US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1525

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SOONG'S WEAKENING GRIP OVER THE PFP

Identifier: 05TAIPEI1525
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI1525 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-03-30 09:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINR PREL TW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

300958Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001525 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, TW 
SUBJECT: SOONG'S WEAKENING GRIP OVER THE PFP 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 00344 
 
     B. TAIPEI 00773 
     C. TAIPEI 01229 
     D. 2003 TAIPEI 03480 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: PFP Chairman James Soong's attempts to carve 
out an independent political niche for himself in Taiwan may 
be under threat from growing disunity within his party.  The 
February 24 meeting between Soong and President Chen 
Shui-bian may have prolonged Soong's political survival but 
the PFP-DPP cohabitation arrangement has also driven a wedge 
between the PFP and KMT, factionalized the PFP, and raised 
questions about whether Soong is actually in charge of the 
party he founded after his 2000 presidential bid.  This 
factor could limit Soong's ability to deliver on any promises 
he makes to the DPP over major legislation, including the 
special defense procurement budget.  End Summary. 
 
End of KFP 
---------- 
 
2. (C) Since the December 2004 LY election, People First 
Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong has flirted with the DPP as 
a means of maximizing the PFP's influence within its Pan-Blue 
coalition with the KMT and to prevent absorption of the PFP 
into the KMT.  Soong's machinations have thus far produced 
mixed results.  On the one hand, Soong's February 24 
cohabitation arrangement with President Chen Shui-bian dashed 
KMT hopes for a post-election KMT-PFP merger.  Both KMT and 
PFP officials tell AIT that a merger, once thought virtually 
inevitable by Pan-Blue supporters, is now out of the 
question.  Local media now use the term "Pan-Blue" only for 
the KMT and New Party, once again describing political 
alignment in Taiwan as Green, Blue, and Orange camps, just as 
it did in 2003 before the KMT-PFP alliance.  Since the LY 
election, the term "kuo-ch'in," (an amalgamation of Chinese 
names of KMT and PFP) that was frequently used in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2004 presidential election has 
virtually vanished from Taiwan's political lexicon. 
 
Disunity within the PFP 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) James Soong's success in preventing the KMT from 
swallowing the PFP may have cost him control of his own once 
highly disciplined party.  While Soong managed to contain 
discontent over the PFP selection of its LY Deputy Speaker 
nominee in February (Ref A), his position within the PFP 
appears to be weakening with each passing month.  He still 
faces major fallout from his February 24 meeting with 
President Chen (Ref B).  PFP LY members pointedly rejected 
Soong's nominee for party caucus leader just days after the 
Chen-Soong meeting.  The same divisions emerged over PFP 
participation in the Pan-Blue March 19 rally (Ref C).  Both 
episodes revealed a three-way, perhaps even four-way, split 
within the PFP, with Soong holding sway over only one of 
these factions.  These intra-party divisions have checked 
Soong's maneuvering on legislation, including the special 
defense procurement budget and the party leadership's ability 
to enforce discipline on decisions taken by Soong on a range 
of issues. 
 
Soong's Entourage 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) Of the various PFP factions, the one faction Soong 
still can count on is a group of diehard loyalists that 
includes Policy Chief Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao), Legislator 
Daniel Hwang (Yih-jiau), and former International Affairs 
Director Raymond Wu (though Wu has been on the verge of 
accepting positions in the DPP government several times). 
There is also a subgroup of dependable lieutenants who are 
not part of Soong's inner circle but generally follow Soong's 
leadership wherever he goes, notably LY Deputy Speaker Chung 
Rong-chi and Acting Secretary General Chin Ching-sheng. 
Daniel Hwang remarked to AIT that even though this latter 
group "is not close to Soong, they implement Soong's 
instructions faithfully and that is good enough."  Soong 
recruited politicians like Chung and former LY Speaker Liu 
Sung-pan (now a fugitive of the Taiwan law, at large in the 
United States) in order to bring government and political 
experience into the PFP.  Most of these individuals were 
former KMT members who had been marginalized by the current 
KMT leadership.  They gravitated to Soong in 2000 hoping that 
he would win the presidency and appoint them to high-level 
positions.  Since their political careers are inextricably 
tied to Soong's, they are likely to remain faithful to him. 
PFP Vice Chairman Chang Chau-hsiung is in a category of his 
own.  Despite being ethnic Taiwanese in the 
Mainlander-dominanted PFP and his lack of any discernible 
ideology, Chang served as Soong's running mate in 2000 and 
remains a loyal deputy. 
 
LY Caucus 
--------- 
 
5. (C) The PFP LY caucus represents a second independent 
center of power within the party.  In early March, PFP LY 
members elected outspoken PFP Legislator Lee Yong-ping as 
their leader, rejecting Soong's loyalist nominee, Lee 
Hung-chun.  Lee Yong-ping had been a leader of a group of 
Pan-Blue "young Turks" that had forced the Pan-Blue 
leadership to reverse its positions on referenda and 
constitutional revisions during the 2004 presidential 
election campaign.  Soong reportedly disliked the tactics 
espoused by Lee and her cohorts and pointedly marginalized 
them after he regained control over the Pan-Blue position in 
the final months of the campaign (Ref D).  The LY Caucus 
rebellion was directed both at Soong personally and the 
leadership style of the previous PFP Caucus Leader, Liu 
Wen-hsiung.  Liu often served as the enforcer, which has 
allowed Soong to avoid direct confrontation with his party 
subordinates.  PFP Legislator Sun Ta-chien told AIT that he 
and his colleagues would not stand for another strongman 
Caucus Leader like Liu, who simply issued orders without 
consulting his colleagues. 
 
