US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK2088

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, PRM, EAP/BCLTV. GENEVA FOR RMA. HQ 
USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PTER, PGOV, TH, BM, BURMA, Refugee 
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH THAI NSC SECRETARY 
GENERAL WINAI 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason:  1.4 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Thai National Security Council Secretary 
General Winai told the Ambassador on March 21 that after two 
postponements of the original August 2004 deadline for the 
move of the urban Burmese to the border camps, there would be 
no further extensions of the current deadline of March 31. 
Only a small percentage of the urban Burmese have registered 
so far for the camp transfer.  The Ambassador emphasized U.S. 
concern about the camp move and expressed hope that there 
would be no general crackdown on urban Burmese who did not 
register, and particularly no refoulement of urban Burmese 
refugees.  Winai said the RTG was not planning any crackdown 
or searches for urban Burmese but Thai immigration law would 
be applied to those who were detained by Thai authorities. 
The Ambassador noted U.S. interest in further discussions 
with the RTG on refugee resettlement from the Burma border 
camps and the planned April visit of PRM DAS Ryan in which 
this issue could be explored further.  Winai welcomed the 
news of Ryan's visit and said the RTG was open to 
resettlement from the camps.  Winai also described the 
evolution in the RTG's assessment of the violence in southern 
Thailand.  The RTG had not initially understood the situation 
and that real sensitivities and grievances existed which 
needed addressing.  The RTG believed the strategy of those 
behind the violence was to separate the people from the 
government and internationalize the issue.  The latter and 
the possibility that the southern situation would become a 
religious conflict were what the RTG feared most.  At the 
conclusion of the meeting, Winai told the Ambassador that he 
did not expect to remain long in his position.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On March 21, Ambassador called on General Winai 
Phattiyakul, Thai National Security Council Secretary 
General, and raised refugee issues and the situation in 
southern Thailand. 
 
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Urban Burmese Refugee Issue 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) General Winai began the discussion by expressing Thai 
gratitude for the U.S. resettlement programs for the Hmong 
and urban Burmese.  Winai noted that both groups were in a 
difficult situation and had few opportunities in Thailand. 
The urban Burmese in particular faced an uncertain future. 
It was unclear whether there would be positive political 
developments in Burma that would allow them to return there. 
Winai said that some in the group were driven by political 
principles and were involved in political activities.  Others 
were engaged in criminal activities.  Thailand had to exert 
some control over them.  The Ambassador replied that the 
Hmong resettlement program had been delayed by a disease 
outbreak that would delay the completion of the program for 
several months.  He asked General Winai to explain the 
background of the urban Burmese situation and the current 
plan to move them to the border camps. 
 
4. (C) Winai recounted that political demonstrations in 
mid-2003 by urban Burmese outside the Burmese Embassy in 
Bangkok, which criticized Thai and Burmese government 
policies had led Prime Minister Thaksin to direct that the 
urban Burmese be moved to the border camps by August 2004 and 
not engage in political activities.  Winai added that the 
Prime Minister had also accused UNHCR at the time of 
conducting refugee status interviews for this group without 
informing the Thai government.  (Comment.  UNHCR had in fact 
regularly kept the Thai Foreign Ministry appraised of its 
refugee interview activities.  End comment.)  The Thai 
government had decided also that the urban Burmese could 
choose resettlement to third countries.  UNHCR had not 
contested the Thai government position.  Winai continued that 
the United States had then stepped in and offered to resettle 
the urban Burmese.  As August 2004 approached, the United 
States and UNHCR had asked for an extension of the deadline 
for the border camp move.  The RTG had agreed to this and 
also to a subsequent request to postpone the deadline to the 
end of March 2005.  Over this period the number of urban 
Burmese whom UNHCR said had refugee status had increased from 
about 1,800 to about 4,400.  Resettlement countries had taken 
so far about 2,000 of the 4,400. 
 
5. (C) Winai said that there could not be further extensions 
of the March 31 deadline.  He added that there was space for 
1,800 persons in three of the refugee camps near the 
Thai-Burma border.  To ensure there was enough room in the 
camps, the urban Burmese could be staged into the camps 
according to their position in the resettlement pipeline. 
That is, those who had been refused by resettlement countries 
should be moved first and those who had appealed a negative 
decision by a resettlement country could be moved next. 
Those who already had a date for departure to a third country 
should be the last to move to the camps.  Winai noted that 
only a small number of urban Burmese in Bangkok had 
registered so far for the camp transfer.  The number in Mae 
Sot was about 400.  UNHCR had told the urban Burmese that 
they would lose their right to resettlement if they did not 
report for the transfer.  Resettlement countries would be 
able to continue processing of the urban Burmese after they 
went to the camps. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that there was serious 
concern among NGOs and in the U.S. Congress about the planned 
move.  He added that some of the refugees had worries about 
camp conditions.  Others might have medical or security 
problems if they moved to the camps.  The Ambassador said 
that the U.S. hoped that there would not be a strong RTG 
reaction against those urban Burmese who did not register for 
the camp transfer.  In particular the United States opposed 
any refoulement of refugees. 
 
7. (C) Winai responded that, &frankly,8 the RTG was not 
planning a general crackdown or large-scale searches for the 
urban Burmese after the March 31 deadline passed.  However, 
the urban Burmese would be subject to Thai immigration law 
after March 31.  He added that the Thai government had not 
formally deported refugees to the Burmese authorities, but 
acknowledged that some were taken to the Burma border and 
released there, whereupon they typically returned to Thailand. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Burma Refugee Camp Resettlement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. was interested in 
resettlement of refugees from the Burma border camps.  As a 
start, the U.S. wanted to look at the Tham Hin refugee camp. 
Resettlement from that site could begin towards the end of 
this year.  He noted that PRM DAS Kelly Ryan would be 
visiting Thailand April 20-22 and would have more to say on 
this issue. 
 
