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| Identifier: | 05QUITO664 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05QUITO664 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Quito |
| Created: | 2005-03-23 21:32:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL EC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000664 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EC SUBJECT: ATTY GEN'L DEBATE UNLEASHES WILD RIDE IN CONGRESS REF: QUITO 650 1. SUMMARY: March 22 witnessed political mischief-making that far exceeded the (already high) Ecuadorian norm, with the battle for control of the Attorney General's office joining the conflict over the Supreme Court as principal catalysts. President Gutierrez and his PRE allies, cognizant that a majority of Congressional deputies (including those of erstwhile partner PRIAN) oppose the leading AG candidate, have sought to delay a legislative vote, thus allowing him to take office March 30 sans Congressional approval. A tactic favored recently, closing the legislature session due to lack of quorum, backfired mightily the morning of March 22. Minutes after Congressional President Omar Quintana issued the closure order, pro- and anti-GoE forces clashed outside the plenary, the first in a day of confrontations. Later that evening, Gutierrez employed another thinly-disguised delaying tactic, declaring March 23 and 24 national holidays (during which Congress could not meet). He rescinded the order just hours later, however. A presidential insider contacted March 23 admitted the Congressional melee had spooked the administration. Gutierrez, he claimed, must take bold steps if he wished to forestall even bolder opposition attempts to remove him. END SUMMARY. ------------------------ Court Solution Imminent? ------------------------ 2. Political temperatures actually had dropped the last seven days, partly a product of UN envoy Leandro Despouy's fact-finding mission to Ecuador (Reftel). Gutierrez had called for a March 23 dialog, inviting administration allies, opposition, media, and civil society to participate. To an audience commemorating the foundation of Ecuador's Supreme Electoral Tribunal, he evinced further flexibility on his referendum, aimed at giving Ecuador a truly independent and functional judiciary. Many Embassy contacts canvassed believed a Court compromise around the corner. ------- Not Now ------- 3, The blow-up surrounding the Attorney General election may have torpedoed nascent dialog, however. Under Ecuador's 1998 constitution, responsibility for naming the AG falls to Congress, which chooses a candidate from a three-person slate (terna) prepared by the National Judicial Council (CNJ). If Congress fails to select a winner in the 30 days following the CNJ's list presentation, the candidate topping the terna takes office automatically. The CNJ, many of whose members had been selected by the controversial Supreme Court, had proposed three jurists all linked to Gutierrez or his allies. The opposition lambasted the lineup, even claiming unconstitutionality, since the CNJ presented its candidates two days before prescribed by law. 4. In recent days, opposition parties, led by the PSC, ID, and Pachakutik, claimed they had marshaled sufficient (51) votes in Congress to reject the entire terna (although the Constitution does not mention such an act). In response, the GoE has sought to delay, or even forestall, a Congressional vote. Pro-government deputies boycotted sessions, for example, making quorum difficult to reach. Ally Quintana had even prohibited special Congressional sessions, although he couched his decision as a cost-savings measure. ------------------------------------ Leader's Tactics Infuriate Opponents ------------------------------------ 5. Congressional opposition frustration over Quintana's leadership peaked March 22 when, only minutes after deputies assembled, the legislative leader declared no quorum. Earlier, PRIAN leader Alvaro Noboa had announced his bloc would join the PSC, ID, and Pachakutik in rejection of the AG terna, arguing the CNJ should propose new, less politicized candidates. (Noboa's about-face reportedly is due to GoE authorities' efforts collect back taxes. PRIAN leaders claim not to have abandoned Gutierrez completely, however, and will continue to support him on other matters). The PRIAN's nine votes meant the opposition held nearly 60, more than enough to reject the slate. "Down with the 'coup-ism,' open the session," the legislators screamed, calling on Congressional VP Jorge Montero to assume command. 6. Meanwhile, trouble was brewing outside the plenary. Judicial workers, striking to demand the current Supreme Court's dissolution, had assembled to present Congress a solution to the crisis. Alongside, the pro-Court entity "Zero Corruption" had organized a counter-protest. Tempers flared once Quintana shuttered the session, and the groups clashed. Media report the workers' leader, Luis Munoz, suffered a puncture wound that required emergency abdominal surgery. 7. Hours later the situation worsened. Judicial workers, joined by superior court judges and ID deputies, rushed the legislative president's offices, claiming they would remain until Congress re-installed to resolve the Court and AG crises. Media reported that pro-government forces pelted them with coins and soaked them with water. Sporadic verbal and physical confrontations continued throughout the day both inside and outside Congress, eventually forcing police to launch tear gas canisters to disperse the crowds. 8. It got even stranger. In early evening, President Gutierrez issued a presidential decree making March 23 and 24 national holidays. Before skeptical media, Press Secretary Ivan Ona claimed the time off would benefit the tourist trade and (somehow) spur economic activity. Opposition leaders cried foul, calling the decision another maneuver to prevent an AG vote. Bowing to pressures from municipal leaders and the business community, the president rescinded the order three hours later (forcing the Embassy to activate its phone tree a second time, telling staff to report for work as normal March 23). ------------------------------------- Insider Acknowledges Serious Problems ------------------------------------- 9. "Chaos in Congress" topped newscasts and front pages March 23. To gauge the GoE's reaction and again press for constructive dialog, the DCM telephoned Presidential Secretary and close Embassy contact Carlos Polit. The SIPDIS previous night's brouhaha clearly troubled the presidential insider. Winning a lion's share of Polit's ire was Alvaro Noboa, whose anti-Gutierrez diatribe over the AG terna had emboldened the opposition to take more extremist positions. In contrast, at breakfast a bloc of ID deputies had approached Polit and proclaimed their desires for a negotiated solution to the judicial impasse. Polit therefore believed the time right for Gutierrez to make a bold gesture toward to opposition. He offered no details, however. Septel will report Polit actions on the Oxy dispute. ------------------------------------ Congress March 23: Back to "Normal" ------------------------------------ 10. The legislature reconvened March 23, with 55 deputies present (to ensure quorum, a number of opposition congressmen remained in the plenary room overnight, reportedly in complete darkness). Political posturing reached near-farsical levels, with deputies cloaked in makeshift masks to fight the effects of yesterday's tear-gassing. As is customary of late, there has been much debate, but no movement on substance. -------- COMMENT: -------- 11. Having seen so many "crises" during the president's 26-month tenure, we're hesitant to say the Attorney General crisis, any more than the Court conflict, represents the beginning of Gutierrez's end. Yet a full defection by Noboa's PRIAN would convert the opposition minority to majority status. And as we've seen in recent months, with 51 votes in Congress, you can do almost anything. END COMMENT. CHACON
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