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| Identifier: | 05MUSCAT480 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05MUSCAT480 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Muscat |
| Created: | 2005-03-22 12:38:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EPET EIND MU IR Economic Affairs |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000480 SIPDIS STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARPI USDOC FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/AMESA/OME/MTALAAT DOE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015 TAGS: EPET, EIND, MU, IR, Economic Affairs SUBJECT: OMAN "SHELL"-SHOCKED BY GAS SHORTFALL, TURNS TO IRAN REF: KUWAIT 1089 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Recent conversations with senior technical advisors at the Ministry of Oil and Gas have revealed strong evidence that Oman's natural gas reserves are significantly smaller than previously reported. Oman is signing agreements to import large quantities of gas from Iran in order to satisfy booming demand from gas-based industries in Sohar and elsewhere in the Sultanate. Meanwhile, Shell is being forced to de-book large quantities of proven gas reserves in Oman, continuing its recent string of disappointments for the Omani government. End Summary. -------------------- Sohar: Just hot air? -------------------- 2. (C) Following routine newspaper reports of Oman's signing an MOU with Iran to import gas beginning in 2008, Econoff made discreet inquiries with Ministry of Oil and Gas (MOG) officials to ascertain the reasons why a net gas exporter would be seeking gas imports. The direct and unambiguous answer is that Oman's sprint toward gas-based industrialization in Sohar, combined with increasing exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Asia and Europe, have completely outpaced gas development in the Sultanate. Khalifa al-Hinai, Technical Advisor to the Minister of Oil and Gas and Chairman of the Board of Oman Gas Company, summed it up by saying "we're running out of gas; too many industries are knocking at our door." Projects underway or envisioned for Sohar include an aluminum smelter, a second oil refinery, a large petrochemical plant, a polypropylene plant, a methanol factory, a fertilizer plant, three power plants (one with a desalination facility), and a steel factory. All of these industries hope to capitalize on cheap electricity and/or guaranteed long-term supplies of natural gas at favorable rates. --------------- Turning to Iran --------------- 3. (C) According to al-Hinai, discussions with Iran began about four years ago. Hinai and several others were sent on missions to Tehran to explore the possibilities of bringing gas from Iranian fields into the Sultanate. As talks deepened, MOG Under Secretary Nasser al-Jashmi and officials from the Oman Oil Company (a 100 percent government-owned investment company responsible for many of the major projects in Oman) held talks with their Iranian counterparts. On March 15, an agreement was signed between Oman and Iran whereby Oman would import 30 million cubic meters of Iranian gas daily, beginning in 2008. The amount would then increase to 70 million cubic meters per day, although no further details were released. While Omani newspapers reported that an MOU had been signed between the countries, a senior expatriate MOG advisor told Econoff that the actual signing consisted of agreeing on the minutes of recent discussions between the sides. Furthermore, the advisor confided that the gas under discussion will come from still-unexplored fields in Iran. 4. (C) One sticking point is the absence of pipelines to bring the gas across the Strait of Hormuz and into Oman. Such a pipeline would involve construction at over 4000 meters of depth underneath the Gulf of Oman, an extremely costly proposition that would make maintenance and repairs treacherous. Moreover, it is unclear whether Oman or Iran would undertake the necessary investment, and whether it would be a government or private sector initiative. The newspaper reports indicated that a specialized company would be hired to study and identify the nearest maritime pipeline link between the countries. ------------------------ Shell continues to crack ------------------------ 5. (C) Shell's woes continue unabated in Oman, as the company is now being compelled to de-book over 5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas from Oman's proven reserves, which represents over 17 percent of Oman's total proven reserves (29 tcf at the end of 2004). MOG officials are complaining about their inability to conduct effective planning in the face of Shell's erratic system for booking reserves. ------- Comment ------- 6. (C) The government has been very clear that gas-based industrialization is a cornerstone of Oman's diversification plans. The underlying assumption has always been that Oman possessed sufficient quantities of natural gas to satisfy the growing demand; but this assumption is now in serious question. Coming on the heels of similar reports from Kuwait of cross-border gas deals with Iran (reftel), Oman's attempt to secure its own pact with Tehran indicates a formal recognition of this vulnerability. Combined with Oman's participation in the Dolphin energy project that eventually will bring Qatari gas to the UAE and Oman, the Sultanate is being pragmatic in the face of its own gas deficiencies. The wild card in all of this is Shell, which continues to lose credibility due to chronically overbooked hydrocarbon reserves. The Omanis stand to lose much face, as they prematurely extended Shell's lease in Oman for another 40 years on January 1 despite grave misgivings within the industry about Shell's performance. BALTIMORE
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