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| Identifier: | 05YEREVAN517 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05YEREVAN517 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Yerevan |
| Created: | 2005-03-23 12:11:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PARM MARR AM AJ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000517 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SNEC (MANN) AND EUR/CACEN EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015 TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, AM, AJ SUBJECT: ARMENIAN DEFMIN ON POW'S, CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b), (d) Summary ------- 1. (C) Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian told the Ambassador that Azerbaijan was to blame for the recent increase in cease-fire violations on the line of contact with Azerbaijan. If the International Community was now concerned about the effect of violations on the negotiation process, then Azerbaijan had achieved its goal. Azerbaijan sought to encourage the negotiators to press Armenia for concessions in order to assuage Azerbaijan's hard-liners, Sargsian claimed. Sargsian said that the incidents were provoked by Azerbaijani forces attempting to improve their tactical position at points along the line; such tactical shifts were not in Armenia's interest, which would be best served by maintaining the status quo. Sargsian confirmed that Armenia continued to hold prisoner three Azerbaijani soldiers who had wandered across the line of contact in February. The three would be returned, but the delay in handing them over was intended as a response to Azerbaijan's delay in returning Armenian prisoners in January. End Summary. Delay in POW returns is tit-for-tat ----------------------------------- 2. (C) In a March 21 meeting with Sargsian, the Ambassador pressed Armenia to move forward with the release of three Azerbaijani soldiers captured along the line of contact on February 15. Sargsian confirmed that he had been in contact with OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk and that Armenia would return the prisoners, but he did not agree to a specific date. He said that for the past three years, Armenia had "without condition" returned captured Azerbaijani soldiers promptly, but this practice was not reciprocal. Sargsian was bitter about Azerbaijan's long delay in returning three Armenian soldiers. He said that Azerbaijan had held the soldiers for two months and 20 days; it was 15 days before the GOAJ even admitted to holding the soldiers, although the GOAM had solid intellligence that the GOAJ knew about the capture right away. Sarsian said Azerbaijan added insult to injury by returning the prisoners on January 28, Armenia's Army Day. Cease-Fire Violations --------------------- 3. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the recent increase in cease-fire violations in N-K and expressed concern that they could adversely affect the productive course of negotiations supported by the Minsk Group co-chairs. Sargsian said that "if the International Community has the view that there is an increased likelihood of a resumption of hostilities and if this view will affect how you approach negotiations, then Azerbaijan has achieved its purpose in instigating these cease-fire violations." Sargsian said Azerbaijan had two goals as it continues to provoke cease-fire violations. First, he explained, was a message to the Minsk Group. Negotiators are intended to draw the conclusion that unless talks produce a prompt result which is favorable to Azerbaijan, a resumption of open hostilities could be imminent. Second, Azerbaijan sought to improve its tactical position and several places along the Line of Contact. When Azerbaijani movements make Armenian positions vulnerable, Armenian troops must engage, Sargsian insisted. 4. (C) Sargsian said that the current tactical situation was similar to that of 2001. At that time, he continued, Armenia had asked Minsk Group co-chairs to use their satellite surveillance capability to demonstrate which side was responsible for troop movements and cease-fire violations; he repeated that request to the Ambassador. "Calm and the status quo are in Armenia's interest," said Sargsian, "we do not seek a conflict." 5. (C) The Ambassador said that that cease-fire violations were not in anyone's interest and urged Armenia to show restraint. Sargsian expressed serious concern about what he viewed as new level of bellicose Azerbaijani rhetoric, including on the part of President Aliyev. EVANS
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