Looking Out for Number One 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (C) A third group is an ideologically diverse group of 
electoral climbers.  Since Summer 2004, KMT insiders, 
including LY President and KMT Vice Chairman Wang Jin-pyng, 
have been telling AIT that a group of fifteen PFP legislators 
were preparing to rejoin the KMT.  The members of this group 
have nothing particular in common with each other and are 
generally regarded with suspicion by the rest of the PFP 
because their dissatisfaction with Soong appeared to be 
motivated purely by self-interest rather than ideology. 
Political insiders expect many of these PFP legislators 
planning to run in the year-end mayoral and magistrate 
elections to try to run under the KMT banner.  PFP Legislator 
Sun Ta-chien, who is considering a run for Taoyuan County 
Magistrate, told AIT that many of his supporters are KMT 
members, suggesting that his long-term interests may lie in 
that direction.  PFP Legislator Lee Ching-an, a likely 
candidate for Taipei City Mayor, has been among the most 
outspoken critics of Soong's relationship with the DPP, while 
her brother, PFP Legislator Lee Ching-hua has been even 
harsher in his criticisms (Note:  Their father, Lee Huan, has 
stayed with the KMT as an elder.  End note).  Former Caucus 
leader Liu Wen-hsiung, planning to run for Keelung City 
Mayor, had earlier also been rumored to be considering a 
switch to the KMT but has apparently realigned himself with 
Soong after the KMT rejected him as a candidate. 
 
7. (C) One of the most notable recent turnarounds in Taiwan 
politics has been PFP Legislator Chou Hsi-wei, whose 
aggressive public persona came to symbolize the PFP in the 
minds of voters.  Many observers now, however, expect Chou to 
join the KMT in order to secure its nomination for Taipei 
County Magistrate.  Shortly after LY election, Chou began to 
criticize Soong and his party members.  Chou has complained 
bitterly to AIT that Soong did not provided adequate 
leadership in the LY election and characterized his PFP 
colleagues as "backbiting and jealous."  His colleagues have 
returned the favor by spreading rumors that Chou has "been 
begging for a job" from the DPP government. 
 
Rank and File: Dazed and Confused 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The fourth group consists of the 150 lesser-known 
party officials in the Taipei headquarters and county field 
offices.  These individuals do not necessarily diverge from 
Soong or the first three groups ideologically nor do they 
struggle for their own platforms.  As the other groups 
quarrel amongst themselves, however, members of this group 
are becoming increasingly disenchanted with both Soong and 
the party leadership, and have emerged as an additional drag 
on Soong's flexibility.  PFP Deputy Public Affairs Director 
Liao Wen-chang, who is representative of this otherwise 
anonymous group, told AIT that he and his fellow party 
officials were "confused about everything."  Liao said that 
he questioned Soong's leadership and that he feared that the 
PFP is about to dissolve.  Moreover, Liao said that he feels 
so much despair that he now preferred to stay away from party 
affairs as much as possible. 
 
Soong Tries to Rally the Troops 
------------------------------- 
9. (C) Soong loyalists acknowledge that the Chairman's recent 
contacts with the DPP have threatened PFP unity.  However, 
PFP Legislator Daniel Hwang insisted to AIT that Soong had 
made progress in convincing his supporters of the wisdom of 
his leadership.  Prior to the Chen-Soong meeting, Hwang said, 
about eighty percent of the PFP LY members supported Soong's 
action, while the other twenty percent had reservations. 
Hwang explained that Soong had spent several hours pleading 
with the dissenters, promising there would be no trade offs 
and that no one from the PFP would accept any of the five 
positions offered by the DPP government.  Despite Soong's 
efforts, PFP Legislator Sun Ta-chien was not convinced.  Sun 
told AIT that more than twenty percent of the PFP LY members 
still oppose the meeting and that many are unhappy with Soong 
for going ahead with the meeting over their objections. 
Asserting that PFP and DPP have fundamentally different 
ideologies, Sun told AIT that he sees no ground for 
cooperation between the two parties.  Sun said that he would 
continue to oppose the DPP on the special defense procurement 
budget, the Control Yuan nomination list, and the March 19 
Truth Commission.  In addition, he stated that the "1992 
Consensus" (the so-called "one China, different 
interpretations" formula espoused by the KMT) was the 
centerpiece of the Pan-Blue cross-Strait policy and that he 
had publicly criticized the Chen-Soong joint statement for 
omitting reference to it.  Sun told AIT that he had heard 
that Soong said, "If Sun Ta-chien disagrees with me so much 
then let him be PFP Chairman." 
 
Comment: Marching to a Different Drummer 
---------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Soong's cooperation with the DPP has succeeded in 
prolonging his own personal political career, though it is 
not clear for how long.  Had he not used this ploy to 
reposition his PFP outside the Pan-Blue alliance, it is 
doubtful that the party could have remained a viable 
independent political force.  However, Soong's dealings with 
the DPP go against the political grain of the PFP's largely 
Pan-Blue supporters and will likely not be sustainable for 
long.  The December local magistrate/mayor elections will 
present the PFP with a clear choice -- work with the KMT to 
nominate a joint Pan-Blue ticket, which enables PFP 
candidates to appeal to their natural Blue bases, or see the 
DPP expand its power at the expense of a divided opposition. 
PFP politicians, especially those intending to run in 
December, are clearly more attuned to this political reality 
than Soong.  His top priority is remaining in the political 
limelight, reportedly with visions of again running for 
President in 2008.  This interest gap between Soong and his 
party raises doubts about how much he will be able to deliver 
in policy concessions to fulfill his promises to President 
Chen and the DPP government.  Adding to his woes, Soong's 
former principal fund raiser told the AIT Director that he 
was forced to separate himself from Soong and the PFP due to 
repeated audits of his firm by Finance Ministry officials. 
PAAL 

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