US embassy cable - 05CARACAS828

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, US, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN FONMIN CALLS FOR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield for reason 
1.4 (b) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez 
called to meet March 17 with Ambassador Brownfield. 
Rodriguez' ostensible purpose was to finally meet the 
Ambassador four months after becoming FonMin.  Real reason 
probably was to support Chavez' "charm offensive" towards the 
USG.  The Ambassador told Rodriguez that the GOV's negative 
approach towards the USG would increasingly affect bilateral 
relations.  Rodriguez said the GOV wanted good bilateral 
relations, stressing Venezuela's reliability as an oil 
supplier.  In a sharp change from previous policy, the FonMin 
said he would meet regularly and frequently with the 
Ambassador. He asked about possible meetings with USG 
officials when he goes to the OAS April 7 SecGen election, 
and also asked about a possible meeting between the USG and 
GOV energy ministers.  The meeting reflects a tactical rather 
than strategic change by Chavez, to which we should respond 
tactically as well. End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)   The Ambassador, DCM, and Foreign Minister 
Rodriguez met March 17 at Rodriguez' request at 9:45 p.m. the 
night before.  Rodriguez' ostensible purpose was to finally 
meet the Ambassador; what really drove the request appears to 
be Chavez' "charm offensive" of this week. The Ambassador 
kicked off the meeting by describing how the USG had signaled 
the GOV after the August 2004 referendum, and how the USG had 
concluded that the GOV did not want a more positive 
relationship.  The result was that there would be 
increasingly public expressions of USG views on bilateral and 
democracy issues. 
 
3. (C) Rodriguez responded that in his February trip to the 
US, he had met with former SecState Shultz.  Shultz had 
advised him to distinguish between "problems of principle," 
and "practical problems," and to not turn the latter into the 
former.  He said he had taken this advice to heart as FonMin. 
The Ambassador replied that there were very important areas 
in which the two governments disagreed, and the consequences 
would increasingly be part of the bilateral picture, and they 
would be public.  There were, however, areas that both 
governments might agree to address:  oil, counternarcotics, 
counterterrorism.  On oil, Rodriguez reiterated his line that 
Venezuela was and always would be a reliable provider of oil, 
unless things got much much worse.  The Ambassador raised 
ExxonMobil's dispute with Rodriguez; after a lengthy defense 
of the GOV's decision to raise the royalty rate, Rodriguez 
suggested that a practical solution for both sides would be 
to assemble a package of ventures ExxonMobil was interested 
in participating in.  On CN, the Ambassador told the FonMin 
there had been a recent negative development (withdrawal of 
National Guard from DEA vetted unit and removal of unit 
equipment); Rodriguez took notes and said he would 
investigate (comment:  this problem appears to be a function 
of the National Guard commander rather than a result of 
bilateral problems.) 
 
4.  (C)  Rodriguez raised the possibility of a meeting 
between Secretary of Energy Bodman and Minister Ramirez.  He 
and the Ambassador agreed to discuss what items might be 
discussed at such a meeting, without committing to a meeting. 
 
5.  (C)  Rodriguez also mentioned he would be in Washington 
April 7 for the OAS SecGen election; he expressed interest in 
possible bilateral meetings around this date.  The Ambassador 
said he would consult with Washington. 
 
6.  (C)  On visits, the Ambassador expressed regret that Sen. 
Coleman had had to make alternative plans given the inability 
of the GOV to commit in principle to a meeting with President 
Chavez.  Rodriguez said that Ambassador Alvarez_ had already 
told him this this morning; he said that the  GOV had always 
come through with presidential meetings for US congressmen; 
the Ambassador said that was true, but the last time around 
we had not received the go ahead until two hours before the 
meeting took place. (Embassy note:  This required cutting 
short Codel's previously scheduled meeting with 
 
opposition/civil society leaders.) 
 
7.  (C)  The Ambassador noted that he had a good working 
relationship with Vice FonMin MaryPili Hernandez.  In a sharp 
change from the previous GOV approach, Rodriguez said that he 
was willing to meet as regularly and as frequently with the 
Ambassador as the Ambassador wanted. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  Ali Rodriguez has a reputation as both a 
committed leftist (a former guerrilla in the 60s) and as a 
pragmatist.  The timing of the meeting, however, was driven 
by Chavez' decision this week to back off on his accusations 
against the US and to engage in a calculated thaw in 
bilateral relations.  On Tuesday, the Communications Minister 
reached out to Ambassador; on Wednesday, the FM summoned him 
to a meeting; on Thursday Chavez said he wants good relations 
with the U.S.; and on Friday MFA issued a press communique on 
FM's meeting with Ambassador.  These decisions, in turn, may 
reflect a decision by Chavez -- perhaps pushed by the 
Brazilian and other governments -- to back off wild 
accusations against the USG.  At the same time, Chavez' 
decision may also serve the GOV as a sort of "see, we tried 
to engage the USG" argument for the future.  This is a 
tactical change by Chavez, not a strategic one; still, there 
may be some room to exploit it. 
 
Brownfield 
 
 
NNNN 
      2005CARACA00828 - CONFIDENTIAL