambassador 
Dell March 30 to discuss Zimbabwe's March 31 parliamentary 
elections.  Ndou said his government hoped to see the 
election lead to intra-party talks and perhaps to a 
government of national unity.  The Ambassador responded 
that the MDC seemed poised to able to claim a democratic 
mandate and that if that scenario played out, the 
negotiations should be about political transition - leading 
to the end of President Mugabe's hold on power.  He added 
that how the GOZ presented the results would be key to 
containing voter anger and potential violence.  Ndou and 
the Ambassador agreed that while violence was down, the 
elections had not met the SADC principles definition of 
free and fair.  End Summary. 
 
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Post-Election Scenarios 
----------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ndou said SAG's post-election goal was to encourage 
dialogue and national reconciliation.  Zimbabwe needed to 
look to its future.  In that regard, he noted SAG 
disappointment with the Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who seemed 
fixated on the past and especially Zimbabwe's colonial 
history - as witnessed by the "anti-Blair" campaign - 
rather than finding ways to address Zimbabwe's many 
problems.  He said the SAG would encourage Mugabe to 
negotiate with the MDC after the elections and perhaps to 
include MDC officials in the new cabinet. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the nature of those 
negotiations would depend on the elections results as well 
as how those results were presented by the GOZ.  The MDC 
seemed poised to win a majority of the contested seats - 
61.  In that case, it would have every right to claim a 
democratic victory and the negotiations should be about a 
political transition, with Mugabe departing power.  Much 
would depend on how Mugabe responded to such a result and 
whether he would be willing to accept the will of the 
people.  Much would also depend on how quickly and 
transparently the results were communicated to the 
Zimbabwean people.  If there were a delay as in 2000, it 
could lead to street protests and violence, for which the 
GOZ would be responsible.  The Ambassador acknowledged that 
the MDC would also need to take Mugabe's concerns into 
account, specifically his desire for a "soft landing." 
 
4. (C) Ndou said a smooth transition would be critical.  He 
agreed that the MDC could do well and noted that Mugabe was 
unlikely to get the two-thirds majority he had sought, 
which would have allowed him to dictate the terms of his 
departure.  The Ambassador agreed and noted that even if 
the MDC won less than a majority it would have demonstrated 
that it was a legitimate party and deserved to be treated 
with respect by Mugabe.  For five years, ZANU-PF had tried 
- and failed - to deal with the MDC by crushing it.  The 
MDC for its part had behaved like a loyal opposition -- 
responsibly and non-violently.  As part of normalizing 
politics here, the time had come when Mugabe had to treat 
them as a legitimate part of the Zimbabwean political 
system.  Ndou agreed and noted in that regard that the 
SAG's impression of MDC President Tsvangirai had improved 
considerably as a result of the campaign.  Tsvangirai had, 
for instance, adopted a conciliatory and statesman-like 
tone, arguing that an MDC victory was a victory for the 
people rather than for his party. 
 
------------------ 
SAG Observer Teams 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) Ndou said there are four South African observer 
teams in Zimbabwe: an African National Congress (ANC) team, 
a team from Parliament, a team from the South African 
Government (SAG) and the South African portion of the South 
African Development Community (SADC) team.  He said the ANC 
team would likely issue a statement before it left 
Zimbabwe, probably either April 1 or April 2.  However, the 
parliamentary and SAG teams would likely return to Pretoria 
before issuing a combined statement next week.  He said the 
SADC team would also likely issue a preliminary statement 
April 1-2, with a full report to follow later. 
 
6. (C) Ndou noted the large number of U.S. diplomatic 
observers and asked for our impressions of the pre-election 
environment.  The Ambassador said we were also seeing 
rising enthusiasm for the election and real excitement that 
change was in the offing.  However, we were also hearing 
consistent reports of low-grade harassment and intimidation 
but that violence was much less than in the 2000 and 2002 
elections.  Ndou said South African observers were 
reporting the same findings, which they were calling 
"subtle intimidation."  He said some of the tactics noted 
including the use of food assistance by the GOZ to 
encourage a vote for ZANU-PF and claims on the part of 
ZANU-PF activists that translucent boxes would allow them 
to tell how someone voted. 
 
7. (C) Ndou observed that the apparent success of some of 
these tactics undermined GOZ claims to be in accord with 
SADC election principles.  It was clear, for instance, that 
the newly formed Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) lacked 
the resources to conduct either voter education or to run 
the election itself.  Instead, it was once more the 
Registrar General, a GOZ functionary, who was running the 
election.  The Ambassador agreed and said it was important 
for all observer teams to accurately report the pre- 
election environment, using the SADC principles as a 
guideline. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) The meeting was at the SAG Ambassador's request and 
we believe represented a clear signal that having tested 
the Zimbabwean waters over the past ten days, they are 
anticipating a good MDC showing.  Ndou said he didn't 
expect any "large swings" but that 10-15 seats could change 
hands - which if true would give the MDC a majority of the 
elected seats.  Alternatively, it could give ZANU-PF a two- 
thirds majority - a very significant shift in either case. 
However, the SAG Ambassador made clear that his country 
would view a good MDC showing favorably, as the best 
foundation for a negotiated settlement that would include 
Mugabe's departure and the installation of a government 
committed to Zimbabwe's future.  We were struck by Ndou's 
clear and objective assessment of the situation in 
Zimbabwe.  It will be especially interesting and telling to 
see whether President Mbeki will take such a balanced view 
or if he'll contrive a way to justify any outcome, 
including massive ZANU-PF fraud. 
 
Dell 

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