US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS1231

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR, EAP/CM, PM, T, S/P 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETTC, CH, TW, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: IS THE EU RETREATING ON THE CHINA ARMS EMBARGO? 
 
REF: A. USEU TODAY 3/23/05 
     B. USEU TODAY 3/22/05 
     C. USEU TODAY 3/21/05 
     D. USEU TODAY 3/18/05 
     E. LUXEMBOURG 253 
     F. STATE 49288 
     G. EMBASSY LONDON DAILY REPORT 3/23/05 
     H. RECINOS E-MAIL 3/23/05 
     I. DEAN E-MAIL 3/23/05 
     J. ROSENBERRY E-MAIL 3/22/05 
 
Classified By: USEU Charge Michael McKinley for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU drive to lift its arms embargo on 
China appears to be faltering as a result of the March 14 
passage of the anti-secession law, increased U.S. pressure, 
and China's unwillingness to deliver concessions on human 
rights.  Our EU contacts generally confirm press reports that 
EU governments might be persuaded by these factors -- plus 
increasing opposition from domestic constituencies -- to 
postpone their decision beyond the current June deadline. 
The EU is particularly keen on finding some accommodation 
with the U.S. before moving forward, and High Rep. Solana 
plans to travel to Washington in April with a "mandate" to 
"come to terms with the Americans."  While these are positive 
signs in the wake of the anti-secession law and suggest the 
EU is finally beginning to understand the depth of our 
concerns, it is far too early to declare victory.  The EU 
machinery is still geared up for a June lift; reversing that 
momentum will not be easy.  More important, Presidents Chirac 
and Schroeder appear as committed as ever to lifting, and 
Solana, whose opinion is especially valued by smaller Member 
States, continues to argue that the time has come for lifting 
the embargo.  The UK, meanwhile, is sending ambiguous signals 
and appears satisfied to hide behind the EU flag.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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New Reasons for Hope ... 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Stories in major U.S. and European news outlets this 
week report that the EU's determination to lift its arms 
embargo on China is wavering in the face of increased U.S. 
pressure.  China's adoption of an "anti-secession" law 
designed to intimidate Taiwan is cited as another key reason 
for the EU retreat.  Our contacts in Brussels largely confirm 
these reports and acknowledge that a number of EU governments 
are having second thoughts about whether or when to lift the 
embargo.  The Irish PSC Ambassador told us March 19 that some 
delegations have begun to think twice about lifting the arms 
embargo by the end of the Luxembourg EU Presidency in June 
(ref. C).  Council Deputy DG Peter Feith told a HIRC Staffdel 
March 22 that he thought the decision "might well" be delayed 
(ref. A).  According to a Council policy advisor working on 
the embargo, the whole issue is "in flux" and EU governments 
are "holding their cards close to their chests" for fear of 
being seen as the problem by China, the U.S., or their own 
parliaments (ref. B).  The bottom line, according to the 
advisor, is that the EU will find it difficult to proceed 
without: 1) some accommodation with the U.S., 2) assurances 
that they can weather the likely reactions of their publics 
and parliaments, and 3) clear concessions from China on human 
rights.  Until then, "you have us over a barrel," the advisor 
said. 
 
3. (C) The EU has consistently argued that the U.S. simply 
did not understand either their intent with lifting the 
embargo or the effectiveness of the regime they intended to 
adopt in its place (the strengthened Code of Conduct on arms 
exports and the "Toolbox" of additional controls).  However, 
after Annalisa Giannella's widely-publicized visit to 
Washington this month (ref. F), the EU has begun to realize 
that our opposition cannot be explained away with vague 
assurances about intent or yet more technical briefings about 
the Code and Toolbox.  Recent remarks by President Bush and 
Secretary Rice, plus tough warnings from senior Congressional 
 
SIPDIS 
leaders, have driven home the message that there will be a 
serious price to pay for transatlantic relations and defense 
trade if the EU proceeds with lifting the embargo.  For the 
first time, EU governments appear to be as concerned about 
the U.S. reaction to a decision to lift the embargo as they 
are of the Chinese reaction if they do not. 
 
4. (C) There are also signs that increased public and 
parliamentary opposition is having an impact on the 
calculations of EU Member States.  The European Parliament 
has passed two near-unanimous resolutions since November 
demanding that the EU not lift the embargo, and leading MEPs 
from the far left to the far right are increasingly trying to 
raise public awareness.  By our count, all major European 
editorial boards (including international papers like the 
Financial Times, Wall Street Journal Europe, International 
Herald Tribune, and Economist) have come out in opposition to 
the EU move, and several European think tanks have taken up 
the issue and given it greater prominence in public debate 
(the next seminar in Brussels will be on April 6 at the 
Transatlantic Institute).  Prominent NGOs, led by Amnesty 
International, have held press conferences and organized 
public commentary, including by prominent Chinese dissidents, 
and we have even seen press coverage of student protests 
against lifting the embargo. 
 
5. (C) Public efforts such as these appear to have altered 
the political atmosphere surrounding the embargo and have 
left some European governments nervous about domestic fallout 
if they are seen to be overly supportive of lifting the 
embargo.  A British contact told us that the Dutch seem to 
want to avoid a decision on the embargo at least for the next 
few months in order not to jeopardize their national 
referendum on the EU Constitution, scheduled for June. 
 
6. (C) Nor has China helped the EU lift the embargo.  While 
China has always insisted there should be no linkage between 
human rights and the decision to lift the embargo, EU leaders 
have made it very clear that they expected at least token 
progress on human rights before they could justify taking a 
decision.  The EU even spelled it out for Beijing by 
suggesting that ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), release of Tiananmen 
prisoners, or reform of the Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) 
system would help facilitate an EU decision. 
 
