US embassy cable - 05HARARE469

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000469 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, March 05 Elections, MDC 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER UPBEAT IN ELECTION STRETCH DRIVE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a dinner at the Residence on March 
24, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai confidently predicted to 
the Ambassador and a visiting Congressional staff delegation 
that his party would win a majority of the contested seats in 
the March 31 parliamentary election.  Tsvangirai said ZANU-PF 
was flagrantly manipulating local chiefs and the food issue. 
Nonetheless, under pressure from abroad the ruling party had 
opened up some space for his party, which they had used to 
seize the momentum, even in rural areas.  Tsvangirai expected 
the ruling party to be receptive to negotiations in the wake 
of its weak showing and asserted that the MDC would be ready 
to discuss everything except a government of national unity, 
which he said would be "political suicide" for himself and 
the MDC.  He promised to coordinate closely with the USG 
after the election.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ZANU-PF Will Cheat 
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2.  (C) Tsvangirai said that although the campaign had been 
largely non-violent to date, ZANU-PF was still attempting to 
win the election by intimidating the electorate.  In rural 
areas, the ruling party was for instance co-opting 
traditional chiefs and using them to pressure voters.    It 
was also cynically exploiting distribution of the country's 
meager remaining food reserves.   ZANU-PF operatives 
frequently disrupted MDC rallies by distributing maize at 
adjacent locations.   The police and CIO were being widely 
deployed in plainclothes to play an intimidating, though to 
date largely non-violent role and were continuing to harass 
candidates and activists.  MDC MP Trudy Stephenson had been 
arrested (and quickly released) in the past week for handing 
out flyers at an intersection.  Finally, he noted that the 
voter rolls were fraught with problems, which he thought 
would cause particular problems in areas of 
resettled/displaced populations. 
 
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But the MDC Will Still Win 
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3.  (C) Tsvangirai said ZANU-PF cheating would not be enough 
to win this election.  The MDC was training its supporters to 
"defend the vote" and would deploy four polling agents to 
each of the nation's 8,000-plus polling stations to guard 
against election-day fraud.  However, more important was the 
snowballing enthusiasm for the MDC.  A contagion of hope was 
rapidly denting the electoral apathy of just months ago. 
Large and animated MDC rallies throughout the country had 
convinced him that the party was on the verge of a 
significant national victory. 
 
4. (C)  Tsvagirai said people across the country were stunned 
to see these huge crowds cheering him and other MDC speakers 
at rallies in former &no-go8 areas, such as Mutoko and 
Guruve in the heart of Mashonaland.  Party leaders such as 
Secretary for Economic Affairs Tendai Biti were impressing 
 
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the electorate in unprecedented media exposure, and ZANU-PF 
was doing little to counteract the MDC's public message. 
Tsvangirai said economic decline and ZANU-PF factionalism 
 
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continued to sap ruling party support.  Evidencing the 
election's shifting tide, Tsvangirai noted that 900 of 1,000 
ebullient MDC supporters at a recent rally in Beitbridge (for 
a seat held by the incumbent Home Affairs Minister) admitted 
to voting ZANU-PF in 2000. 
 
5. (C) Tsvagirai said that despite the MDC,s momentum, he 
did not expect a spike in violence in the election,s last 
week.  He suspected that Mugabe was not fully aware of the 
MDC's sudden rise in fortunes, and had thus not deployed 
sufficient government and party machinery to assure ZANU-PF 
victory.  In any event, the deployment of security forces to 
assure a ZANU-PF victory at this late date would be easily 
exposed and would thoroughly undermine ZANU-PF's strategy of 
using ostensible implementation of SADC election principles 
to legitimize its rule.  Moreover, the police were not as 
disruptive as in the past, in part because police 
sympathizers were feeding MDC campaign staff information. 
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Previewing the Election and its Aftermath 
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6.  (C) Tsvangirai said winning 80-85 seats was the MDC's 
best-case scenario, and that taking only 61 (a majority of 
120 contested seats, not including the 30 seats appointed by 
Mugabe) would represent a "total fraud."  However, the lesser 
figure still would undermine the government's legitimacy by 
any definition of democracy even if the Constitution gave 
Mugabe's party control of the government.  A total of 76 
would give the MDC the power to thwart any legislation and 
effectively produce a "constitutional crisis."  He predicted 
that the ruling party would be ready to negotiate in either 
event. 
 
7.  (C) Tsvangirai offered no timeline for such negotiations 
but said "much work" had already been done on constitutional 
amendments, which would be a good departure point.  In that 
regard, he dismissed Mugabe's recent proposal for a senate, 
and predicted agreement on a new parliament built on a 
combination of proportional representation and 
"first-past-the-post" seats, with abolition of the 30 
presidentially-appointed seats. 
 
