Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 05HARARE486 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05HARARE486 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Harare |
| Created: | 2005-03-30 17:02:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL PHUM ZI Zimbabwe South African Relations March 05 Elections |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000486 SIPDIS FOR A/F DAS WOODS, AF/S FOR MOZENA/NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE DEPARTMENT PASS EUMEM EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/12/15 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, Zimbabwe South African Relations, March 05 Elections SUBJECT: South African Ambassador Acknowledges MDC Momentum Classified by: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d ------- Summary ------- 1. (C) South African Ambassador Ndou called on Ambassador Dell March 30 to discuss Zimbabwe's March 31 parliamentary elections. Ndou said his government hoped to see the election lead to intra-party talks and perhaps to a government of national unity. The Ambassador responded that the MDC seemed poised to able to claim a democratic mandate and that if that scenario played out, the negotiations should be about political transition - leading to the end of President Mugabe's hold on power. He added that how the GOZ presented the results would be key to containing voter anger and potential violence. Ndou and the Ambassador agreed that while violence was down, the elections had not met the SADC principles definition of free and fair. End Summary. ----------------------- Post-Election Scenarios ----------------------- 2. (C) Ndou said SAG's post-election goal was to encourage dialogue and national reconciliation. Zimbabwe needed to look to its future. In that regard, he noted SAG disappointment with the Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who seemed fixated on the past and especially Zimbabwe's colonial history - as witnessed by the "anti-Blair" campaign - rather than finding ways to address Zimbabwe's many problems. He said the SAG would encourage Mugabe to negotiate with the MDC after the elections and perhaps to include MDC officials in the new cabinet. 3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the nature of those negotiations would depend on the elections results as well as how those results were presented by the GOZ. The MDC seemed poised to win a majority of the contested seats - 61. In that case, it would have every right to claim a democratic victory and the negotiations should be about a political transition, with Mugabe departing power. Much would depend on how Mugabe responded to such a result and whether he would be willing to accept the will of the people. Much would also depend on how quickly and transparently the results were communicated to the Zimbabwean people. If there were a delay as in 2000, it could lead to street protests and violence, for which the GOZ would be responsible. The Ambassador acknowledged that the MDC would also need to take Mugabe's concerns into account, specifically his desire for a "soft landing." 4. (C) Ndou said a smooth transition would be critical. He agreed that the MDC could do well and noted that Mugabe was unlikely to get the two-thirds majority he had sought, which would have allowed him to dictate the terms of his departure. The Ambassador agreed and noted that even if the MDC won less than a majority it would have demonstrated that it was a legitimate party and deserved to be treated with respect by Mugabe. For five years, ZANU-PF had tried - and failed - to deal with the MDC by crushing it. The MDC for its part had behaved like a loyal opposition -- responsibly and non-violently. As part of normalizing politics here, the time had come when Mugabe had to treat them as a legitimate part of the Zimbabwean political system. Ndou agreed and noted in that regard that the SAG's impression of MDC President Tsvangirai had improved considerably as a result of the campaign. Tsvangirai had, for instance, adopted a conciliatory and statesman-like tone, arguing that an MDC victory was a victory for the people rather than for his party. ------------------ SAG Observer Teams ------------------ 5. (C) Ndou said there are four South African observer teams in Zimbabwe: an African National Congress (ANC) team, a team from Parliament, a team from the South African Government (SAG) and the South African portion of the South African Development Community (SADC) team. He said the ANC team would likely issue a statement before it left Zimbabwe, probably either April 1 or April 2. However, the parliamentary and SAG teams would likely return to Pretoria before issuing a combined statement next week. He said the SADC team would also likely issue a preliminary statement April 1-2, with a full report to follow later. 6. (C) Ndou noted the large number of U.S. diplomatic observers and asked for our impressions of the pre-election environment. The Ambassador said we were also seeing rising enthusiasm for the election and real excitement that change was in the offing. However, we were also hearing consistent reports of low-grade harassment and intimidation but that violence was much less than in the 2000 and 2002 elections. Ndou said South African observers were reporting the same findings, which they were calling "subtle intimidation." He said some of the tactics noted including the use of food assistance by the GOZ to encourage a vote for ZANU-PF and claims on the part of ZANU-PF activists that translucent boxes would allow them to tell how someone voted. 7. (C) Ndou observed that the apparent success of some of these tactics undermined GOZ claims to be in accord with SADC election principles. It was clear, for instance, that the newly formed Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) lacked the resources to conduct either voter education or to run the election itself. Instead, it was once more the Registrar General, a GOZ functionary, who was running the election. The Ambassador agreed and said it was important for all observer teams to accurately report the pre- election environment, using the SADC principles as a guideline. ------- Comment ------- 8. (C) The meeting was at the SAG Ambassador's request and we believe represented a clear signal that having tested the Zimbabwean waters over the past ten days, they are anticipating a good MDC showing. Ndou said he didn't expect any "large swings" but that 10-15 seats could change hands - which if true would give the MDC a majority of the elected seats. Alternatively, it could give ZANU-PF a two- thirds majority - a very significant shift in either case. However, the SAG Ambassador made clear that his country would view a good MDC showing favorably, as the best foundation for a negotiated settlement that would include Mugabe's departure and the installation of a government committed to Zimbabwe's future. We were struck by Ndou's clear and objective assessment of the situation in Zimbabwe. It will be especially interesting and telling to see whether President Mbeki will take such a balanced view or if he'll contrive a way to justify any outcome, including massive ZANU-PF fraud. Dell
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04