US embassy cable - 05CARACAS872

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000872 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, VE 
SUBJECT: CIVILIAN RESERVES:  DEFENDING THE REVOLUTION 
 
REF: CARACAS 00750 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has begun 
organizing civilian units to defend the country from 
potential invasions.  The GOV has not made clear the 
relationship between military reserves and civilian militias, 
but Chavez announced that Maj. Gen. Julio Quintero Viloria 
would emerge from retirement to lead the reserves.  The 
civilian units are to answer to the President.  Building up 
the reserves and adding civilian units to Venezuela's defense 
structure are works in progress dependent on the President 
himself.  Although some Chavez opponents believe the 
country's military may not be pleased with the development, 
the institution has been subjected to significant changes 
under Chavez and the old paradigms may not apply.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Venezuelan civilian militias have begun to organize 
in response to President Hugo Chavez's February 4 
announcement of the formation of popular defense units 
(UDPs).  The groups wear civilian clothing with military 
patches and drill without weapons, according to press. 
During drills, volunteers receive payment (rumored to be 
about US $25 per month) and a meal.  Rafael Cabrices, a 
civilian who fired into a crowd of demonstrators during the 
April 2002 coup, is one of the leaders of a suburban Caracas 
UDP.  Cabrices told a reporter his group of about 120 people 
was formed to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a US 
invasion. 
 
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Who's in Charge 
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3.  (C)  GOV officials have issued contradictory statements 
about how the civilian and military reserves will relate to 
each other, and who will lead each force.  The National 
Assembly's defense committee announced that the new armed 
forces organic law--to be discussed by the full assembly in 
April--would remove military reserves from Ministry of 
Defense auspices and make them answerable to Chavez and the 
state governments, according to press reports.  During his 
March 20 "Alo Presidente" broadcast, Chavez called up Maj. 
Gen. Julio Quintero Viloria, the former Armed Forces Joint 
Command chief who retired March 4, to lead the reserves and 
report directly to the President.  Although Chavez referred 
principally to military reserves, he noted that military 
reserves and popular mobilization "go together like hydrogen 
and oxygen in water."  DAO contacts described the two forces 
as separate institutions, reporting that Gen. Quintero would 
take command of the military reserves and that Chavez would 
oversee the UDPs.  National Security and Defense Council 
secretary Maj. Gen. Melvin Lopez Hidalgo described a 
 
SIPDIS 
different command structure; specifying that the military 
reserves would remain under its current leadership, and 
Quintero would assist Chavez in coordinating a "popular" 
reserve force. 
 
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Who Can Bear Arms? 
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3.  (U)  Statements from GOV officials and supporters have 
also been unclear about how such civilian militias are to be 
armed.  Discussing reserve recruitment in February, Chavez 
indicated the GOV would seek citizens with skills in armed 
combat (REFTEL).  Gen. Lopez predicted that in less than a 
year, one million people would be trained in asymmetrical 
warfare, but they would only be allowed weapons during 
training or an actual invasion.  Interior Minister Jesse 
Chacon cautioned that the UDPs would not be allowed arms, and 
any members who carried them would be prosecuted, according 
to March 17 press reports.  Cabrices argued that armed UDPs 
should be autonomous from the military so that they would be 
insulated from any military uprising.  "If the military knows 
... what weapons we have, ... they will shoot us like ducks 
in a pond," he warned. 
 
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Neighborhood Big Brother 
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4.  (C)  Chavez loyalists are also seeking to employ 
civilians to inform on potential threats to the revolution. 
According to press reports, greater Caracas mayor Juan 
Barreto promoted in early March the organization of an 
intelligence network of taxi drivers to inform on rich 
opposition members.  Ideologue for the new civilian militias 
Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Lt. Col. (retired) William 
Izarra has proposed that some members of civilian units be 
charged with intelligence collection.  The GOV may have 
already begun to form such groups; a neighborhood street 
sweeper told a US Embassy officer that he was receiving 
monthly 300,000 bolivares (over USD 150--a significant bonus 
for a manual laborer) to report on locals driving expensive 
vehicles. 
 
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Opposition Reaction 
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5.  (C)  Chavez opponents have criticized the creation of 
civilian units.  Accion Democratica president Jesus Mendez 
Quijada objected that the new doctrine encourages the 
formation of parallel armed groups.  Former Defense Minister 
Fernando Ochoa Antich lamented that Chavez's personal command 
of the new units would destroy the military's "institutional 
sense," according to press reports.  Retired general-grade 
officers told poloff March 17 that morale was waning in the 
armed forces because soldiers viewed armed civilian groups as 
undermining the military's prominence as the only institution 
charged with national defense.  One retired general wrote in 
an electronically circulated essay that the new doctrine 
would allow for greater partisan control over the political 
opposition.  Another opined that Chavez was creating a 
parallel force because he did not trust his own armed forces. 
 
 
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Comment 
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6.  (C)  Like the development of a new doctrine for the 
Venezuelan military, the beefing up of reserve forces and the 
establishment of a separate militia under President Chavez's 
control are a work in progress.  Contradictory or incomplete 
information about them will be the norm as GOV officials 
often have difficulty staying on message when it is largely 
Chavez who is masterminding the process.  It is difficult for 
us to gauge how the  expansion of militias is affecting 
military morale.  Although some officers have resented the 
promotion of officers on the basis of loyalty rather than 
competence, such bitterness is mostly limited to the 
dwindling ranks of officers politically opposed to Chavez. 
The question now is the degree to which this apparent 
usurpation of a military's principal role will be tolerated 
by an institution that has been undergoing a significant 
transformation already. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA00872 - CONFIDENTIAL