US embassy cable - 05ROME976

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000976 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, IT, EUN 
SUBJECT: SYRIA/LEBANON: ITALY STILL PLANS TO HOST FM 
SHARA'A IN ROME 
 
REF: A. STATE 44087 
 
     B. ROME 878 
 
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The Italian MFA has given serious 
consideration to our request that Italy postpone the April 6 
visit of Syrian FM Shara'a but, barring major changes on the 
ground in Lebanon, still plans to go through with the visit. 
Rome continues to view engagement as the best way to deal 
with Damascus, and views Italy as the US' most forceful ally 
in delivering a tough message.  End summary. 
 
"It's in our DNA" 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) DCM, Pol MC and Poloff met with Riccardo Sessa, the DG 
for the Mediterranean and Middle East, and Luca Ferrari, 
Office Director for the Eastern Mediterranean, on March 21 in 
follow-up to our March 14 demarche (Ref B) asking Italy to 
postpone Syrian FM Shara'a's planned April 6 visit to Rome, 
at least until Syria announces a firm timetable for full 
withdrawal from Lebanon.  Sessa said that Italy, as always, 
is taking our request very seriously because of its close 
relationship with the United States and Italy's special 
interest in the region.  He said that the MFA agrees in 
general terms with our assessment of the situation in 
Lebanon, but disagrees about postponing FM Shara'a's April 6 
visit, explaining that "it's in (Italy's) DNA" to maintain an 
open dialogue with "rogue states" even if Rome is skeptical 
about the immediate results of engagement.  Sessa underscored 
that he had discussed our demarche directly with FM Fini and 
Secretary General Vattani and both had "blessed" the view 
 
SIPDIS 
that the Shara'a visit should not be postponed. 
 
3. (C) Sessa likened Syrian President Asad to Qaddafi, 
arguing that Bashar "gets it" and is reacting to the strong 
pressure of the international community.  By closing the door 
to dialogue, he argued, the US deprives itself of the 
opportunity to have a reliable partner like Italy deliver a 
tough message to Damascus.  Furthermore, Ferrari noted, 
closing the door in Italy would only open another one 
somewhere else, such as Greece or Spain, where the US has a 
much less reliable ally and one whose voice would not 
resonate as widely. (Note: Ferrari said Athens, though not 
confirmed, probably will be on Shara'a's European itinerary, 
as well as the Holy See.  End note.) 
 
4. (C) Both Sessa and Ferrari argued that Italy has been the 
most aggressive EU member state when it comes to dealing with 
rogue states.  They cited several examples of Italy's 
toughness on Syria and its commitment to the US position, 
including Fini's tough message to Shara'a during his January 
visit to Damascus, Italy's statement -- the strongest in the 
EU -- after the Harari bombing, Italy's modification of its 
position on Hezbollah at last week's EU Clearing House 
meeting (Ref B).  Fini's March 8 statement on Lebanon 
differed from other EU states' in its explicit reference to 
the other requirement of UNSC 1559, the disarmament of 
militias.  The focus, our contacts argued, should not be on 
whether or not to meet with the Syrians, but on what to say. 
 
It's the Syrians, not the Italians 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) DCM pushed back, saying that the US is fully confident 
of Italy's commitment and ability to deliver a tough message. 
 The issue under discussion was not Italy's intentions, bur 
rather Syria's.  Unfortunately, going forward with the 
meeting runs the very likely risk that Syria will use it to 
further its own goals and stall for time, citing European 
support.  Syria, he said, is only moving because of 
international pressure, not because Damascus suddenly has 
seen the light.  Transatlantic cohesion is what has caused 
Syria to begin to move.  At a minimum, he argued, Italy 
should postpone the visit until Syria agrees to a fixed 
timetable for withdrawal. 
 
6. (C) Ferrari countered that the April 6 meeting could be 
viewed from an opposite angle, as the last chance to send the 
Syrians a tough message before the Lebanese and Syrian 
military committees meet on April 7 to set a timeframe for 
 
 
Syrian withdrawal.  Ferrari argued that the Syrians are 
already moving toward withdrawal, and that international 
pressure is at the bottom of the list of explanations, 
following fears of an internal Sunni-Maronite uprising, Arab 
pressure, and the "Saddamization" of Syria that would give 
the US an excuse to intervene militarily. 
 
Agreeing to Disagree 
-------------------- 
 
7. (C) Sessa mused that the best outcome might be if Shara'a 
himself asked to postpone the visit so that he could 
participate in the April 7 military committee meetings.  DCM 
said that if this happened, Italy needed to think ahead about 
how it would react to different outcomes.  If the Lebanese 
and Syrians decided on April 7 that a full withdrawal would 
be completed in two weeks, before Lebanon's elections, that 
would be one thing; but what if they agreed on a 12-month 
timetable?  Would Italy then still go forward with a Shara'a 
visit?  Sessa concluded the meeting stating that, for the 
moment, Italy does not intend to postpone the visit. 
However, he suggested that we revisit the issue again next 
week to see if there are any changes in the Syrian position 
that would merit a postponement. 
 
Prime Minister's Office Takes a Different Approach 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8. (C) DCM raised the Shara'a visit in the course of a 
separate meeting later on March 21 with PM Berlusconi's top 
diplomatic advisor, Giovanni Castellaneta.  Castellaneta said 
that he had raised the issue in a March 18 telcon with NSA 
Hadley and that he shared our view on the need to pressure 
the Syrians.  He opined that Bashar might even appreciate a 
postponement as he tries to distance himself from the "old 
guard" that Shara'a represents.  Castellaneta promised to 
discuss the issue directly with FM Fini on March 22. 
 
9. (C) Comment.  Sessa was eager to demonstrate to us that 
the MFA is taking our concerns about Syria seriously. 
However, the Italians' desire to accommodate us on this issue 
is at odds with their own (self-inflated?) image as the most 
effective EU player in the Middle East and, more 
significantly, their conviction that they can play a useful 
role when it comes to Syria and that dialogue is the way to 
go.  Given that their message has been "blessed" from the top 
of the MFA, it probably will take an equally strong hand from 
our side or from PM Berlusconi's office -- or a misstep by 
the Syrians -- to persuade them to change their mind.  End 
comment. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME00976 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL