US embassy cable - 05ROME1024

S E C R E T  ROME 001024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 03/24/2020 
TAGS: IT, IZ, KJUS, MOPS, PREL, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: US/ITALY JOINT INVESTIGATION - LOOKING AHEAD 
TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1186 
 
Classified By: DCM EMIL M. SKODON, REASONS 1.4 B, C, D 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: We have gotten past Italian nervousness (Ref 
A) about participating jointly in the full range of Gen. 
Vangjel's investigation into the March 4 death of Nicola 
Calipari.  PM Berlusconi's office, which is tightly managing 
the Italian public stance on this issue, remains concerned 
about future political fallout.  They are ready to begin 
coordination on common press strategy for the eventual 
conclusions of the investigation.  This cable reports on key 
recent developments in Rome, and begins to lay out procedures 
and themes for a joint public affairs strategy.  END SUMMARY 
 
(TEMPORARY) ITALIAN NERVOUSNESS ON FULL PARTICIPATION 
 
2. (S) As reported Ref A, the Italian investigators in 
Baghdad told Charge Jeffrey on March 18 that they could only 
participate in part of the joint investigation.  Upon 
learning of this, Amb. Sembler requested a meeting with 
Berlusconi,s right hand, Undersecretary Gianni Letta.  DCM 
and POLMC joined the Ambassador for the Friday night meeting. 
 Letta was accompanied by SISMI chief Gen. Nicolo Pollari, 
National Security Adviser Gianni Castellaneta and (late in 
the meeting) PM Berlusconi.  Letta confirmed that he had told 
Ragaglini not to participate in any aspect of the 
investigation that went beyond the immediate events of the 
March 4 shooting, as this went beyond the Italian 
understanding of the terms of reference (ref B) for the joint 
investigation. 
 
3. (S) Pollari made a less legal, but more convoluted 
argument for restricting Italian participation, saying in 
essence that he wanted to avoid embarrassment for the USG. 
If a public report makes known that a US military officer was 
pre-notified and waiting at the airport for the car, but that 
he clearly did not know about that particular checkpoint, it 
would be politically sensitive for the USG. 
 
4. (S) Ambassador emphasized: 
- The USG wants a full investigation of ALL relevant facts, 
so that we can be certain such an event does not recur. 
- Italian participation is essential to establishing the best 
possible record. 
- If Italy declined to participate in any part of the 
investigation, for whatever reason, this would eventually 
become known and would not be defensible to the press and the 
public.  In the worst case, it could even lead to a public 
dispute between the USG and Italy, which we had all pledged 
to avoid. 
- Therefore, he urged Letta, Ragaglini should be instructed 
not to limit his participation to such a narrow 
interpretation of the relevant events. 
 
5. (S) After much discussion, Letta phoned Ragaglini in 
Baghdad to tell him that he would be getting new instructions 
allowing him to participate also in the part of the 
investigation studying the degree of advance US 
knowledge/Italian notification of the operation.  (Note: 
Castellaneta confirmed to DCM on March 21 that Ragaglini now 
had full authority to participate in all aspects of the 
investigation).  Further, Letta agreed with the Ambassador on 
the essential points guiding the way ahead: 
-- We share the common goal of producing a report that is 
accurate, defensible and does not lead to any finger-pointing 
between our two governments. 
-- Letta added that, for Italy, it is essential that the 
final report does not put the blame for the incident on 
Calipari himself.  Ambassador agreed we should seek to avoid 
this. 
-- As the investigation draws to its conclusion, we will 
coordinate on a common strategy for presenting its results to 
the public.  Until that time, both governments will continue 
to avoid making press statements on the details on the 
events. 
 
POLITICAL FALLOUT MANAGABLE -- WITH A FEW WILD CARDS 
 
6. (S) All but the furthest left opposition figures and press 
are impressed by how well the Berlusconi government has 
handled its response to this tragedy, largely because they 
perceive the PM as standing up for Italy in contesting the 
initial statements made by the US government and successfully 
 
 
pressing the USG to agree to a joint investigation.  If both 
governments continue to show restraint and unity, we will 
take some bruises, but we can get through this without 
lasting damage to the two governments and with our bilateral 
relationship stronger than ever. 
 
7. (S) The first wild cards, about which the Italians have 
already expressed their concern, are the concurrent 
investigations by the Rome prosecutor (who does not answer in 
any way to the Italian executive or legislative branches) and 
by Iraqi authorities, who are apparently investigating 
whether the Italians paid ransom to get Sgrena,s release. 
Neither of these are likely to be concluded before Gen. 
Vangjel,s 15-6 report, but rampant leaks from both sources 
could steer the public perception in a way detrimental to our 
effort to present a full and documented result.  (On March 
21, Castellanetta told DCM that, while Italy appreciates that 
the Iraqi investigators are part of the sovereign Iraqi 
government, he would hope that the US could persuade them to 
avoid incautious press statements about the Italian actions). 
 