7. (C) So far, China has done virtually nothing to give the 
EU the fig leaf it needs.  Instead, China irritated the EU by 
passing the anti-secession law and then sending FM Li to 
Europe to demand quicker progress on lifting the embargo. 
The anti-secession law, in particular, has given some 
Europeans pause, leading them to realize that US concerns 
about regional stability have greater validity than they 
previously thought.  As a result, according to WMD Rep. 
Giannella's Deputy, the Europeans now need even more progress 
on human rights from China in order to counter the perception 
that they are giving Beijing an undeserved reward.  According 
to the Council advisor, High Rep. Solana pressed this point 
in his March 17 meeting with FM Li, saying that progress on 
just one of the three human rights issues highlighted by the 
EU (ICCPR, Tiananmen prisoners, RTL) would no longer be 
enough; China now needed to make progress on all three (ref. 
D). 
 
-------------------------------- 
... But not out of the Woods Yet 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The December European Council declaration that the EU 
was working toward lifting the arms embargo by the end of the 
Luxembourg EU Presidency in June remains the only current, 
"official" EU position.  While the declaration was drafted 
vaguely enough to allow some wiggle room (EU leaders "invited 
the next Presidency to finalize the well-advanced work in 
order to allow for a decision"), the EU has seen it as a 
deadline and the Chinese as a promise.  Some EU officials 
believe backing down risks Chinese diplomatic and perhaps 
commercial consequences, and also see it as a blow to the 
EU's credibility as a global player capable of making 
autonomous decisions on important international issues. 
President Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder, and High Rep. Solana 
all remarked to the press March 23 (on the margins of a 
European Council meeting) that the EU should maintain its 
political will to lift the embargo as soon as possible.  We 
should expect intense lobbying from these and other European 
leaders, and from the Chinese, over the coming weeks. 
 
9. (C) Nor are we comfortable with where the UK is on lifting 
the arms embargo.  While some press reports are 
characterizing the UK as unlikey to support a lift during its 
EU presidency in the second half of the year (we have heard 
reports that the local UK PSC ambassador has made similar 
statements), we see other indications that give us pause. 
The UK is sending ambiguous signals that suggest a preference 
for hiding behind the EU flag.  Asked on March 22 about the 
UK's position on lifting the embargo, PM Blair's Official 
Spokesman responded that it was an EU-led issue and the UK 
wanted EU consensus.  However, he added that the UK still 
believed that a strengthened Code of Conduct could meet U.S. 
concerns (ref. G).  While FM Straw acknowledged to the press 
March 20 that the anti-secession law had created a "difficult 
political environment" around the embargo, Deputy PM John 
Prescott then told the press March 23 that he thought "the 
good sense in Europe will be that they will come to some 
agreement on this matter and lift the embargo."  Comments 
such as these indicate that we should not count on the UK to 
help us with this issue, even if it lands in their 
Presidency. (We defer to Embassy London for a more 
authoritative assessment.) 
 
10. (C) Moreover, the EU's bureaucratic machinery has been 
gearing up for a spring lift.  Work on the Code of Conduct 
and Toolbox has been all but completed by national experts in 
the COARM group.  These measures could be adopted as soon as 
the Luxembourg Presidency decides to put them on the agenda 
of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).  The calendar 
also offers plenty of opportunities for France, Germany and 
others to push for continued progress.  There will be four 
more meetings of EU Foreign Ministers before the end of June, 
including an informal "Gymnich" gathering on April 15 (the 
GAERCs will be April 25, May 23 and June 13).  Heads of 
Government will meet June 16-17, and will almost certainly 
discuss China regardless of their expectations at that point 
on the embargo.  The EU will also have a troika ministerial 
with China on May 8 to celebrate 30 years of official 
relations.  At any of these meetings the dynamic could turn 
very quickly and a June decision could again look imminent. 
Our first test will be on April 5 when the PSC convenes to 
discuss the arms embargo and to examine options for further 
engagement with the U.S. 
 
------------------------ 
Next Steps with the U.S. 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) High Rep. Solana plans to visit the Washington in 
April to follow-up on the Giannella visit.  According to 
Council Deputy DG Feith, Solana will be traveling with a 
&mandate" from Member States to "come to terms with the 
Americans" (ref. A).  There is a desire within the EU, Feith 
added, to reach agreement with the U.S. on weapons and 
technology that should not be transferred to China. 
According to the Council advisor, the EU still hopes to 
overcome at least our biggest concerns through some 
combination of strategic talks on China and consultations 
about weapons and technology.  They recognize that we will 
not support lifting the embargo no matter what they do, but 
they hope to at least reduce the risk of serious damage to 
transatlantic relations and defense trade.  "You've got us 
over a barrel on this, and we can't really move forward until 
we see what happens with the strategic dialogue and weapons 
consultations," he said. 
 
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Comment 
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12. (C) The technical discussions on April 5 will be 
important, but far more critical will be the Solana visit 
later in the month.  In our view, Solana is part of the 
problem.  He jumped on board the pro-lift train early, and 
his views have been important in influencing smaller member 
states.  He does not take our regional stability concerns 
seriously, nor give prominence to China's persisting human 
rights problems.  He was quoted yesterday saying it was 
"unfair to maintain sanctions on China so many years after 
the reason" it was imposed.  We should use Solana's visit to 
"re-educate" him on our concerns, challenge him on many of 
his assumptions, and then to discuss in detail the nature of 
a strategic dialogue that will allow us to look at China in 
the broader regional and global perspective.  If we can lock 
the EU into a process, Mission believes they will be more 
likely to delay any final decisions that run counter to our 
interests.  We can then use the time gained to keep 
ratcheting up the pressure, especially by exploiting the gap 
that currently exists between European leaders and their 
publics on this issue. 
 
McKinley 
.