US embassy cable - 05ATHENS841

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR ISP - GRAFF, STATE FOR EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, GR, AMB 
SUBJECT: GREECE: DEFENSE MINISTER ON EXPANDING COOPERATION 
ON IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: ATHENS 770 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  In a March 24 meeting to discuss his 
proposed travel to Washington, Defense Minister 
Spiliotopoulos told Ambassador that Greece could provide the 
Iraqi military with decommissioned APCs as they are replaced 
over the coming years by new German models -- and perhaps 
other military hardware sooner.  Spiliotopoulos asked for 
additional information concerning a NATO request that Greece 
provide sealift for a donation of Hungarian T-72 tanks to 
Iraq.  He agreed to look into the possibility of SEEBRIG 
taking the lead on the deployment of a Role 2 Medical 
Facility to Kabul, particularly if SEEBRIG can move faster 
than Greece, and bridge to a Greece national-flag Role 2 
facility later.  Finally, Spiliotopoulos agreed to discuss 
the U.S. suggestion that Alliance members establish a policy 
that officers assigned to IS and NATO command positions 
henceforth not be subject to national caveats.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Greek Defense Minister Spiliotopoulos asked to see 
Ambassador March 24, to continue discussions of the 
Minister,s proposed meeting in Washington with Secretary 
Rumsfeld (reftel).  Working through an embassy-provided list 
of ways to improve bilateral military relations and to 
increase Greek contributions to NATO activities in Iraq and 
elsewhere, Spiliotopoulos identified a series of steps he was 
prepared to discuss during a proposed April 28 meeting with 
SecDef. 
 
Contribution to Iraqi Military: Something Now, APCs later 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
3.  (C)  Spiliotopoulos noted that Greece was considering 
buying Marder Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) from Germany, 
but that this procurement was only at a preliminary stage. 
If the sale went through and once deliveries began, he said, 
Greece could begin sending its current stock of Russian-model 
BMP-1 APCs to Iraq.  He cautioned that this might not begin 
for two years or more. 
 
4.  (C)  In the meantime, he offered to review the NATO 
Training and Equipment Coordination Group,s (NTECG) list of 
critical needs, to see what Greece could offer from its 
existing stocks of equipment.  Ambassador offered to assist 
with coordination with NTECG, to avoid duplication of effort. 
 
Considering Moving Hungarian Tanks 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Spiliotopoulos asked for details about a suggestion 
that Greece provide sealift for other Allies, contributions 
to Iraq.  Ambassador said the most pressing need was to move 
77 Hungarian T-72 tanks.  Ambassador noted that our latest 
information is that Hungary would get the tanks to the 
Slovenian port of Koper but needed sealift to Iraq.  After a 
discussion of possible transportation routes, including via 
Turkey or Kuwait, Ambassador agreed to seek additional 
information from NATO, including preferred ports of 
embarkation and disembarkation.  Ambassador pointed out that 
all NATO needed was sealift -- other arrangements would be 
made to move the tanks to and from the ports. 
Spiliotopoulos, Diplomatic Advisor Bourlogiannis said it 
would be easier to accommodate such a request if it came from 
NATO, rather than bilaterally from the United States. 
Ambassador assured him that the request was from NATO. 
Spiliotopoulos commented that commercial sealift would be 
quicker than Greek Navy LSTs (which are slow), and emphasized 
that all of the tanks would need to be mobile; Greece did not 
have the capability to load inoperable tanks. 
 
Medical Unit to Afghanistan: Greek or SEEBRIG? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (C)  Spiliotopoulos noted that OSD/ISP Greece desk 
officer Graf raised the possibility of deploying the Role 2 
Medical Facility pledged by Greece to ISAF under the SEEBRIG 
aegis, as a demonstration of SEEBRIG,s effectiveness.  He 
explained the Greek preference to characterize the deployment 
as a national contribution, for political reasons. 
Ambassador pointed out that SEEBRIG partners might have 
mobile medical equipment on hand that would allow for 
deployment of the unit faster, citing reports that Greece 
would need to equip a team, a process that might take many 
months.  If this was the case, he asked, and if SEEBRIG could 
deploy faster, would it be possible for some Greeks to go 
first to Kabul as a part of a SEEBRIG unit and, possibly, 
assume the lead later?  Spiliotopoulos agreed to consider the 
idea. 
 
NATO Policy Against Future Caveats:  Worth Considering 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
7.  (C)  Ambassador reminded Spiliotopoulos of the U.S. 
suggestion made at the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in 
Nice to move past Alliance disagreements over Iraq and adopt 
an Alliance policy against future national caveats on 
officers assigned to NATO IS and command positions. 
Spilitopoulos said such a policy would seem logical, and 
agreed to discuss it with the Foreign Minister and others in 
the Greek government.  Diplomatic Advisor Bourlogiannis said 
Greece was unlikely to be able to influence others in the 
group of five countries with these caveats.  Ambassador 
replied that, if one of these countries supported such a 
policy, it would make it easier for others to follow suit. 
Ries