US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK2259

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JAPANESE DFM TANAKA BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA

Identifier: 05BANGKOK2259
Wikileaks: View 05BANGKOK2259 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bangkok
Created: 2005-03-30 11:21:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM PGOV BM TH ASEAN BURMA China
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BM, TH, ASEAN, BURMA, China 
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DFM TANAKA BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA 
 
REF: STATE 50205 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4(d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  On March 25 Ambassador met with visiting 
Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Tanaka to discuss Tanaka's 
recent official visit to Burma.  Tanaka said he delivered "a 
strong message" to the SPDC on democracy and the release of 
ASSK.  Tanaka reported that Prime Minister Soe Win did not 
show any flexibility, blaming the NLD and outsiders for the 
lack of progress.  Tanaka said that Japan was increasingly 
concerned with the situation in Burma, especially in light of 
China's growing regional influence.  Tanaka urged continued 
close U.S.-Japanese cooperation, along with engagement with 
ASEAN.  END SUMMARY 
 
JAPAN'S MESSAGE TO BURMA: "PROGRESS NEEDED ON DEMOCRACY" 
 
2.  (C)  On March 25, visiting Japanese Deputy Foreign 
Minister Tanaka briefed the Ambassador about his 
just-completed trip to Burma.  Tanaka met with Prime Minister 
Soe Win and Foreign Minister Nyan Win.  (NOTE: Tanaka said he 
would also brief Thai MFA Permanent Secretary Krit 
Ganjana-Goonchorn about his mission to Burma before heading 
back to Tokyo.  END NOTE)  Tanaka said his instructions were 
to deliver a clear message to the SPDC that progress was 
needed on national reconciliation and democracy.  Tanaka 
indicated he had been selected to deliver the message because 
he is a "friend of Burma".  He highlighted some of his past 
experience with the country, noting that he first traveled to 
Rangoon in 1976, and has met with both Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK) and Khin Nyunt (before Khin Nyunt was removed from 
office). 
 
3.  (C)  Tanaka claimed that he told the SPDC in blunt terms 
that the GOJ has serious concerns about Burma's internal 
situation.  He said he "demanded" that the SPDC release ASSK 
and other political detainees and lift restrictions on the 
NLD as part of the democratization process, and said these 
reforms needed to take place before Burma's chairmanship of 
ASEAN in 2006/7. 
 
4.  (C)  Soe Win and Nyan Win responded to Tanaka's demarche 
by repeating "often heard excuses," according to Tanaka.  The 
Burmese said they are deeply mistrustful of "the West" 
because of Burma's colonial legacy.  Soe Win reportedly said 
the regime also did not trust UN Special Envoy Razali, saying 
he was duplicitous and only interested in self-promotion. 
Lastly, Soe Win said they had no faith in ASSK and the NLD, 
blaming her for "working against the territorial integrity of 
the country."  Soe Win reportedly claimed that the SPDC was 
strongly committed to national reconciliation as part of the 
"road map," but blamed the NLD's boycott with delaying the 
process. 
 
5.  (C)  Tanaka said he pressed Soe Win and Nyan Win but they 
were not flexible in their positions, and refused to directly 
answer Tanaka's repeated questions about progress on 
democratization.  Tanaka "warned" Soe Win that Japan would 
continue to press the regime on these issues over the next 
year. 
 
STRATEGIES FOR BURMA: THE UN AND ASEAN 
 
6.  (C)  Tanaka told the Ambassador that he believes that 
increased UN involvement is a crucial component for progress 
on Burma.  Tanaka privately expressed frustration about UN 
Special Envoy Razali and his lack of access to the regime. 
Tanaka said that, as a "pragmatic issue," Razali's status 
needed to be discussed, suggesting that a replacement is in 
order. 
 
7.  (C)  Tanaka said the GOJ would continue to push its 
democracy message for Burma through diplomatic channels, but 
acknowledged the importance of close coordination with the 
U.S.:  "We must see eye to eye."  Most important, Tanaka 
said, is ASEAN engagement.  Tanaka said the integrity of 
ASEAN is at stake and that Singapore and Malaysia have to 
play a larger role in the issue. 
 
ROLE OF CHINA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
8.  (C)  Behind much of Tanaka's comments was an obvious 
concern over the influence of China in Burma.  Tanaka 
repeatedly stressed the importance that Japan places on the 
situation in Burma vis--vis China's growing regional role. 
Tanaka said the GOJ has noted with concern how Chinese 
interests and influence have rapidly increased in Burma.  He 
also noted how active China has been in the region, and that 
the Chinese role would continue to grow with time.  Tanaka 
suggested that both the U.S. and Japan needed to engage China 
more on Burma. 
 
9.  (C)  Tanaka opined that the Six-Party Talks in Northeast 
Asia might provide a useful model for future dealings on 
Burma and other issues in Southeast Asia -- with the U.S., 
Japan, China, and India at the core.  Tanaka said that Japan 
was looking ten years ahead, when China will be the biggest 
player in Southeast Asia.  He said Japan believed that this 
rise could benefit everyone, but only if the U.S. remained 
engaged. 
BOYCE 

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