US embassy cable - 05AMMAN2556

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POLISH CONTINGENT TO WITHDRAW FROM JORDAN'S POLICE TRAINING CENTER

Identifier: 05AMMAN2556
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN2556 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-03-28 15:40:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL ASEC MOPS KCRM IZ JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

281540Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, MOPS, KCRM, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: POLISH CONTINGENT TO WITHDRAW FROM JORDAN'S POLICE 
TRAINING CENTER 
 
REF: A. 04 AMMAN 10035 
 
     B. 04 AMMAN 9678 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (U)  This is an action request; please see paragraph 4. 
 
2.  (C)  Despite earlier indications that the Polish 
contingent at the Jordan International Police Training Center 
(JIPTC) would remain in place (refs), the Polish contingent 
commander at JIPTC and the Polish Ambassador in Amman have 
informed us that the GOP has informed them the trainers will 
return to Poland.  The ambassador (protect) told Charge on 
March 24 that he believed financial constraints were the main 
impetus for the decision.  He said a second U.S. intervention 
with the GOP in Warsaw could lead to a reversal of this 
decision, as occurred last year. 
 
3.  (C)  Given the high quality of the Polish instructors and 
the fact that the other JIPTC contingents (particularly those 
from other "emerging democracies" in Eastern Europe) look to 
the Polish contingent as a "lead element" at JIPTC, a pullout 
of the Polish force could have significant negative 
ramifications on the training program.  In addition, 
following on the Secretary's recent travels in Europe and the 
demonstrated coalition successes in Iraqi police training at 
JIPTC, the withdrawal of a key partner in the program could 
send the wrong signal to other governments closely watching 
coalition activities. 
 
4.  (C)  Action Request:  We recommend engagement with the 
GOP to determine whether it is possible to reverse this 
decision.  Failing this, Polish government statements of 
support for the coalition training effort underway at JIPTC 
might soften the blow. 
 
5.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
 
Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through 
the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE 

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