US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1437

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR WARNS OF DETERIORATING 
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
REF: TAIPEI 1188 
 
Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General 
James Huang told AIT on March 28 that Taipei will need some 
time before returning to the path of engagement with the PRC. 
 Huang said that the government has concluded that Beijing 
timed the release of the Hsu Wen-lung letter (Septel) and the 
invitation to KMT Vice Chair Chiang Ping-kun in the wake of 
the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) to isolate and embarrass the DPP 
government.  This has led Taipei to fear that Beijing is 
reverting to the "united front" tactics of President Chen 
Shui-bian's first term, using the opposition parties and 
Taiwan business community to isolate the DPP government. 
Unless Beijing changes course, Huang warned, Taipei will have 
to resist strongly and cross-Strait relations could return to 
the negative cycle of the past three years.  Huang said that 
the DPP government had no choice but to reflect the deep 
suspicion of the people in the wake of this series of events. 
 He expressed deep skepticism that Beijing might be sincere 
in its stated desire to ease cross-Strait  tensions.  End 
Summary. 
 
Return to United Front 
---------------------- 
 
2. (C) Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James 
Huang told AIT March 28 that Taipei remains suspicious of PRC 
intentions and is watching carefully what Beijing does in the 
coming several weeks.  Huang said that the Chen 
administration is concerned that the ASL may prove to have 
been the first shot in a renewed "united front" campaign that 
will combine incentives to the Pan-Blue opposition with 
pressure on the Taiwan business community to isolate the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government.  Huang said 
that the Anti-Secession Law, PRC pressure on pro-DPP business 
leader Hsu Wen-lung to endorse "one China" (Septel) and 
anticipated red carpet treatment for KMT Vice Chairman P.K. 
Chiang formed a troubling pattern. 
 
Beware of Chinese Bearing Gifts 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Between now and the May 14 elections for the National 
Assembly to ratify constitutional amendments passed by the LY 
last August, Huang said the government will focus on 
maximizing domestic and international attention to the 
Anti-Secession Law and its reference to the use of 
"non-peaceful" measures.  Huang stated that the Chen 
administration appreciated the USG's efforts to urge Beijing 
to offer concrete gestures to Taiwan in the aftermath of 
the Anti-Secession Law's passage.  He said he would welcome 
any additional information we might obtain about what 
specifically the PRC side might do, but he added that Taipei 
would be hard pressed to respond positively in the current 
atmosphere.  Huang said that people in Taiwan and the 
international community may view Taipei's acceptance of a PRC 
offer on things like agricultural liberalization or cargo 
flights as tacit acknowledgment of the PRC's new law.  When 
pressed on how Taipei would react if Beijing did offer trade 
concessions in the coming days or weeks, Huang replied that 
Taipei would not likely reject them, but would find 
"technical reasons" to string the process along until after 
the May 14 NA election. 
 
Especially Beware a KMT Messenger 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) However, if the concessions were presented to KMT Vice 
Chairman P.K. Chiang, they would be impossible to accept. 
Huang said that if the Taiwan government accepted a 
concession offered to Chiang, then the PRC government would 
simply treat the KMT as its preferred channel to Taiwan, and 
the DPP might as well give up its claim to govern Taiwan. 
Huang made it clear that there is little stomach for any 
flexibility on this issue.  If Chiang receives particularly 
high level treatment (which he defined as either PRC 
President Hu Jintao or Premier Wen Jiabao) that would only 
confirm suspicions in Taipei that Beijing has decided on a 
return to the "united front" tactics of the first four years 
of Chen's term in office. 
 
5. (C) Huang said that the government does not plan to offer 
any high-profile reaction either to the Hsu letter or the 
Chiang visit, but he acknowledged that ongoing legislative 
interpolations will make it impossible for Premier Frank 
Hsieh to avoid the subject completely.  The government hopes 
it will be possible to avoid reacting for a couple of months, 
but he warned that, if Taipei does determine that the PRC is 
again trying to isolate the Chen administration by dealing 
directly with the opposition parties and Taiwan business 
community, the government will react strongly.  While Huang 
did not offer specifics over what measures Taipei might be 
contemplating, he stated that there was a real possibility of 
a return to the "vicious cycle" of the past three years. 
 
6. (C) AIT urged Huang against rushing to conclusions, noting 
that the PRC has signaled its intention publicly and 
privately to take steps to ease cross-Strait tensions.  AIT 
also pointed out that Taipei's restrained handling of the 
Anti-Secession Law, including its willingness to leave the 
door open to further cross-Strait economic liberalization, 
has greatly enhanced Taiwan's international position.  We 
stressed that the Taiwan government needs to look beyond its 
domestic political situation to consider how to advance 
Taiwan's long-term strategic interests, including both 
cross-Strait stability and Taiwan's economic interests. 
Huang made it clear that such an approach was difficult for 
Taiwan's leadership to conceive in the present atmosphere. 
 
Comment: Focusing on the Negatives 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Huang's take on PRC intentions was considerably more 
pessimistic than recent assessments provided to AIT by 
cross-Strait specialists at the Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC) and the NSC.  Nevertheless, they reflect an important 
strain of analysis within President Chen Shui-bian's circle 
of advisors.  Huang, who is by no means a radical, was 
clearly approaching PRC policy through a prism of domestic 
politics.  While Huang and those with whom he works had 
clearly been prepared to move past the ASL, the additional 
negatives of the Hsu letter and the Chiang visit appear to 
have made their assessment of PRC behavior decidedly 
negative.  Both of these new factors will complicate the 
Taiwan policy process if and when the dust settles from the 
Anti-Secession Law. 
PAAL