US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV1844

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KWBG, IS, EU, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: (C) OTTE LAMENTS WEAK PA COORDINATION ON 
DISENGAGEMENT IN MEETING WITH ABRAMS AND WELCH 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 1729 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) In a March 23 meeting with Deputy APNSA Abrams, NEA 
A/S Welch, and the Ambassador, EU Middle East envoy Marc Otte 
recounted that President Abbas had been vague in describing 
his next steps in discussions with EU officials at the Arab 
League summit in Algiers.  Otte said Solana pressed Abbas to 
improve his organizational command over the PA.  Otte also 
lamented the PA failure to move ahead on disengagement 
coordination, noting that PM Quraya had said to him that the 
PA did not need to start planning before the Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza.  Otte said Finance Minister Fayyad told 
him in Algiers that he was making progress with Kuwait and 
the UAE on fulfillment of assistance pledges, although no 
money had arrived yet.  The U.S. officials briefed Otte on 
their discussions earlier in the day with PM Sharon and other 
GOI officials about reported plans for new construction in 
the E-1 zone between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim.  Otte 
concurred on the advisability of deferring public comment 
pending clarifications, while expressing concern about a 
pattern of Israeli infrastructure construction in the West 
Bank, particularly roads.  Otte gave details about the EU 
assistance program for the PA police, and concurred with the 
U.S. side that coordination with Gen. Ward has been good. 
Otte said that the EU continues to struggle with the question 
of how to deal with Palestinian municipal officials and PLC 
electoral candidates from Hamas.  The issue, he noted, 
includes how EU election monitors would respond to questions 
and complaints from Hamas candidates.  He said he shared U.S. 
concerns about the timing of the PLC election right before 
the start of disengagement.  Welch urged the EU to refrain 
from raising Palestinian expectations about moves beyond 
Phase 1 of the roadmap after disengagement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Amb. Marc Otte, the EU Special Representative for the 
Middle East Peace Process, reviewed the Algiers Arab League 
Summit, which he attended as an observer, and a range of 
Israeli-Palestinian issues in a March 23 meeting with Deputy 
National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, NEA Assistant 
Secretary David Welch and the Ambassador.  The meeting took 
 
SIPDIS 
place at the end of a day of meetings that Abrams, Welch and 
the Ambassador had with Israeli officials, but before Abrams 
and Welch began their program with PA officials. 
 
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Arab League Summit 
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3. (C) Otte recounted discussions with PA President Abbas, 
Finance Minister Fayyad and other PA officials in Algiers at 
the just-completed Arab League summit.  He said Abbas was in 
a good mood but not specific about what he will do next.  (He 
attributed Abbas' mood to the "star" treatment given Abbas in 
Algiers.)  EU foreign policy chief Solana, Otte said, pressed 
Abbas to improve his organizational command over the entire 
PA government.  Sweden, Otte noted, is studying a possible 
plan to help Abbas organize his own office; the UK has 
expressed interest in such assistance as well.  Abrams said 
the Japanese are thinking about it, too.  Fayyad, Otte said, 
reported progress in getting Kuwait and the UAE to fulfill 
their pledges of assistance to the PA, although Fayyad said 
no money had yet been transferred. 
 
4. (C) Otte characterized the overall atmosphere in Algiers 
as chaotic and unfocused, while acknowledging that the EU, as 
observers, could not attend the main working sessions.  The 
Lebanon/Syria issue was not raised at all in the public 
session because, he said, Arab League rules preclude 
discussions of any issue that a member state identifies as an 
internal matter.  The highest-profile issue of the summit, 
Otte said, was building support for Egypt's candidacy for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
 
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Disengagement Coordination 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) In its discussion with Fayyad at Algiers, the EU team, 
Otte said, pressed for the PA to develop a specific strategy 
for disengagement.  Getting the PA to act has not been easy, 
he said, noting that Prime Minister Quraya told him at their 
last meeting that the PA could wait until after Israel is out 
of Gaza before beginning to deal with the new reality. 
Abrams said U.S. officials are concerned, as well, about the 
lack of PA preparation for disengagement.  The Ambassador 
commented that the international community cannot force the 
PA to organize for disengagement if the PA is not willing.  A 
tougher approach to Abbas, in which the international 
community threatens to abandon its disengagement-related 
efforts if the PA does not act to prevent chaos in Gaza, 
might be in order, he said. 
 
