US embassy cable - 02ABUJA1538

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001538 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP, S/CT. AF/W, AND AF/EPS; 
DEPT PASS TO TREASURY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2012 
TAGS: ETTC, EFIN, PTER, PREL, KPAO, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: TERRORISM FINANCE: REGULATION OF OVERSEAS 
CHARITIES 
 
REF: STATE 90100 
 
 
Classified By: HOWARD F. JETER, AMBASSADOR, REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D) 
1. (U) Nigeria officially regulates all corporate bodies and 
non-governmental organizations (including charities and 
religious organizations) through registration with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC).  The registration process 
requires a one-time fee, a filing of papers on the 
organization's charter and purpose, data on the 
organization's principal officers, a background police check 
of those principals, and advertisements about the 
organization in the public media. 
 
 
2. (C) However, most indigenous Nigerian charitable 
organizations, especially local charities formed around 
mosques and churches, avoid the rather expensive and 
complicated CAC registration process.  Larger and more 
sophisticated organizations, especially those which will look 
to the Nigerian Government or foreign donors for funds, tend 
to register.  All foreign charities and foreign-based NGOs 
are expected to register and do so.  Once registered, very 
few organizations comply with regulations by sending in the 
periodic updates on structure and personnel.  The CAC is 
among the less effective Nigerian government offices. Its 
main office in Abuja has no working telephones.  It is safe 
to say that the CAC cannot adequately track the activities of 
charitable organizations. 
 
 
3. (C) Nigeria's State Security Services (SSS) actively 
monitors religious groups and services, both Christian and 
Muslim, in an attempt to predict, and if possible prevent, 
inter-religious and ethnic violence.  The SSS pay particular 
attention to Muslim missionary activities.  Organized 
teaching by foreign Muslim scholars has a centuries-long 
history in Nigeria.  Among the larger groups proselytizing in 
Nigeria are organizations with bases in Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, and Sudan.  Groups with ties to Iran, Iraq and 
Libya also exist, and are closely watched by the SSS. 
 
 
4. (C) As far as we know, Nigeria is not a source of 
significant funding for any international charities.  It is 
more often a destination country, especially for charities 
focused on construction of mosques.  We do not believe that 
pushing for more strenuous regulation of charities would be 
well received or effective.  Due to its undisciplined and 
opaque financial system and lack of adequate oversight of 
charitable organizations, Nigeria is potentially attractive 
to terrorist for money laundering. 
 
 
5. (C) We believe that Nigerian authorities (the Central 
Bank, SSS, Ministry of Finance) will take effective action 
when provided  information on charities being used for 
financing terrorist activities.  Rather than try to change 
Nigerian public policy on charities, we suggest continuing to 
work closely with GON authorities (particularly through 
training programs) to enlist their aid in identifying abuses 
of charities, and stopping those abuses. 
 
 
6. (C) As we deliberate measures aimed at terrorist financing 
through charities, we need to be aware of a possible public 
diplomacy downside which must be factored into plans. 
Targeting Muslim charities moves us into a sensitive area. 
We risk being perceived as going after organizations that "do 
good" in the community without bringing in any 
counterbalancing relief.  This opens us to charges of being 
"anti-Muslim," and this can be used by radical elements to 
sway Muslim public opinion against us.  Even the most 
educated and informed moderate Muslim will be negatively 
influenced, perhaps profoundly so.  Consequently, we must do 
a much better job of educating the public that some purported 
charities are alleged front organizations for terrorism, and 
that terrorism is not just directed at the U.S. but may have 
domestic repercussions as well.  Said plainly, we must be 
able to provide evidence to the public.  Announcing measures 
while responding to criticism with "we can't discuss specific 
evidence" will not do.  We must also broaden our interaction 
with Muslims and enhance our presence among them, including 
provision of additional economic developmental assistance. 
JETER