US embassy cable - 05CARACAS878

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000878 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR HADLEY 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA CHARM OFFENSIVE -- MEETING WITH 
COMMUNICATION MINISTER 
 
Classified By: Amb. William R. Brownfield for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Acting on GoV instructions, Venezuelan Minister of 
Communication Andres Izarra met with the Ambassador March 23. 
Izarra suggested cooperation on journalist exchanges, an 
idea which the Ambassador found lacking for among other 
reasons, the Minister's severe public criticism of U.S. 
journalists.  The Ambassador told Izarra that both sides had 
to accept that we have areas of disagreement, adding that we 
would state our disagreements clearly and publicly.  He also 
told the Minister we would not accept limited channels of 
communication nor pay silence on core issues as a price for 
those channels.  The Izarra meeting was one more episode in 
the GoV's recent, plainly tactical, mini-charm offensive.  To 
our advantage, it and any others that may arise will be 
opportunities to highlight our willingness to discuss and 
resolve issues, while blunting possible attempts by President 
Hugo Chavez to claim we are unwilling to talk or to play down 
fundamental differences between us.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador met one-on-one for breakfast with 
Minister of Communication Andres Izarra March 23.  Izarra 
reached out and proposed the meeting a week in advance. 
Ambassador deferred on the first two proposed dates, and 
accepted the third. Izarra opened by reporting that his 
instructions were to establish a better channel of 
communication.  He suggested Ministry of Communication and 
Embassy could work jointly on some journalist exchanges 
between Venezuela and the U.S. 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador agreed that communication was 
important.  This had been his message since arriving in 
September 2004, he told Izarra.  But both sides had to accept 
that there were important areas where we had fundamental 
disagreements, and it appeared that those disagreements were 
not going to disappear.  Where we differed on issues of 
democracy, or foreign policy, or law, the Ambassador noted, 
we would state our disagreements clearly and publicly.  He 
emphasized that we would not accept channels of communication 
with the GOV if the price is silence on fundamental areas of 
importance to the GOV.  In addition, when we had military, 
law enforcement, or intelligence issues to discuss, we would 
only discuss them through military, law enforcement, or 
intelligence channels.  We would not limit all 
government-government communication to the Foreign Ministry. 
Izarra accepted this approach without comment. 
 
4.  (C) Izarra noted that in his previous conversation with 
Ambassador (nearly four months ago), we had discussed 
possibility of outreach to Venezuelan journalists and 
Ministry of Communication officials to visit the U.S.  Izarra 
was skeptical, believing that such visits might merely be 
indoctrination trips by the USG.  Nevertheless, he was ready 
to explore the idea, with understanding that we would invite 
U.S. journalists to Venezuela for reciprocal visits to poor 
Venezuelan communities where they might witness the GOV 
social missions.  Ambassador asked if Izarra was talking 
about inviting USG officials, or private journalists; he said 
journalists.  Ambassador asked if Izarra envisioned directly 
inviting U.S. journalists to Venezuela, or wanted the 
invitations to be issued by the USG; Izarra said he wanted 
them to go through the USG.  Ambassador said it seemed 
unusual to insert the USG in the middle of an invitation by 
the GOV to U.S. journalists to visit Venezuela.  We would 
consider the idea, but it did not seem like a strong 
possibility. 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador noted Izarra had been very severe in 
public on several U.S. journalists based in and accredited to 
Venezuela.  GOV could criticize journalists and their 
reporting.  If, however, they moved to restrict their access, 
control their reporting, threaten their security, or expel 
them from Venezuela, then we would have a bilateral issue 
between the two governments.  Izarra said there was no such 
intention.  Several U.S. journalists, particularly the 
correspondent of the Miami Herald, were consistently and 
erroneously critical of the GOV and its policies, Izarra 
said, and he had a duty to criticize their errors.  The 
Ministry of Communication, he said, was also changing the 
accreditation badges of foreign journalists to make it easier 
 
 
for GOV security personnel to differentiate journalists from 
Ministry employees.  Ambassador noted that a critical press 
was an essential and fundamental element of any democratic 
society, including the United States.  The GOV, he told 
Izarra, should start to worry about its democratic 
credentials when the press ceased to be critical.  The 
Ambassador also noted that it was a fair point for the USG to 
express an opinion in public and open debate. 
 
6.  (C) Izarra said that while we were debating, he might 
mention recent stories (in El Nuevo Herald) about USG 
investigations of organizations supporting the Bolivarian 
cause in the U.S.  Surely the GOV and its supporters had a 
right to express their views in the United States? 
Ambassador said there was no question of right to express 
views.  However, the U.S. was a sovereign nation, like 
Venezuela, and advocacy organizations had to obey U.S. law. 
He reminded Izarra that organizations representing a foreign 
government had to register under the FARA; organizations 
claiming tax-exempt status had to engage in activities 
consistent with that IRS status; radio stations had to hold 
valid broadcast licenses; and demonstrators on public 
property had to obtain permits.  Assuming all GoV supporters 
were operating consistently with U.S. law, the Ambassador 
said, they had nothing to worry about.  If not, then they 
were in violation of U.S. law.  Izarra assured the Ambassador 
that the Venezuela Information Office and the GoV legal 
representatives in the U.S. were in strict compliance with 
U.S. law. 
 
7.  (C) Izarra asked if Embassy planned to make public 
comment on the current discussions between Exxon-Mobil and 
the Ministry of Energy on their dispute over royalties. 
Ambassador said Exxon-Mobil had asked us not to make public 
comment, so we would not.  If, in the future, they were to 
ask us to make public comment, the Ambassador said, we 
probably would.  Izarra said this issue should be left in 
private channels.  Talking about the case publicly (COMMENT: 
The local press carried a brief story on the subject that 
morning) would complicate the negotiations. 
 
8.  (C) As breakfast concluded, Izarra noted again GOV 
concern over recent comments on a Miami television station by 
a former USG official that in GOV judgment encouraged coup 
plotting in Venezuela.  Ambassador said he had reviewed the 
transcript of the interview.  He was not a legal or 
constitutional expert, he told Izarra, but he seriously 
doubted that the language came anywhere near prohibited 
speech in the U.S.  Free speech was free speech: Sometimes 
you agreed with it, and sometimes you did not.  If the 
language was not criminal in nature, U.S. law enforcement was 
not going to restrict it.  Izarra acknowledged their U.S. 
legal representatives had reviewed the tape as well, and 
reached the same conclusion.  He noted, however, that he was 
still going to comment on it in public.  Ambassador said he 
would be delighted to say in public what he had just said to 
Izarra in private. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C) The charm offensive continues.  Ambassador handed 
Izarra several red meat comments, and the minister did not 
bite.  Our judgment is still that the GOV offensive is 
tactical in nature.  We do not want to fall into a tactical 
trap.  If, after seven months of wandering in the desert, 
they offer us meetings, we will accept.  At each encounter, 
we will emphasize the fundamental areas where we disagree, 
but express willingness to discuss and resolve issues of 
importance to the United States.  We do not want to give 
Chavez the opportunity to say that we refuse to meet with his 
government, but we do not want to allow him to say that we do 
not have fundamental differences and problems, either. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA00878 - CONFIDENTIAL