8.  (C) Tsvangirai said that "everything" except a government 
of national unity would be on the table from the MDC's 
perspective in inter-party negotiations.  He suspected that 
the South African Government favored a GNU, but given the 
historical example of ZAPU's absorption by ZANU-PF in the 
1980s and current domestic political dynamics, a GNU would be 
"political suicide" for Tsvangirai and his party.  Charting a 
course for Mugabe's departure, presumably with a "soft 
landing", would likely be a key MDC negotiating objective. 
In that regard, Tsvangirai anticipated Mugabe's strategy 
would revolve around "giving Vice-President Joyce Mujuru 
space", i.e., effectively passing the reins to her for an 
extended period during which the Zezuru clan faction within 
ZANU-PF could further consolidate its control of the party. 
 
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Need for Coordination 
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9.  (C) The opposition leader said his party was still 
working on a "Plan B" should the election results prove 
completely fraudulent but offered no details.  The Ambassador 
stressed the need to coordinate on press statements and other 
measures in the wake of the election in any event. 
Tsvangirai agreed that it would be useful to have a USG 
 
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statement as soon as possible after the announcement of 
election results so as to set the terms of evaluation by 
other key players who might be inclined to blessing a flawed 
election, most notably South Africa and some in the EU. 
 
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On ZANU-PF,s Future 
------ 
 
10. (C) If the election went badly enough for ZANU-PF, 
Tsvangirai said Mugabe could face calls from within his own 
 
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party to step aside.  The party had no leader strong enough 
to unite its membership without Mugabe.  Eventually, the 
party would fragment sufficiently to become no more than a 
political vehicle for Mashonaland areas where ethnic Zezurus 
predominated.  Former Mugabe heir apparent and Parliamentary 
Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa was a "spent force", and the 
alienation of his wide network of influential allies was 
contributing to the MDC's rapid rise.  The demoted Karanga 
clique leader could yet marshal "a third force" - but not for 
now. 
 
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On the Military 
------ 
 
11.  (C) On the Ambassador's inquiry, Tsvangirai asserted 
that the military would not stand in the way of an MDC 
victory.  The military leadership appreciated that the 
election was a potential step toward needed change and not an 
event that would change the government by itself.  Further, 
he speculated that retired General Solomon Mujuru, ascendant 
in the dominant Old Guard ethnic Zezuru faction, would be 
inclined to support inter-party negotiations after the 
election. 
 
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On South Africa ... 
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12.  (C) As for the South African Government, Tsvangirai said 
it was seeing that the story on the ground was not as ZANU-PF 
had depicted it.  He expressed concern that the SAG 
nonetheless was intent on blessing what was a flawed process 
but noted that the SAG and SADC observer missions had diverse 
compositions.  He thought that the SAG would be most 
satisfied with an election that gave the MDC a significant 
presence but did not give it power.  It had supported 
dialogue in the context of constitutional negotiations and 
could be expected to continue to do so.  Mbeki would have a 
potentially important role in facilitating post-election 
inter-party dialogue. 
 
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... And Labor 
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13.  (C) Tsvangirai observed that Zimbabwe's labor movement, 
over which he presided before the MDC was formed, was 
absorbed with its own problems.  Although the dominant 
Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was largely 
supportive of the MDC, the movement was "confused" in 
addressing its difficult political situation.  Some in the 
leadership worried about the consequences of being portrayed 
as "too MDC" and so sometimes pushed the movement into 
accommodating positions with the GOZ.  It had been further 
decimated by economic conditions.  Nonetheless, labor 
remained very important to the MDC and an MDC victory would 
significantly strengthen its hand. 
 
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Comment 
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14.  (C) Even 51 seats would be an extraordinary achievement 
for the MDC given this steeply tilted playing field and five 
years of relentless pressure from a Mugabe determined to 
eliminate it from Zimbabwean politics.  This outcome would 
give the opposition representation sufficient to block 
ZANU-PF's high priority plans for a new constitution.  We are 
not as confident as Tsvangirai that ZANU-PF will be prepared 
to negotiate meaningfully after elections in any event nor 
can we fully share his optimism on the outcome.  While there 
is little doubt that Tsvangirai is reading the public mood 
correctly, even he may understimate ZANU-PF's willingness to 
resort to fraud to skew the results, and Tsvangirai has a 
history of excessive optimism about his party's prospects. 
That said, we agree with him that broad, resolute 
international pressure will be the key to helping Zimbabwe 
make the most of this potential opportunity to jump start the 
beginning of the end-game for R. G. Mugabe. 
Dell