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| Identifier: | 05BANGKOK2259 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BANGKOK2259 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bangkok |
| Created: | 2005-03-30 11:21:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM PGOV BM TH ASEAN BURMA China |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002259 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BM, TH, ASEAN, BURMA, China SUBJECT: JAPANESE DFM TANAKA BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA REF: STATE 50205 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4(d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 25 Ambassador met with visiting Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Tanaka to discuss Tanaka's recent official visit to Burma. Tanaka said he delivered "a strong message" to the SPDC on democracy and the release of ASSK. Tanaka reported that Prime Minister Soe Win did not show any flexibility, blaming the NLD and outsiders for the lack of progress. Tanaka said that Japan was increasingly concerned with the situation in Burma, especially in light of China's growing regional influence. Tanaka urged continued close U.S.-Japanese cooperation, along with engagement with ASEAN. END SUMMARY JAPAN'S MESSAGE TO BURMA: "PROGRESS NEEDED ON DEMOCRACY" 2. (C) On March 25, visiting Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Tanaka briefed the Ambassador about his just-completed trip to Burma. Tanaka met with Prime Minister Soe Win and Foreign Minister Nyan Win. (NOTE: Tanaka said he would also brief Thai MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Ganjana-Goonchorn about his mission to Burma before heading back to Tokyo. END NOTE) Tanaka said his instructions were to deliver a clear message to the SPDC that progress was needed on national reconciliation and democracy. Tanaka indicated he had been selected to deliver the message because he is a "friend of Burma". He highlighted some of his past experience with the country, noting that he first traveled to Rangoon in 1976, and has met with both Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and Khin Nyunt (before Khin Nyunt was removed from office). 3. (C) Tanaka claimed that he told the SPDC in blunt terms that the GOJ has serious concerns about Burma's internal situation. He said he "demanded" that the SPDC release ASSK and other political detainees and lift restrictions on the NLD as part of the democratization process, and said these reforms needed to take place before Burma's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006/7. 4. (C) Soe Win and Nyan Win responded to Tanaka's demarche by repeating "often heard excuses," according to Tanaka. The Burmese said they are deeply mistrustful of "the West" because of Burma's colonial legacy. Soe Win reportedly said the regime also did not trust UN Special Envoy Razali, saying he was duplicitous and only interested in self-promotion. Lastly, Soe Win said they had no faith in ASSK and the NLD, blaming her for "working against the territorial integrity of the country." Soe Win reportedly claimed that the SPDC was strongly committed to national reconciliation as part of the "road map," but blamed the NLD's boycott with delaying the process. 5. (C) Tanaka said he pressed Soe Win and Nyan Win but they were not flexible in their positions, and refused to directly answer Tanaka's repeated questions about progress on democratization. Tanaka "warned" Soe Win that Japan would continue to press the regime on these issues over the next year. STRATEGIES FOR BURMA: THE UN AND ASEAN 6. (C) Tanaka told the Ambassador that he believes that increased UN involvement is a crucial component for progress on Burma. Tanaka privately expressed frustration about UN Special Envoy Razali and his lack of access to the regime. Tanaka said that, as a "pragmatic issue," Razali's status needed to be discussed, suggesting that a replacement is in order. 7. (C) Tanaka said the GOJ would continue to push its democracy message for Burma through diplomatic channels, but acknowledged the importance of close coordination with the U.S.: "We must see eye to eye." Most important, Tanaka said, is ASEAN engagement. Tanaka said the integrity of ASEAN is at stake and that Singapore and Malaysia have to play a larger role in the issue. ROLE OF CHINA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 8. (C) Behind much of Tanaka's comments was an obvious concern over the influence of China in Burma. Tanaka repeatedly stressed the importance that Japan places on the situation in Burma vis--vis China's growing regional role. Tanaka said the GOJ has noted with concern how Chinese interests and influence have rapidly increased in Burma. He also noted how active China has been in the region, and that the Chinese role would continue to grow with time. Tanaka suggested that both the U.S. and Japan needed to engage China more on Burma. 9. (C) Tanaka opined that the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia might provide a useful model for future dealings on Burma and other issues in Southeast Asia -- with the U.S., Japan, China, and India at the core. Tanaka said that Japan was looking ten years ahead, when China will be the biggest player in Southeast Asia. He said Japan believed that this rise could benefit everyone, but only if the U.S. remained engaged. BOYCE
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