US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN517

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ARMENIAN DEFMIN ON POW'S, CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

Identifier: 05YEREVAN517
Wikileaks: View 05YEREVAN517 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Yerevan
Created: 2005-03-23 12:11:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PARM MARR AM AJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SNEC (MANN) AND EUR/CACEN 
EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, AM, AJ 
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN DEFMIN ON POW'S, CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian told the 
Ambassador that Azerbaijan was to blame for the recent 
increase in cease-fire violations on the line of contact with 
Azerbaijan.  If the International Community was now concerned 
about the effect of violations on the negotiation process, 
then Azerbaijan had achieved its goal.  Azerbaijan sought to 
encourage the negotiators to press Armenia for concessions in 
order to assuage Azerbaijan's hard-liners, Sargsian claimed. 
Sargsian said that the incidents were provoked by Azerbaijani 
forces attempting to improve their tactical position at 
points along the line; such tactical shifts were not in 
Armenia's interest, which would be best served by maintaining 
the status quo.  Sargsian confirmed that Armenia continued to 
hold prisoner three Azerbaijani soldiers who had wandered 
across the line of contact in February.  The three would be 
returned, but the delay in handing them over was intended as 
a response to Azerbaijan's delay in returning Armenian 
prisoners in January.  End Summary. 
 
Delay in POW returns is tit-for-tat 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a March 21 meeting with Sargsian, the Ambassador 
pressed Armenia to move forward with the release of three 
Azerbaijani soldiers captured along the line of contact on 
February 15.  Sargsian confirmed that he had been in contact 
with OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk and that Armenia would 
return the prisoners, but he did not agree to a specific 
date.  He said that for the past three years, Armenia had 
"without condition" returned captured Azerbaijani soldiers 
promptly, but this practice was not reciprocal.  Sargsian was 
bitter about Azerbaijan's long delay in returning three 
Armenian soldiers.  He said that Azerbaijan had held the 
soldiers for two months and 20 days; it was 15 days before 
the GOAJ even admitted to holding the soldiers, although the 
GOAM had solid intellligence that the GOAJ knew about the 
capture right away.  Sarsian said Azerbaijan added insult to 
injury by returning the prisoners on January 28, Armenia's 
Army Day. 
 
Cease-Fire Violations 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the recent 
increase in cease-fire violations in N-K and expressed 
concern that they could adversely affect the productive 
course of negotiations supported by the Minsk Group 
co-chairs.  Sargsian said that "if the International 
Community has the view that there is an increased likelihood 
of a resumption of hostilities and if this view will affect 
how you approach negotiations, then Azerbaijan has achieved 
its purpose in instigating these cease-fire violations." 
Sargsian said Azerbaijan had two goals as it continues to 
provoke cease-fire violations.  First, he explained, was a 
message to the Minsk Group.  Negotiators are intended to draw 
the conclusion that unless talks produce a prompt result 
which is favorable to Azerbaijan, a resumption of open 
hostilities could be imminent.  Second, Azerbaijan sought to 
improve its tactical position and several places along the 
Line of Contact.  When Azerbaijani movements make Armenian 
positions vulnerable, Armenian troops must engage, Sargsian 
insisted. 
 
4.  (C) Sargsian said that the current tactical situation was 
similar to that of 2001.  At that time, he continued, Armenia 
had asked Minsk Group co-chairs to use their satellite 
surveillance capability to demonstrate which side was 
responsible for troop movements and cease-fire violations; he 
repeated that request to the Ambassador.  "Calm and the 
status quo are in Armenia's interest," said Sargsian, "we do 
not seek a conflict." 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador said that that cease-fire violations 
were not in anyone's interest and urged Armenia to show 
restraint.  Sargsian expressed serious concern about what he 
viewed as new level of bellicose Azerbaijani rhetoric, 
including on the part of President Aliyev. 
EVANS 

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