US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1774

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: ULTRA-NATIONALIST MHP SENSING NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 001342 
 
     B. ANKARA 001730 
 
Classified By: Deputy POLCOUNS Charles O. Blaha; E.O. 12958, reasons 1. 
4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary. Although leaders of Turkey,s 
ultranationalist, right-wing National Action Party (MHP) 
claim that their party is a modern, democratic, secular, 
patriotic, and non-racist, the party has a neofascist 
ideology, a history of political violence, and a rigid 
hierarchical structure.  MHP has been connected to recent 
anti-Christian activity in Turkey, and its publications 
continue to be rabidly anti-American.  MHP leaders believe 
that the U.S. is punishing Turkey for governing AKP's failure 
to pass the 1 March 2003 resolution authorizing the 
deployment of the U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey.  Oddly, 
MHP leadership has not yet been able to capitalize on AKP's 
policy drift and the rise in Turkish nationalism. End Summary. 
 
MHP Stays True to Neofascist, Violent History 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In conversations with POLOFFs, MHP leaders claimed 
that their party is a modern, democratic, secular, patriotic, 
and non-racist party.  MHP, however, is a party with a 
neofascist ideology, a history of political violence, and a 
rigid hierarchical structure.  Members of MHP have been 
connected to recent violence against Protestant churches in 
Tarsus and Gaziantep (Ref A) and harassment of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchy in Istanbul.  MHP publications, moreover, continue 
to print rabidly anti-American articles. 
 
Attitudes Toward the U.S. 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C) MHP officials have been unfailingly polite and 
courteous in recent meetings with POLOFFS, a stark contrast 
with the stiff and distant pose many MHPers displayed toward 
U.S. Embassy officials in the past.  However, although 
POLOFFs have had multiple meeting with national MHP leaders 
and regional MHP mayors, efforts to contact regional MHP 
organization leaders have been rejected on two occasions. 
(Regional party officials from main opposition, 
left-of-center Republican People's Party (CHP) have also 
refused to hold meetings with U.S. Embassy officials on a few 
occasions.) 
 
4. (C)  When they have met with us, MHP leaders have 
repeatedly stressed the importance of US-Turkish relations. 
MHP VP Metin Cobanoglu, for example, stressed that the US and 
Turkey have common national interests in the region.  MHP VP 
Faruk Bal highlighted Turkey's geostrategic importance to the 
U.S. and Turkey's important role as a transit country for 
Central Asian oil and natural gas.  MHP leaders, however, are 
quick to remind POLOFFs of Turkey's concerns regarding the 
territorial integrity of Iraq, the status of Kirkuk, the 
plight of the Iraqi Turkomen, and the threat posed to Turkey 
by the PKK/Kongra Gel terrorist organization. 
 
5. (C) MHP VP for Propaganda Metin Sandir and other MHPers 
have blamed the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
for the current downturn in US-Turkish relations and the rise 
in anti-Americanism.  MHP politicians, organizations, and 
media outlets from across the political spectrum have 
contributed to the current environment.  However, several MHP 
leaders, including Bal, Cobanoglu, and former MHP MP and 
party ideologue Riza Muftuoglu, have stated that Turkey 
should have passed the 1 March resolution authorizing the 
deployment of U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey.  They blame 
AKP for making a huge mistake, compromising Turkey's national 
interests, undermining the historic U.S.-Turkish friendship, 
and encouraging anti-Americanism in Turkey.  One MHP leader 
noted that MHP had vocally opposed the U.S.-led intervention 
in Iraq.  The others have all fudged the issue or claimed 
that MHP would have supported the U.S. if it had been in 
power. 
 
6. (C) Like many others in Turkey, MHP leaders universally 
share the belief that the USG was behind the rise of PM 
Erdogan and the AKP.  MHP leaders believe that the U.S. is 
punishing Turkey for governing AKP's failure to pass the 1 
March 2003 resolution authorizing the deployment of the U.S. 
forces into Iraq via Turkey.  Bal, for example, told POLOFF 
that the US should not punish the Turkish military for the 
errors of the governing party. 
 