6. (C) Otte highlighted the transfer of settlement assets as 
a particularly difficult problem aggravated by insufficient 
PA coordination on disengagement.  He pointed out that the PA 
has already demonstrated its capacity for missing valuable 
real estate opportunities in Gaza.  The upscale Sheikh Zayyad 
apartment complex in Gaza remains empty, he said, because the 
PA has insisted, against the wishes of the donors who 
financed the project, on charging high rents for apartments. 
 
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E-1/Settlement Growth 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) Saying he wanted the EU message on E-1 and other 
settlement growth issues to be consistent with the U.S. line, 
Otte asked how the U.S. team handled the E-1 issue (reftel) 
in its meetings with PM Sharon and other Israeli officials. 
Welch stressed that the USG has not yet finalized a position, 
and would not do so before he and Abrams discuss the issue 
with the PA on March 24.  Otte indicated that he was inclined 
to recommend that the EU withhold comment as well, pending 
clarifications. 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador noted that GOI officials had described, 
in the meetings earlier in the day, the planning and approval 
process for construction at E-1.  They claimed that no 
residential construction at E-1 is imminent given the 
possibly lengthy planning and public review stages that must 
still take place before final approval of the project.  He 
noted, though, that the GOI officials acknowledged that 
DefMin Mofaz's authorization to refer E-1 plans to the Higher 
Planning Council represented a step forward in the approval 
process.  Abrams underlined two points: A) Mofaz's decision 
does not authorize construction, which is unlikely in the 
near future, and B) The GOI clearly sees Ma'ale Adumim as 
territory Israel will keep under a final status agreement. 
 
9. (C) Otte asked how the U.S. is dealing with the argument 
that E-1 development, by linking Jerusalem with Ma'ale 
Adumim, would cut East Jerusalem Palestinians off from the 
West Bank hinterland.  The Ambassador pointed out that the 
GOI is unlikely right now to discuss the boundary 
implications of this week's E-1 news, given that any such 
discussion would undercut the political gains that Sharon 
accrues from the announcement in his battles with the 
settlers. 
 
10. (C) Otte noted that Abbas had mentioned the E-1 issue in 
Algiers, but in a less emphatic manner than one might have 
expected.  He commented that the Palestinians nevertheless 
see the E-1 news as consistent with a pattern of GOI activity 
that expands impediments to Palestinian travel within the 
West Bank.  The focus of recent Israeli construction in the 
West Bank, he said, appears to be more on infrastructure, 
notably roads, than on residential units within the 
settlements.  He said the GOI is building more east-west 
roads linking Israel to the settlements, and more roads 
linking settlements outside the blocs to nearby hilltops, 
thereby implying intentions to build on the hilltops.  He 
also charged that the GOI is excluding Palestinian traffic 
from ever greater portions of main roads through the West 
Bank. 
 
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PA Security Performance 
----------------------- 
 
11. (C) Otte called Abbas's recent agreement in Cairo with 
the militant groups a step forward in extending the period of 
calm, but potentially "dangerous" if Abbas does not 
eventually try to dismantle the groups' terrorist 
capabilities.  The PA, he said, must be ready to crack down 
on the groups if they do not respect the terms of their deal 
with Abbas.  The Ambassador pointed out that the GOI takes a 
dim view of the Cairo agreement because it allows the groups 
to break the calm if Israel commits any of dozens of poorly 
defined "violations." 
 
12. (C) Turning to reform of the PA security services, Otte 
reported that PA Interior Minister Nasser Yusef is claiming 
that he needs six months to restructure the PA security 
forces.  Welch and Abrams told Otte that Gen. Ward is 
stressing to the PA that it must make certain that its 
reforms are reflected in on-the-ground operations.  Ward's 
message to the GOI, they said, underlines the importance of 
dealing with the PA security leadership in a manner that 
reinforces the PA chain of command. 
 