8. (S) The next wild card is the issue of responsibility.  In 
his first statements, Berlusconi emphasized that an 
investigation was necessary in order to determine who was 
responsible for the death.  Although he has not used this 
line in the last two weeks, there will still be a desire on 
the part of many Italians to identify (and punish) a guilty 
party.  However, if the investigation concludes (and we are 
not trying to prejudge the results) that no individual -- 
Italian or American -- can be blamed, and can back up that 
conclusion with jointly agreed facts, the issue of fixing 
responsibility will -- for all but the most anti-Berlusconi 
parties and newspapers -- die noisily but rapidly. 
 
9. (S) SISMI chief Pollari is watching more closely than 
anyone else the investigation and the political mood within 
Italy.  He knows that if the demand for "responsibility" 
(i.e., a scapegoat) turns out to be irresistible, he is more 
at risk than anyone else.  He has already been questioned by 
the Senate intelligence oversight committee, and challenged 
in the press, on the question of why he did not coordinate 
this operation with USG intelligence services.  He has put up 
a vigorous defense, arguing that Italy and the US conduct 
separate operations in Iraq according to their interests, and 
that SISMI cannot be considered to be subordinate to the CIA. 
 We strongly suspect (based in part on his comments to us 
March 18) that he has been the one spinning the press toward 
the line that the failure of communication rests with the US 
military, not SISMI.  If he feels pressured by the results of 
the joint investigation, he would not publicly point fingers 
at the US military, but would actively work the press to that 
end. 
 
QUESTIONS FOR EMBASSY BAGHDAD 
 
10. (C) Embassy Rome is deeply grateful to our military and 
diplomatic colleagues in Baghdad for their skillful efforts 
in support of the joint investigation and for keeping us well 
informed, despite the press of a hundred other issues.   In 
preparing for discussion of the rollout strategy, it would be 
helpful to have Embassy Baghdad,s assessment of the 
following issues.  (We realize these issues are within Gen. 
Vangjel,s purview, and are not trying to steer his decisions 
in any particular direction). 
-- Your best guess on when the investigation will be 
concluded? 
-- Have the Italian investigators (Ragaglini/Campregher) 
indicated whether they wish to be signatories of the final 
15-6 report?  (NOTE: Castellaneta told DCM March 21 that the 
Italians had no fixed position on who should sign the final 
report and are prepared to discuss the best options with US 
mil investigators in Baghdad). 
-- Will the final 15-6 report include both findings of fact 
and recommendations?  Will these be separable documents? 
-- Is the final report likely to be classified?  (Note: If 
part of the report is classified, not only will it not stay 
secret for long, but it will be the focus of unbounded press 
 
SIPDIS 
speculation and "cover-up" theory, and the unclassified 
version will be ignored). 
 
LOOKING AHEAD TO A JOINT PUBLIC STRATEGY 
 
11. (C) In the March 18 meeting, PM Berlusconi and U/S Letta 
repeatedly affirmed to Ambassador their determination to 
 
 
forge a common US/Italian public affairs line for the 
conclusion of the joint investigation.  With Washington,s 
concurrence, Embassy Rome is prepared to move forward on that 
discussion with the Prime Minister,s inner circle of 
advisors, and suggests USG diplomatic and military officials 
also discuss the same issue with Ragaglini and Campregher.  A 
common public line can only be finalized once we have a 
better idea of the investigation,s results.  However, we can 
seek consensus now on the following key points of procedure 
and substance. 
 
12. (C) Procedure: The USG and Italy should agree that: 
-- Once the investigation is complete (or nearly so), we will 
coordinate urgently on the common press line before either 
side releases (or leaks) any portion of it to the press. 
-- Each government will designate one agency/office as the 
lead for official reaction to the report.  For Italy, this 
will almost certainly be the Prime Minister,s office 
(Palazzo Chigi).  For the US, we need to decide whether the 
designated spokesperson should be in Baghdad, Rome or 
Washington. 
-- All other Italian and US officials will have clear 
instructions to refer questioners to the lead spokesperson 
and to the report itself.  Substantive comments should be 
limited to the core points below. 
 
13. (C) Substance (to be supplemented as report is finalized): 
-- Both governments are fully satisfied with the completeness 
of the investigation. 
-- Both governments representatives, cooperated fully in 
every aspect of the investigation. 
-- The US, Italy and the sovereign government share the 
conviction that Italy continues to make an essential 
contribution to Iraq,s stability. 
-- (IF JUSTIFIED BY REPORT): Agreement that this was a tragic 
accident that should have been avoided, but not an accident 
for which blame can be assigned. 
-- (AS APPROPRIATE): Common statement on steps both 
governments will take to ensure there is no recurrence. 
 
14. (C) Finally, perhaps most importantly: Despite best 
efforts by all parties, we must recognize that it may never 
be possible to establish objectively all the precise facts of 
what happened the night Calipari was killed.  If so, our two 
governments may end up with differeing subjective evaluations 
of who (if anyone) is to blame.  Some political actors, 
seeing how Berlusconi benefited from the perception that he 
"stood up" to the Americans, will be tempted to play up any 
such differences.  We must prepare for a scenario in which 
full agreement is not reached, and be ready to identify with 
Italy the points on which our commentary will differ, and 
manage these differences in a way that defends our point of 
view adequately and brings most Italians to closure on this 
issue.  In short, joint management of our differences will be 
even more important than managing our points of agreement. 
 
15. (C) Minimize considered. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2005ROME01024 - Classification: SECRET