US embassy cable - 05MUSCAT492

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 03/22/2005

Identifier: 05MUSCAT492
Wikileaks: View 05MUSCAT492 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Muscat
Created: 2005-03-23 13:38:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/DSS/OSAC, 
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: AEMR, ASEC, AMGT, PTER, CASC, KHLS, MU, EAC 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 03/22/2005 
 
REF: MUSCAT 0476 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III 
Reason: 1.4(c). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core 
Emergency Action Committee March 22 to review the Embassy's 
security posture following the terrorist bombing in Qatar. 
Members noted no significant changes in the local security 
environment since the last meeting.  Accordingly, the EAC 
agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture 
and FPCON remain appropriate.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Response to the Qatar Attack 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (S/NF) On March 22, the Ambassador chaired a meeting of 
the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the 
Embassy's security posture following the March 19 terrorist 
bombing in Qatar.  The meeting opened with a review of the 
known facts regarding the VBIED attack and the current status 
of the investigation.  The EAC noted the timing of the 
incident; just days after the release of a string of internet 
messages by Saudi national Saleh al-Oufi calling for sleeper 
cells to attack Western targets in several of the GCC states, 
including Qatar and Oman specifically, and on the second 
anniversary marking the start of OIF.  The Ambassador 
indicated that an Embassy-related Public Affairs event 
scheduled for March 19th, was in fact postponed by its Omani 
organizers in light of this anniversary.  CONS remarked that 
the private American citizen response to the bombing has been 
rather muted, having received no security-related queries. 
A/RSO and RMAS affirmed that their Omani government 
counterparts continue to emphasize that they have control of 
the local security situation and are poised to respond to any 
imminent threat to American personnel or interests in Oman. 
The A/RSO will confirm with ROP contacts the need for 
increased police presence at local churches for next week's 
Easter services. 
 
---------------- 
Target Hardening 
---------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The EAC acknowledged that as the U.S. "hardens" many 
of its facilities, terrorists are forced to seek out more 
vulnerable "soft targets."  Relative to the location of the 
Qatari attack, EAC members discussed the recent award of 
Overseas School Security Phase III funding for select 
security upgrades for six non-Department sponsored schools. 
A/RSO explained to the committee that early next week, the 
Embassy Local Guards will provide training to newly-hired 
security guards from the Department-sponsored The American 
International School of Muscat (TAISM).  This standard 
training, provided to all of TAISM's guards, will cover such 
skills as surveillance detection, attack recognition, vehicle 
search techniques, and personnel screening. 
 
------------------------------ 
Reinforcing Personal Vigilance 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) The EAC agreed that this recent attack in Qatar 
underscores the fact that Embassy personnel must continue 
reinforcing to both their staffs and family members the need 
for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal security. 
A/RSO further re-emphasized the importance of immediately 
reporting all suspicious activity or security-related 
incidents, especially any possible surveillance, to Post One. 
 
-------------- 
EAC Conclusion 
-------------- 
 
5. (S/NF) Despite recent events, the EAC concluded that there 
have been no significant changes to the local security 
environment since the last meeting held on March 19 (reftel). 
 The EAC continued to characterize the local security 
situation as stable.  Accordingly, members agreed that the 
Embassy's already heightened security posture and FPCON 
(Bravo) remain appropriate.  Embassy Muscat remains acutely 
aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local 
security and threat environments, and is prepared to take the 
necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. 
ABM, DCM, P/E, CONS, A/MGT, A/RSO, RMAS, DAO, OMC (USDR), and 
ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting. 
BALTIMORE 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04