9. (C) Winai responded that he looked forward to Ryan's 
visit.  He said that the situation in Tham Hin was not good 
and the refugees there had little opportunity to develop 
themselves.  Many had been in the camps for 20 years.  The 
best alternative would be if they had an opportunity to 
return to Burma.  Winai described how a recent Thai military 
delegation to Rangoon had raised this issue and Burmese 
leader Maung Aye had said that the Burmese government, in a 
policy shift, was now willing to issue passports to Burmese 
workers who returned to Burma from Thailand so they in turn 
could come back to Thailand under the Thai migrant worker 
registration program.  Winai said this statement by Maung Aye 
would have to be pursued further to determine if it 
represented a real change.  Maung Aye had also said Rangoon 
was willing to accept back to Burma those who had left 
because they were fleeing fighting.  However, Rangoon was not 
willing to permit those Burmese who rebelled against the 
government to return.  Winai said that it was not clear what 
distinction there was between the second and third groups. 
 
10. (C) Winai said that when he first took the position of 
NSC Secretary General, there had been concern in the RTG that 
any resettlement program from the border camps would be a 
pull factor and draw more Burmese into Thailand.  Now, 
however, there was little fighting in eastern Burma and so 
concerns in this area had lessened.  The RTG, including the 
Prime Minister, was agreeable to resettlement from the border 
camps.  Winai said it was important now also for the camp 
refugees to have greater educational and vocational training 
opportunities.  This would give them skills that they could 
use if they were able to return to Burma.  If, on the other 
hand, they stayed in Thailand and became Thai, they could 
make a contribution to Thai society. 
 
-------------------------- 
Situation in the South 
-------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Winai said that the RTG's views about the situation 
in southern Thailand had changed over the past two years. 
Initially, the RTG had thought that the perpetrators of the 
violence were bandits, criminals involved in illegal 
activities, or influential local persons who had differences 
with Thai officials.  The RTG also believed that some in the 
South, particularly the younger generation, still had notions 
of separatism, but did not have the means to put such ideas 
into action.  Later, the RTG realized the situation was more 
complex and that some Southerners felt that Thai society and 
Thai officials did not treat them justly.  These feelings 
were genuine, different from the feelings of other Thai. 
Southerners were very sensitive on this point.  The RTG also 
discovered that the Ministry of Education had little 
knowledge about the teachers and curriculum in the Muslim 
schools in the South.  It learned that many Thai students 
were going to schools in Indonesia.  The Indonesian 
government had asked for the Thai government's assistance in 
tracking the movements of these students. 
 
12. (C) Winai said those behind the southern violence wanted 
to separate the people from the government, draw foreign 
attention to the situation, and internationalize the issue. 
The RTG feared most that the situation would become a 
religious conflict and become internationalized.  Winai noted 
that it was not yet clear what role the newly formed National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed by former Prime 
Minister Anand Panyarachun would play.  He thought it would 
try to identify legitimate grievances and what could be done 
to address them. 
 
13. (C) The Ambassador said that as a friend of Thailand, he 
was concerned about the situation in the South.  He 
understood the issue of the sensitivity of Muslim feelings 
based on his experience in Indonesia.  The Ambassador said 
there seemed to be disagreement on whether the disbanding 
several years earlier by Prime Minister Thaksin of the 
long-standing commission of military, police, officials and 
southern civilians that had addressed general problems in the 
region was a mistake and contributed to the current 
instability.  Winai responded that he felt the old commission 
had played a useful role.  However, the Prime Minister at the 
time had been told that law enforcement officials could 
handle the situation and that the number of persons with guns 
in the South totaled no more than 50.  In addition, the three 
southern provinces were a part of Thailand and should not 
necessarily be treated or governed differently from the rest 
of the country.  Winai added that the problems in the South 
had ebbed and flowed for about 100 years. 
 
14. (C) Winai said that the new RTG approach would be to 
accept that there were cultural differences with the South. 
These differences should be looked at as an asset. 
Southerners would also have full religious freedom.  However, 
there would be no special autonomy.  The RTG was now giving 
Southerners special preferences in the test for entering the 
police force since they would otherwise not pass.  Many of 
the 1,900 new police hired for the South would be from the 
region.  The Ministry of Education would also take a much 
more active role in improving the curriculum in the Islamic 
schools.  The schools currently did not teach regular 
subjects and this made it difficult for graduates to obtain 
jobs.  Winai stated that senior southern religious leaders 
had recently met with the RTG and said that they wanted a 
return to normalcy.  They asked the RTG to improve security 
in the South and said that most southerners wanted peace. 
 
15. (C) In an aside to the Ambassador at the conclusion of 
the meeting, General Winai said that he did not expect to 
remain long in his current position.  He hoped to return to 
the military and retire from there. 
 
16. (C) Comment.  Winai's comment that there are no plans for 
a general crackdown on urban Burmese after the March 31 
deadline is positive, but Embassy will watch this issue 
carefully.  UNHCR and the RTG are now working feverishly to 
put in place the necessary logistical arrangements for the 
camp transfer.  While some arrangements have been made 
already, whether they will be sufficient will likely depend 
on how many of the urban Burmese sign up for the camp move 
and the pace of the movements. 
BOYCE