13. (C) Otte said that the approach of the EU assistance 
program for the Palestinian police is consistent with Gen. 
Ward's approach.  He and the Ambassador noted that both Gen. 
Ward and EU COPPS program coordinator Jonathan McGyver say 
they are satisfied with their cooperation.  EU officials have 
told the PA that EU material assistance for the police will 
require that the PA demonstrate its seriousness about 
building a professional police force.  Otte said the EU is 
organizing a mid-April conference with "stakeholders" to 
reach understandings about the conditions for EU police 
support.  PA Interior Minister Nasser Yusef has agreed to 
attend and lend his authority to any agreement reached. 
 
14. (C) In addition to the British assistance that evolved 
into the EU COPPS program, Otte said that Italy is offering 
to conduct police training, and Spain is offering to provide 
police equipment.  Germany has also expressed interest in 
providing assistance to the PA police.  Otte said the EU will 
insist on conducting all training in-country, and plans, 
accordingly, to rebuild the police training facility at 
Jericho.  Abrams noted that Gen. Ward concurs with the value 
of centralizing training in one place. 
 
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Dealing with Hamas in the PLC Elections 
--------------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) Abbas's Cairo agreement with the militant groups 
appears to have strengthened the standing of Hamas in the 
polls for the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Otte 
commented.  He asked how the presence of Hamas candidates in 
the PLC elections, and of elected municipal officials from 
Hamas, would affect U.S. assistance programs.  Abrams said 
the issue is under study, but poses big problems because 
Hamas is on the U.S. terrorism list.  The Ambassador 
commented that the problem is not only a legal one.  From a 
policy perspective, he said, donors must ask whether they 
want to provide assistance to institutions in which Hamas has 
a role.  U.S. interests might be better served by targeting 
assistance to non-Hamas figures, such as Fatah mayors, who 
are bolstering Abbas's reform agenda. 
 
16. (C) Otte said the Hamas problem for the EU goes beyond 
assistance programs.  Any election observers the EU sends for 
the PLC elections would almost certainly receive requests for 
meetings, or election-related complaints, from Hamas 
candidates.  Whether to have observers interact with Hamas 
candidates has important practical and political 
implications, Otte said, pointing, for example, to the 
likelihood that some members of the European Parliament would 
threaten to cut off funding for any observation mission that 
deals with Hamas. 
 
17. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that PA plans to hold the 
PLC elections in July present practical difficulties in light 
of their proximity to Gaza disengagement, the run-up to which 
will leave movement in Gaza severely restricted.  Otte 
offered his personal view that holding the elections as 
Israel prepares for disengagement would present significant 
operational problems.  Abrams observed that the work of 
observers would be easier after disengagement.  Otte noted 
that some in the PA have called for postponing the election 
for policy reasons, arguing that the August 5 Fatah elections 
should precede the PLC elections. 
 
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After Disengagement/Return to Roadmap 
------------------------------------- 
 
18. (C) The EU should not rush to judgment about where we 
will be on the roadmap once disengagement is over, Welch told 
Otte.  Any discussion about holding this autumn the 
international conference called for in Phase 2 of the roadmap 
is premature and sends the wrong signals, he said. 
 
19. (C) Otte offered his personal view that the role of the 
Quartet now is to reconcile what he called mismatched Israeli 
and Palestinian timetables.  Whereas the Israelis need to 
move slowly before the summer on steps extraneous to 
disengagement, Abbas needs to demonstrate real progress on 
the ground quickly.  The Quartet, Otte said, should manage 
the expectations of both sides. 
 
20. (C) Welch underlined that the Palestinians are not ready 
for a discussion of final status issues.  He cautioned that 
unfocused international expressions of support for such 
discussions could raise expectations that are bound to be 
disappointed, an outcome that could work to the benefit of 
the extremists.  Otte concurred.  He called for a "crash 
program" on Phase 1 commitments that would "flush out the 
culture of violence" from Palestinian society, and insist 
that Israel meet its obligations on settlements and outposts. 
 Steps must be taken at the same time, he said, to improve 
Palestinian economic conditions. 
 
21. (U) Abrams and Welch cleared this message. 
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