7. (C) Ulku Ocaklari (Idealist Hearths), a youth group with 
connections to MHP, has been actively stoking 
anti-Americanism under the banner of anti-imperialism. 
Alisan Satilmis, the former leader of Ulku Ocaklari, was 
recently forced by MHP leader Bahceli to resign.  The reasons 
behind Satilmis's removal are unclear, but we suspect it had 
more to do with intraparty politics than U.S. Embassy 
activities.  However, MHP leaders have pointedly sought to 
frame this issue in the press as MHP clamping down on 
anti-Americanism. 
 
Erdogan Cannot Afford to Take MHP Lightly 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The ruling AKP government cannot afford to take MHP 
criticism lightly: a group of AK MPs came from the MHP.  Our 
contacts confirm that the AKP government's EU-inspired 
"concessions" to ethnic Kurds and on Cyprus have eroded 
Erdogan,s support within the AKP Parliamentary Group. 
EU Skeptics, if Not Downright Hostile 
------------------------------------- 
9. (C)  MHP leaders are very skeptical about, and often 
outright hostile to, the Turkey-EU relationship, despite 
party leader Devlet Bahceli's official support for Turkey's 
EU membership goal during the Ecevit government (1999-2002). 
Muftuoglu claimed that MHP members oppose Turkey's EU 
membership bid.  MHP VP Vural Oktay and Cobanoglu both 
claimed that the EU was applying an unfair double standard 
against Turkey.  Cobanoglu, moreover, claimed that the EU was 
using the issue of Turkish ethnic minorities as a wedge to 
divide Turkey. 
 
Nationalist MHP Has Not Yet Capitalized on Rising Nationalism 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
10. (C) Several Turkish newspaper columnists have written 
columns suggesting that MHP is on the rise in Turkey, but 
oddly, despite resurgent nationalism in Turkey, this is not 
yet reflected in parliamentary resignations or public opinion 
polls.  We have seen a small stream of MHP-oriented MPs 
resign from AKP; but, so far, none of the resigning MPs has 
joined MHP.  An ANAR poll published in January, moreover, 
still had MHP well below the 10 percent electoral threshold. 
A MetroPOLL conducted in February had similar results. 
 
11. (U) Although nationalistic sentiments are strong within 
the Turkish body politic, this has only rarely been 
translated into electoral strength for MHP.  In the November 
2002 elections, for example, MHP received only 8.3 percent of 
the vote.   In fact, MHP has received less than 10 percent of 
the vote in every national election since 1973.  The sole 
exception to this pattern occurred in 1999 when MHP received 
18 percent of the vote in the aftermath of the GOT's capture 
of Abdullah Occalan, the leader of the PKK terrorist 
organization. 
 
12. (C) The current MHP leadership may not be up to the task 
of capitalizing on AKP's policy drift and the rise in Turkish 
nationalism (Ref B).  Muftuoglu, a dissident within the 
party, told us that the party's leadership is unable to take 
advantage of the current political environment.  Oktay 
indicated that the party has only recently started to 
activate its regional and youth structures.  AKP youth group 
president Zelkif Kazdal stated that MHP's youth group is 
organized in less than 10 provinces and MHP-oriented groups 
on university campuses are very small and prone to violence. 
 
13. (C) Comment: MHP could gain strength as tension between 
the EU and Turkey rises over EU demands perceived 
domestically as infringements on Turkish honor and 
sovereignty.  MHP leaders are clearly aware of the press 
stories highlighting turmoil within governing AKP and strains 
in the U.S.-Turkish relationship.  They sense that they can 
gain domestic political advantages by criticizing AKP's 
mishandling of U.S.-Turkish relations and its perceived 
failure to protect Turkish interests in Iraq.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN