US embassy cable - 05HARARE459

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ZI, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE'S LESS VIOLENT ELECTION 
 
REF: A. HARARE 384 
     B. HARARE 383 
     C. HARARE 381 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
------ 
Summary 
------ 
 
1. (C) This is the latest in a series of cables post is doing 
assessing the legal setting, pre-electoral environment, and 
conduct of Zimbabwe,s March 31 parliamentary elections. 
According to everyone involved in the election, violence is 
much reduced from the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 
presidential elections.  We are seeing reports of continuing 
intimidation and more overt violence may yet escalate in the 
campaign,s remaining weeks.  However, both sides have 
largely adhered to their high-level public declarations of 
the need for tolerance and non-violence.  There are a variety 
of factors that explain this welcome development, including: 
regional and international pressure, ZANU-PF infighting and 
overconfidence, and the opposition MDC's late entry into the 
race.  The relative lack of violence may provide a foundation 
for renewed intra-party talks following the election.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Reduced Violence 
---------------- 
 
2.  (C) President Mugabe and other senior GOZ officials have 
repeatedly emphasized in public that the March 31 
parliamentary elections must be non-violent.  At the end of 
January, Vice President Joyce Mujuru led a well-publicized 
national prayer service for peaceful elections, and most 
ruling party candidates have consistently echoed the 
leadership's rhetoric on violence at campaign rallies and 
media interviews.  The opposition MDC has made similar 
appeals for a non-violent election and even the police have 
played a constructive role.  Police Commissioner Augustine 
Chihuri and other senior officials have publicly and 
privately reiterated a "zero tolerance" policy toward 
political violence. 
 
3. (C) That said, contested Zimbabwean elections have always 
engendered violence, leading observers to predict that 2004 
would follow the familiar pattern of a rise in 
campaign-related violence beginning around October.  However, 
as the elections on March 31 draw near, the anticipated spike 
in violence has not materialized.  To be sure, the run-up to 
elections has not been without incident.  Still, MDC 
officials and NGOs such as The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum agree that violence is much lower now than during the 
2000 and 2002 elections (ref A).  MDC and NGO contacts 
advise, for instance, that "pungwes" -- days-long political 
indoctrination sessions to which locals were force-marched 
and sometimes beaten during past elections -- have vanished 
from the scene, even in the most remote rural areas. 
 
4. (C) In addition, in many rural and urban areas, the 
militia activity of past elections has reportedly noticeably 
diminished.  One resident from Chitungwiza, a high-density 
district on the outskirts of Harare, advised that ruling 
party cadres are still coming door-to-door, hectoring locals 
to attend ZANU-PF neighborhood rallies, but unlike in the 
past locals felt free to ignore them without fear of 
retribution.  Although the public display of party loyalties 
still triggers occasional inter-party violence and 
harassment, MDC and NGO contacts and diplomatic observers 
around the country report that MDC posters and t-shirts are 
evident practically nation-wide, again, in marked departure 
from 2000 and 2002. 
 
Intimidation May be Rising 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) During the past two weeks, however, we have received 
reports of increasing intimidation in some parts of the 
country, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas of 
Mashonaland, the center of the country and ZANU-PF,s 
&heartland.8  An American legal permanent resident 
Zimbabwean visiting his family home in Mashonaland Central, 
for example, reported that ruling party elements had been 
conducting door-to-door campaigns, telling residents that 
translucent ballot boxes would enable local authorities to 
see how people voted, and that the "blackboots8 would later 
visit those who had voted for the MDC.  In meetings on March 
17 with Embassy staff, MDC candidates in Mashonaland East 
cited similar examples of intimidation.  ZANU-PF supporters 
had been seen recording the names of those attending MDC 
rallies, and voters had been instructed to go to the polls 
with their village chief or headman, who would insure votes 
went to the ruling party. 
 
6. (C) With less than two weeks to go before the election, 
however, many here still fear that the more relaxed 
environment represents a ruling party experiment, and that 
ZANU-PF may yet unleash violence in areas where its 
traditional hold is most tenuous.  We have heard reports, for 
instance, that some ZANU-PF candidates and local organizers 
recognize that the party cannot win without violence in their 
constituency, and have been pressing the leadership for more 
latitude on intimidation.  In that regard, the increasing 
reports of escalating intimidation may signal the ruling 
party,s return to traditional tactics.  Even without further 
intimidation and violence, residual fear ) the legacy of 
violence in past elections ) remains a very real factor. 
 
Causes of Reduced Violence 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Several factors help explain the change in Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF,s tactics during these elections.  Many observers 
cite the confidence ) some would say overconfidence ) of 
the regime, which seems to believe it can score a victory 
without overt violence.  By all accounts, years of repressive 
tactics have the electorate cowed.  To boot, the opposition 
MDC observed a conditional boycott of the elections in late 
2004 and early 2005, bolstering the ruling party,s sense of 
strength.  ZANU-PF,s preoccupation with its own internal 
politics may also have played a role in reducing violence. 
The Tsholotsho affair, an espionage scandal, and divisive 
primaries distracted the party from pursuing its usual 
heavy-handed tactics, and took some of the focus off the 
opposition. 
 
8.  (C) The ruling party,s new non-violent stance is also 
central to Mugabe,s attempt to regain legitimacy.  The GOZ 
can be expected to showcase the reduction in violence to make 
its case that it has adhered to the Southern African 
Development Community,s (SADC) election principles, even as 
its performance has fallen short in many key areas.  The 
knowledge that he is under close scrutiny by the 
international community, especially the U.S. and U.K., 
certainly contributed to Mugabe,s decision to ratchet down 
the violence.  He seems to have done so as well as part of a 
more or less explicit understanding with his SADC neighbors 
that this was key to winning their endorsement of the process 
and outcome.  According to unconfirmed rumors, President 
Mbeki told Mugabe that SADC would bless the elections, 
regardless of outcome, as long as they were non-violent and 
Mugabe will, in turn, point to SADC,s approval as proof of 
his mandate. 
 
9. (C) Finally, another factor may have been the assessment 
of some in the ruling party that its intimidating tactics, 
rather then ensuring victory, may have precipitated a voter 
backlash in 2000.  Several ZANU-PF MPs have confirmed this to 
us, and we have heard numerous reports of MPs, including 
Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa, who lost his seat in 2000, 
instructing their local organizers not to use intimidation to 
elicit votes.  Whatever the causes, the diminution in 
violence this year appears to have given the MDC an opening. 
Senior MDC leaders tell us that even a last minute spike in 
violence will now be too late to overcome the connection the 
party has made with the electorate.  They continue to predict 
a good electoral showing for their party, which in turn could 
spur resumed intra-party talks following the election to 
resolve Zimbabwe,s debilitating political crisis. 
 
10. (C) COMMENT.  SADC will almost certainly justify its 
expected endorsement of the elections largely based on a 
comparison to the 2000 and 2002 elections, citing in 
particular the much lower levels of violence as &proof8 of 
a positive trend.  In reply, we will want to emphasize that 
the outcome should be judged against the SADC principles and 
guidelines (as well as the recommendations of the 2002 South 
African national observer team) and not by comparison to 
other, even more deeply flawed previous elections.  END 
COMMENT. 
Dell