US embassy cable - 05QUITO682

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, EC, CU 
SUBJECT: PUSHING GUTIERREZ TO VOTE YES ON CUBA 
 
REF: QUITO 625 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  President Lucio Gutierrez has assured that 
Ecuador will "no worse than" abstain on the upcoming UN Human 
Rights Commission resolution on Cuba.  A yes vote appears a 
political Pandora's box, he believes, likely to unite and 
embolden his many detractors across the political spectrum. 
Although convinced abstention is the best he can offer, 
Gutierrez promises to listen to further USG entreaties on 
Cuba.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Over breakfast March 28, Gutierrez and the Ambassador 
touched on topics ranging from OXY nationalization to travel 
to Caracas (Septels); none mattered more than the Geneva vote 
on Cuba, however.  The Ambassador offered numerous reasons to 
support sanction of Castro, highlighting a worsening human 
rights situation on the island and the moral necessity to 
condemn it formally.  Ecuador had voted yes before (in 1999); 
the USG hoped it would again.  She planned to discuss the 
Geneva resolution at length with FM Patricio Zuquilanda in a 
meeting three days hence.  The Ambassador concluded by noting 
high-level Washington policymakers might soon be ringing the 
president, seeking the GoE's support. 
 
3.  (C) Gutierrez seemed well-briefed on the UNHRC 
resolution.  Agreeing Castro was no defender of human rights, 
he too deplored conditions in Cuba.  Ecuador, Gutierrez 
promised, would "no worse than" abstain when the resolution 
came to the floor.  But a display of support was a different 
matter.  To maintain political stability and minimize public 
disturbances, Gutierrez needed to keep Ecuador's far-left and 
indigenous off of the streets.  Voting against Castro, he 
claimed, would invite wide-scale protests in Quito, the Cuban 
dictator's appeal spanning the political map.. 
 
4.  (C) Despite his misgivings, the president remained open 
to USG lobbying, asking only for an Embassy heads-up in 
advance of calls from Washington.  He also sought intel on 
other South American nations' UNHRC voting positions, hinting 
he might allow an anti-Cuba vote if Ecuador's neighbors 
supported it.  Gutierrez had heard, however, that Brazil was 
dead-set against Castro condemnation, and was in fact seeking 
hemispheric unity in opposing it. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  On Cuba, getting Ecuador to yes requires a 
multi-front effort.  We'll continue to push every local 
button possible, from calls on Cabinet members to media 
placement of anti-Castro messages.  From Washington, telcons 
with GoE leaders could help, as would pressing the Ecuadorian 
embassy.  We should continue lobbying in Geneva, as Ecuador's 
overseas missions often exercise autonomy and vote counter to 
home office instructions.  To have a realistic chance of 
attaining a yes vote, however, we must address Gutierrez's 
core concern:  his political vulnerability at home.  END 
COMMENT. 
KENNEY