US embassy cable - 05QUITO666

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000666 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015 
TAGS: SNAR, MOPS, MASS, PREL, EC, EARI 
SUBJECT: CNIES UPDATE:  ECUADOR DISMISSES STOCK TEXT 
 
REF: A. QUITO 491 
 
     B. QUITO 444 
     C. QUITO 257 
     D. 04 QUITO 3032 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold Chacon, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Attempting to dissipate confusion and spur 
movement on CNIES negotiations, Embassy officers called on 
Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) leaders March 22 and worked 
through the USG boilerplate line-by-line.  The FAE remains 
convinced, however, that current agreement language does not 
reflect Ecuadorian realities.  They offered to draft 
counter-text focusing more on provision of CNIES data and 
prohibitions on its use, and less on aerial interceptions, 
lethal or non-lethal.  Fearing negotiations otherwise dead, 
we recommend hearing the FAE out.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) The Embassy's Pol-Mil Officer and USAF Mission Chief 
visited FAE HQ March 22 for a meeting with Brigadier General 
and Chief of Air Operations Jorge Moreno.  Their intent was 
two-fold; to explain that Washington was averse to the FAE's 
proposed CNIES text changes, and to identify which sections 
were causing confusion and consternation among FAE leaders. 
Interrupting, Moreno claimed Ecuador considered the CNIES 
system useful, in that it showed high-level leadership -- 
both military and civilian -- how narcotraffickers 
increasingly used eastern Ecuadorian airspace.  He hoped the 
FAE could continue to receive the signal.  CNIES aerial 
tracks did not arrive in real-time, however, but rather some 
15 minutes after-the-fact.  Moreno therefore argued the data 
was of no use in aerial interdiction. 
 
3.  (C) The FAE general loved the idea of ramping up an 
Airbridge Denial-like program in Ecuador.  He would need a 
massive infusion of USG cash to do so, of course, to provide 
for A-37 refurbishment, new radar installations, and 
communications upgrades.  He was cognizant that U.S. aerial 
interception aid was not forthcoming, instead using his 
discourse to introduce his fundamental problem with the 
proposed CNIES accord.  If, he asked, our intention was to 
govern use of CNIES data, why did the agreement feature but 
one or two paragraphs on CNIES, but three pages on 
interdiction provisions?  Ecuador's moribund aircraft fleet 
precluded Peru-like lethal interceptions, he added. 
 
4.  (C) Moreno's CNIES accord would be one-fourth the length 
of ours.  A salutary paragraph, a definition of the CNIES 
systems and its capabilities, a provision or two governing 
how Ecuador could and could not utilize the aerial tracks, 
and a closing -- no more.  He offered up his staff to draft 
the counter-text, and asked for detail on the U.S. 
legislation governing (and potentially penalizing) 
interceptions conducted with "USG assistance." 
 
5.  (C) Emboffs countered by claiming that a half-dozen Latin 
American nations already had inked the agreement, as-is.  If 
the CNIES data did not assist in shoot-downs, and if the 
FAE's fleet was so decrepit as to make interceptions 
impossible, why protest the current language?  They 
emphasized that Washington was unlikely to accept wholesale 
changes to the U.S.-proposed text.  Seeing the Ecuadorians 
dug in, however, Emboffs floated another idea:  a change to 
the GoE's dipnote response, more closely hewing to Ecuadorian 
"realities."  Positively, they secured Moreno's buy-in to 
what we believe our key goal in the negotiations:  Ecuador 
agreeing it would not conduct lethal and/or ICAO 
non-compliant interceptions utilizing CNIES data or other 
USG-provided assistance. 
 
6.  (C) Concluding, Emboffs asserted they could buy Ecuador 
no more CNIES time.  If an agreement could not be reached 
shortly, the USG would flip the system switch.  Moreno again 
offered his staff's full cooperation in finding mutually 
acceptable agreement text. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  We aimed to clear confusion with our visit 
to Moreno; we believe we succeeded.  Unfortunately, we have 
reached a substantive impasse with our FAE interlocutors that 
looks unbreakable without USG flexibility on text.  We 
therefore recommend giving the  FAE counter-proposal a 
serious look, especially if it satisfies our basic CNIES 
liability concerns.  If it does not, however, we won't 
protest a system shutdown.  END COMMENT. 
CHACON