US embassy cable - 05ALMATY1059

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM FINANCE: UPDATE NO. 2

Identifier: 05ALMATY1059
Wikileaks: View 05ALMATY1059 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: US Office Almaty
Created: 2005-03-23 05:20:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PARM KTFN KZ ECONOMIC Counterterrorism
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS ALMATY 001059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE), EB/ESC/TFS (DAVID NELSON), S/CT 
(TODD KUSHNER), IO/PSC (JOLEEN SCHWEITZER), EB/EPPD (CAROL 
THOMPSON) 
 
TREASURY FOR JUAN ZARATE 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS OFAC FOR ROBERT WERNER 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM, KTFN, KZ, ECONOMIC, Counterterrorism 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM FINANCE: UPDATE NO. 2 
 
REF: A) State 32688  B) 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism 
 
1. (SBU) Post submits the following in response to Ref A 
request, para. 10. 
 
2. (SBU) A. Amount of assets frozen, forfeited, or seized (in 
U.S. dollars) by host governments pursuant to UNSCR Resolutions 
1267 and 1373, the legal authority under which the action was 
taken (legislative, judicial, administrative, regulatory); and 
what additional domestic actions have been taken against the 
designated parties. 
 
In October 2002, the National Bank issued orders to freeze the 
assets belonging to an individual identified on the Executive 
Order 13224 terrorist asset-freeze list who had held shares in 
a local bank. (Ref B)  The shares were valued at approximately 
$63,000. 
 
3. (SBU) B. What impediments exist for more robust cooperation 
with your host government or co-sponsoring designations? 
 
The main impediments to more robust cooperation with Kazakhstan 
are the need for a more complete legislative framework and the 
need for the GOK to improve its own interagency processes. 
 
4. (SBU) C. Is your host government willing to accept USG 
training and technical assistance, including an assessment of 
training needs?  In your view, what are your host government's 
priority training and technical assistance needs with regard to 
the development and/or enhancement of their anti-terrorist 
financing regimes in general and their sanctions program in 
particular? 
 
The GOK regularly accepts USG training and technical 
assistance. During meetings among Director Robert Mueller, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Legat, and Chairman Dutbayev 
of the Committee for National Security (KNB) in Washington, DC 
in October 2003, the KNB requested FBI assistance/training in 
Terrorism Financing matters. In April 2004, the FBI provided 
INL-funded training to investigators from the KNB, the 
Prosecutor General's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and 
the Financial Police.  As a result of this training, it was 
clear that Kazakhstani law enforcement authorities needed to 
develop an understanding of how to use developing laws and a 
means of coordinating with financial institutions. 
 
INL did a training assessment in January 2004 which resulted in 
the above-mentioned terrorist financing course and a series of 
INL-funded money laundering courses.  The latter have included 
students from the KNB, the lead agency for anti-terrorism 
financing.  INL continues to work with the GOK on the passage 
of an anti-money laundering law (expected this year) and has 
been invited back to help with financial institution compliance 
training and in the establishment of a financial intelligence 
unit (FIU). The FIU will be a major tool in the tracking of all 
kinds of money laundering. 
 
5. (SBU) D. How would you rank your host country in terms of 
risk that it will be used as a site either for significant fund 
raising or for significant banking services for terrorists 
("high," "medium," or "low")?  "Significant" means raising or 
banking tens of thousands of dollars.  Please provide a brief 
justification for your opinion, including references to intel 
or other reporting, as appropriate. 
 
Post assesses the risk of fund raising in Kazakhstan as low, 
given the lack of sympathy among the vast majority of the 
population for extremist views.  The risk of banking services 
is medium to high, given that Kazakhstan is rapidly becoming an 
important financial services center for Central Asia.  The GOK 
estimates that more than $1 billion is year is laundered out of 
Kazakhstan; while we presume that the majority is related to 
tax evasion and organized crime, it is probable that some is 
related to terrorist groups.  The GOK did not, however, report 
any money laundering by terrorist groups last year among the 
497 money laundering cases it prosecuted.  Cash smuggling into 
Russia and Europe is also prevalent; a Federal Reserve group 
here last year estimated the amount could be as high as several 
hundred million dollars each year. 
 
Ordway 
 
 
NNNN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04