US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT1159

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KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP: GOK TO USE TRAINING AS PART OF ITS CT STRATEGY

Identifier: 05KUWAIT1159
Wikileaks: View 05KUWAIT1159 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2005-03-21 14:13:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PTER PREL PGOV EFIN ASEC MARR CVIS KU TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI AND S/CT; NSC FOR TOWNSEND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, EFIN, ASEC, MARR, CVIS, KU, TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP:  GOK TO USE 
TRAINING AS PART OF ITS CT STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1071 
     B. KUWAIT 1069 
     C. KUWAIT 730 
     D. 04 KUWAIT 4559 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  The Ambassador chaired on March 14 the 
monthly meeting of post's Counterterrorism Working Group 
(CWG).  Participants reviewed pending anti-terror 
legislation, developments in stemming terror financing, and 
identified criteria by which to assess GOK counterterrorism 
measures.  The group noted intensified GOK efforts to improve 
technology used to track wanted individuals, enhance training 
for security service personnel, and identify possible 
militants within the military and public sector.  (Post's CWG 
is composed of the Ambassador, DCM, and section heads from 
RSO, POL, ECON, CONS, RMAS, OMC-K, and DIALO.)  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Pol Chief provided an update on counterterrorism 
legislation currently being discussed by the Council of 
Ministers or before the National Assembly.  The GOK wants to 
strengthen existing laws, especially those addressing "jihad" 
and arms possession.  Experts are seeking to define jihad in 
a way so that those who extol it cannot claim freedom of 
expression if charged with a crime.  Likewise, legislators 
want to legally distinguish between those who seek/offer 
weapons training for sport in contrast to training in order 
to perpetrate terror acts.  The GOK is also taking steps in 
support of international efforts to combat terrorism.  The 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism is expected to be ratified this legislative 
session and the GOK recently confirmed it submitted the 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings to the 
UN in April 2004 (ref B).  Although the GOK often refers to 
its obligations under the GCC anti-terror pact, post has not 
yet located a copy of the agreement. 
 
3.  (C)  Econ Chief reported on an FBI/IRS team in Kuwait 
from 12-16 March to present a training course for personnel 
from Kuwait State Security (KSS), the Central Bank, and 
Ministry of the Interior (MOI).  The seminar, entitled 
"Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering Program," was 
funded by the Department of State to provide training to 
countries most vulnerable to terrorist financing.  It 
reinforced Kuwaiti institutions' ability to detect, disrupt 
and dismantle terrorist financing networks.  He also noted 
that current money laundering legislation addressed the 
source of the funds, not their use, making it difficult for 
the GOK to take action against terror financiers.  The 
Ambassador mentioned that he raised the need for the GOK to 
begin tracking cash exported from Kuwait funds with Shaykh 
Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah, President of the National Security 
Bureau, who did not fully appreciate the extent of the 
problem (ref A).  Econ Chief further suggested that Kuwait 
would benefit from consultations with the IMF on the fund's 
efforts to combat international terror financing. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  RMAS reported that security forces had located 
most members of known terror cells.  Financier Mohsen 
Al-Fadhli remains at large and is believed to be in Kuwait. 
There is no information on the whereabouts of Khaled 
Al-Dosari.  The GOK is also investigating reports that 
detained Imam and Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs 
employee Hamid Al-Ali recruits and sends Kuwait youth for 
jihad. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  OMC-K Chief said that the Kuwaiti military 
leadership asked the British Military Mission (BMM) to 
recommend options on how to better organize in order to 
support the MOI in internal security operations.  To that 
end, BG Jim Baxter, the BMM Chief, has delivered a 
recommendation to the Deputy Chief of Staff, MG Ahmed 
Al-Khaled Al-Sabah that builds upon the Commando Brigade as a 
response force.  Additionally, the Commandos are sending 
20-30 Commandos to Jordan for training (NFI).  Separately, 
and on its own initiative, the BMM is seeking to develop a 
training and advisory niche or position within the Kuwaiti 
governmental structure that would allow it to train and 
advise the three primary Kuwaiti security forces:  MOI, 
Ministry of Defense, and the Kuwaiti National Guard with a 
focus on internal security.   The GOK is also taking a closer 
look at the make-up of the military, locating AWOL personnel, 
identifying non-Kuwaitis with the intent of moving them out 
of the security forces (there are and estimated 4,000 Saudis, 
for example, within the larger security forces of Kuwait), 
and screening out those with extremist ideologies.  He 
further informed OMC-K Chief that MG Khaled Al-Jarrah 
Al-Sabah, the Kuwait Armed Forces (KAF) J2, said he had been 
tasked by the Minister of Defense to screen the KAF and also 
given authority to remove those found to have extremist 
positions or allegiances.  The MG added that the Army Chief 
of Staff lost his veto on personnel decisions regarding 
possible extremists in the ranks.  RSO echoed a revived 
Kuwaiti interest in training opportunities offered by the 
U.S. or private sector sources.  The GOK also has long-term 
plans to establish a training center. 
 
6.  (S)  The Working Group also discussed benchmarks by which 
to measure Kuwaiti progress on CT activities.  Among the 
areas to be monitored are: 
 
Law Enforcement and Judicial Action -- monitoring the GOK's 
ability to locate and detain wanted insurgents, adoption of 
CT laws and international conventions, and sentencing of 
convicted terrorists and their supporters. 
 
Financial Controls -- monitoring GOK oversight of charitable 
organizations, implementation of money-laundering laws, and 
prosecution of those accused of terror financing. 
 
Coordination and Sharing of Intelligence -- monitoring the 
speed and accuracy of information shared with the U.S. and 
others, as well as coordination among GOK entities. 
 
Public Awareness -- tracking GOK efforts to educate the 
public on domestic threats and reforming educational and 
information material that espouse violence. 
LEBARON 

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