US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN521

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR DAS KENNEDY, DRL/MLA, WHA/CCA, IO/SHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, CU, AM, CHR-1 
SUBJECT: CHR-61: FM OSKANIAN SUGGESTS "LIMITED OPTIONS" ON 
BELARUS 
 
REF: A. A) EUR 3/23 E-MAIL 
     B. B) STATE 49957 
     C. C) YEREVAN 449 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Per instructions in ref A, Ambassador Evans met with 
FM Vartan Oskanian March 24 to ask the GOAM to rethink its 
position on a no-action motion on Belarus at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.  Oskanian said the GOAM would 
give "serious consideration" to our request given the 
emphasis the USG was placing on the issue.  He characterized 
the situation, however, as one of "limited options."  He said 
that the issue posed a problem of "mutual solidarity as 
Belarus traditionally sides with our causes (read: 
Nagorno-Karabakh) in international fora."  Oskanian is aware 
that DAS Kennedy will likely call him today on the issue and 
pledged to raise the issue with President Robert Kocharian 
personally.  On Cuba, Oskanian indicated that the GOAM 
position had not changed.  Oskanian's advisors said that he 
had personally reviewed the draft resolution we delivered 
earlier this week and told Armenia's mission in Geneva that 
"Armenia will be with the USG" on the Cuba vote.  End Summary. 
 
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OSKANIAN SUGGESTS NOT MUCH LATITUDE ON BELARUS 
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2. (C) Per instructions in ref A, Ambassador Evans met with 
FM Vartan Oskanian March 24 to ask the GOAM to re-think its 
position on a no-action motion on Belarus at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.  Oskanian said the GOAM would 
give "serious consideration" to our request and pledged to 
raise the issue with President Robert Kocharian personally. 
He noted the particular emphasis the USG was placing on the 
issue this year.  He characterized the situation, however, as 
one of "limited options."  He said that the issue posed a 
problem of "mutual solidarity as Belarus traditionally sides 
with our causes (read:  Nagorno-Karabakh) in international 
fora." 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador made the additional point that debate 
on important issues like this should not be stifled by 
no-action motions and noted Armenia's stated opposition -- at 
least in principle -- to no-action motions in the past. 
Oskanian suggested that had Armenia been more consistent in 
staying away from no-action motions at UNCHR, the GOAM could 
at a minimum justify abstaining on the no-action motion on 
procedural grounds.  Oskanian tasked his staff to make an 
inventory of previous no-action motions and present him the 
information before taking the issue to President Kocharian. 
 
4. (C) MFA International Organizations Chief Valery Mkrtumyan 
told us following the meeting that the MFA had received 
reports that the UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Belarus was 
making "problematic" statements regarding the issue of 
national identity in Belaurs that appeared to undermine the 
integrity of his report.  He said that the GOAM's sense was 
that such language, or at least the rumors about such 
language, could strengthen Belarus's case for a no-action 
motion. 
 
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STILL WITH US ON CUBA 
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5. (C) On Cuba, Oskanian indicated that their position had 
not changed.  Oskanian's advisors said that he had personally 
reviewed the draft resolution we delivered earlier this week 
and told Armenia's mission in Geneva that "Armenia will be 
with the USG" on the Cuba vote.  MFA Senior Advisor Salpi 
Ghazarian (Amcit) told Poloff that "we heard the message" on 
Cuba.  While she would not comment on the prospect of 
co-sponsoring, she assured us that we could count on the 
GOAM's support but also suggested that USG and GOAM officials 
in Geneva continue to touch base on the issue during the 
lead-up to the voting to ensure "full information sharing" as 
things progress. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6. (C) It was clear from Oskanian's comments that, before our 
demarche, he and his staff as well as the GOAM mission in 
Geneva did not feel a sense of urgency on the Belarus issue. 
Our meeting and the promise of a call from Washington appears 
to have changed that perception.  Oskanian clearly views 
Belarus's conditional support for "Armenia's" issues 
including Nagorno-Karabakh as a serious limitation.  Engaging 
the Armenians on purely procedural grounds appears to leave 
us some room for dialogue. 
EVANS