US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE789

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SOBEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NL, EUN, NATO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S APRIL 
1 VISIT TO THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
Mr. Deputy Secretary: 
 
1. (C)  My staff and I are eager to welcome you to the 
Netherlands for your first visit here as Deputy Secretary. 
Your trip reinforces the message of transatlantic cooperation 
delivered by the President and Secretary Rice, and will help 
focus the Dutch, in particular, on taking practical steps on 
the important issues.  Foreign Minister Bot has time and 
again demonstrated his keen interest in reinvigorating the 
transatlantic partnership and its institutions, including 
NATO, to face the challenges of the 21st Century.  Your 
meetings with him and with a select group of senior opinion 
makers demonstrates the value we place on Dutch leadership in 
this endeavor. 
 
2. (C)  During the Dutch presidency of the EU (June-December 
2004), Foreign Minister Bot pushed the EU to engage more 
actively in Iraq, guided the EU to set a date for accession 
negotiations with Turkey, helped stiffen the EU's spine to 
face down Russia over Ukraine, and pressed for increased 
U.S.-European cooperation in the Middle East.  On the China 
Arms Embargo, Bot began the Dutch EU presidency trying to 
convince us that a lift was inevitable, but ultimately used 
the authority of the Presidency both to prevent a lift and to 
ensure that EU committed itself to no "quantitative or 
qualitative" increases in arms sales following a lift.  Bot, 
like many Dutchmen, sees no contradiction between being a 
strong ally of the United States and a "good European;" the 
China Arms Embargo experience demonstrates his willingness to 
buck conventional European wisdom at times to ensure that 
U.S. interests are understood and taken into account.   If 
anything, his experience during the EU presidency has only 
strengthened his basic transatlantic orientation, and he 
continues to look for ways to use his unique experience 
(which includes a decade as Dutch permrep to the EU) and 
perspective to "build bridges" across the Atlantic.  This was 
the main reason for his request to meet with Secretary Rice 
in Washington prior to the President's European trip. 
 
3. (S) The Dutch also deserve credit for promoting U.S.-EU 
Counter-Terrorism cooperation during their EU presidency and 
for initiating high-level U.S.-European exchanges of 
information and intelligence.  Recent events in the 
Netherlands, including the murder of controversial filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh by a radical Dutch Islamist and subsequent 
heightening of tensions here, have sensitized the Dutch to 
the fact that Europe faces a real and present terrorist 
danger.  The recent decision to deploy special forces to 
Afghanistan in a combat role -- over the objections of the 
largest opposition party in parliament -- represents a major 
shift in the way the Dutch think about their military, and 
demonstrates the government's determination to do its part in 
the global war on terrorism. 
 
4. (S) Naturally, the Dutch and we do not see eye-to-eye on 
all issues, and you should be prepared for some tough 
questioning (in the typically Dutch blunt style) on the 
handling of enemy combatants at Guantanamo in particular at 
the roundtable.  This issue has taken on added importance 
with the deployment of Dutch special forces to Afghanistan. 
We have responded quickly to Bot's requests for expert-level 
consultations -- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Waxman 
will be here March 24 to discuss this issue -- but he is 
under intense pressure from Parliament to demonstrate that 
Dutch concerns are being taken seriously.  I expect he will 
raise this issue with you, if for no other reason than to be 
able to tell Parliament honestly that he has done so. 
 
5. (C) Bot and the Dutch leadership are still sensitive to 
criticism that they pulled the Dutch contingent out of 
Al-Muthanna too early (a judgment we believe Bot personally 
shares).  The reasons for the decision not to extend the 
Dutch deployment for a third time are complicated and 
grounded in domestic politics.  Bot led the effort within the 
cabinet to extend the troops, and has taken pains to ensure 
that government remains committed to the Iraqi effort. Iraq. 
The Dutch were among the first to offer trainers to the NATO 
training mission and have let it be known that they can do 
more -- possibly even including additional future deployments 
-- provided other allies also step up to the plate.  In your 
discussion with Bot, you may want to probe further to see how 
far the Dutch are prepared to go at this time and in the 
future, and to discuss what more the Dutch can do to leverage 
additional commitments from other European partners. 
 
6. (C) Finally, as an astute observer and participant in 
inter-European decision making, Bot can be relied on to 
provide an honest assessment on the current state of play 
within the EU on the China Arms Embargo, where the Dutch will 
be happy to join, but not lead, a stalling campaign.  Bot 
departs April 4 on a trip to Asia that will include stops in 
Japan and China, so it will also be useful to arm him with 
our latest arguments against a lift.  Bot can also provide 
useful insights into EU thinking on Turkey, where Bot, as a 
former Dutch Ambassador to Ankara, has a proprietary interest 
in getting both sides successfully to October 3, and the 
Balkans, where the Dutch remain among the most stalwart 
supporters of the ICTY and holding regional governments 
(including Croatia's) to account. 
 
 
SOBEL