US embassy cable - 05SANAA723

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OPO/FPD, CENTCOM FOR 
POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 27 MARCH 2005 
 
REF: A. (A) TD-314/11841-05 
 
     B. (B) SANAA 00557 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d). 
 
1.    (S/NF) Summary:  CDA Nabeel Khoury, convened an EAC 
meeting on March 27, 2005, to discuss a litany of recent 
security concerns to include security at the hotels in Aden, 
recent threats from Yemen citizens who have lost family 
members in Iraq, as well as a review of general security 
concerns in light of U.S. development and military assistance 
in country.  Additionally, para. 4 delineates a meeting 
between hotel management and the RSO.  EAC meeting key 
offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: 
DCM, LEGATT, RMAS, POLE, OMC, and RSO. End Summary. 
 
2.    (S/NF) RMAS briefed EAC members about security concerns 
regarding the Sheraton Hotel in Aden.  RMAS noted that a cell 
previously thought to be targeting the Aden Hotel had in fact 
turned out to be planning a mass casualty attack on Aden,s 
Sheraton Hotel.  Although previous RMAS reporting documents 
the fact that host nation, Republic of Yemen (ROYG) security 
forces interdicted the cell conducting pre-attack planning, 
RMAS explained to the EAC that it is possible that remnants 
of the terrorist cell could be reconstituted to resume 
pre-attack planning.  Based on the non-specific but potential 
threat that may exist in Aden, EAC members recommended that 
the DCM and RSO take action to improve security at the 
Sheraton in particular and to hotels frequented by the 
western community in general, immediately. 
 
3.    (S/NF)  EAC discussed the findings of a hotel security 
survey conducted by FPD of the Sheraton Hotel in Aden.  Based 
on RMAS threat reporting, the EAC recommended immediate 
action to first provide a positive 24 hours, 7 days a week 
stand-off at the Sheraton.  The DCM instructed the RSO to 
immediately contact Sheraton Hotel management in Aden to 
request action.  The EAC agreed that if no constructive 
measures were taken to improve security within the next three 
days at the Sheraton Hotel, the Embassy should inform the 
American community through a Warden Message about ongoing 
security concerns related to the Sheraton Hotel and Aden. 
 
4.    (S/NF)  RSO met with Sanaa Sheraton Hotel manager, Tony 
Gubran, at the Sanaa Sheraton at 1230 hours on 28 March 2005. 
 Tony is acting manager of the Sheraton Hotel in Aden, during 
the interim until a new manager arrives.  RSO provided Tony a 
general threat briefing regarding Embassy concerns about the 
Sheraton Hotel in Aden.  Tony asked RSO to travel with him, 
on or about April 3, 2005, to Aden to provide the owner and 
him guidance for setting up the security of the hotel,s 
physical plant; RSO agreed.  Following the briefing, Tony 
immediately contacted the owner and Sheraton headquarters and 
advised them of the potential risk of a serious incident at 
the Sheraton Hotel, if hotel management did not take 
immediate action to improve perimeter security. Tony then 
contacted personnel at the Sheraton Hotel in Aden and 
instructed them to begin immediately: 
 
-     Restricting car parking:  No cars allowed to park 
closer than 25 feet. 
-     To use an existing drop barrier to slow incoming 
vehicles. 
-     To register all vehicle plate numbers entering the 
Sheraton property. 
-     Screening vehicles specifically looking for large 
packages. 
-     To check car trunks. 
-     Screening trucks and receiving area deliveries. 
-     Posting two Group 4 contract guards at the Beach. 
-     Ensuring the beach remains well illuminated. 
-     Placing all security personnel on high alert. 
-     Requesting Yemen authorities to post additional armed 
sentries on the perimeter 
      (Tony asked the RSO to conduct liaison on Sheraton,s 
behalf). 
 
 
5.    (SBU) The OMC also advised the EAC about an individual 
in the Yemeni Coast Guard, in Aden, who lost a son in Iraq 
due to Coalition Forces security operations.  The angry 
father believes his son went to Iraq as a Mujahadeen to fight 
Coalition Forces and was subsequently killed.  According to 
the American Embassy OMC source in Aden, the father, a Coast 
Guard Officer named Major Abd-Rabu or Abd al-Rabu, made 
general threats against Americans.  RSO informed EAC members 
that he provided the name of the angry father and 
circumstances of the threats to the MOI on March 26, 2005, 
with a written request to intervene.  OMC stated that he had 
received word on March 27, 2005, that in fact Yemen Coast 
Guard/MOI officials had taken action to prevent the Yemen 
Officer from striking out at Americans.  RSO awaits 
confirmation from MOI as to what specific action they have 
taken to interdict a potential attack against Americans by 
the man or the man,s family members and associates.  RSO 
placed the threatening person's name in the Visa Viper 
system. 
 
6.    (S/NF) EAC members also discussed a second case 
reported by RMAS REFTEL, involving a threat that was made 
against the Ambassador and Westerners in general, by a father 
disgruntled because he believes his son was being detained in 
Iraq by Coalition Forces.  RSO informed the EAC that he 
presented information regarding the threatening person's name 
to MOI.  RMAS and RSO reported no verification of 
intervention by local authorities regarding the threat.  RSO 
placed the threatening person's name in the Visa Viper 
system. 
 
7.    (C/NF) At the request of the RSO the Charge advised the 
EAC that an expanded EAC would be held to look at the overall 
threat environment in respect to current operational tempo, 
especially continued growth in travel and exposure brought 
about by development activity, i.e. USAID expansion and large 
military assistance programs and training that create 
clusters of 30 people or more in soft-target hotels and 
buildings. 
 
8.    (SBU) One EAC member asked the committee to consider 
her perception that the post danger pay differential was too 
low when compared to the threat and to other posts with 
similar risk profiles.  The DCM agreed to ask the Management 
Office for guidance. 
 
9.    (SBU) EAC members inquired of RSO as to DS/IP/FPO's 
response to previous concerns regarding cuts in static 
residential guard services as noted reftel B.  RSO advised 
EAC that he would conduct appropriate inquiries. 
Khoury